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Philosophy in Urban Studies presented May 3, 1983. 
Title: External Dependence and National Urban Development Policy: 
A Structural Analysis of Graduate Unemployment in Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE DISSERTATION COMMITTEE: 
This study examines the attempts by the government of Kenya to 
develop and implement policies directed toward the problem of urban 
unemployment. Specifically, it focuses upon two policy areas directly 
related to urban unemployment: education and economic growth. An 
additional element of this study is to examine the possible consequences 
of Kenya's external dependency upon the linkages among education, 
economic growth, and employment opportunities. 
Throughout the 1960's, the main problem in the educational 
i i 
sector of developing societies as perceived by planners, politicians, 
and theorists, related primarily to the challenge of producing numbers 
of educated people to promote a rapid localization of jobs and to sus-
tain the high rate of economic growth which were believed necessary for 
development. The policy prescriptions involved a dramatic quantitative 
expansion of school enrollments. This was understandable and inevitable 
in view of the dramatic manpower shortages which existed at the time of 
independence. 
In recent years, however, these efforts at expanding educational 
opportunities for the people of Kenya have resulted in widespread 
unemployment of school graduates. The dynamic rate of economic growth 
and a forceful campaign of Kenyanization have not been successful in 
creating sufficient employment to meet the growing numbers of Kenyan 
students who believe themselves qualified for gainful employment. The 
problem is particularly significant in the city of Nairobi, where the 
African population is increasing through births and migration by over 
10% per year. In contrast, the tiny increase in employment is scarcely 
noticed. 
In an attempt to resolve the problem of unemployment among grad-
uates, governmental policies in Kenya were directed toward improving 
various components of the school system, such as examination content 
and procedures, curriculum, and vocational and technical education. 
Policymakers believed that the mismatch between education and employment 
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was the cause of graduates lacking marketable skills to secure the 
needed employment. However, the impact of these educational strat-
agies in solving the unemployment problem has been extremely limited. 
Thus, any attempt to trace the causes of graduate unemployment 
in Kenya rapidly leads to an analysis of the entire socio-economic 
structure and touches on almost every element of development strata-
gies. A major factor is Kenya's dependency on external economic 
forces, which influence and constrain its actions by controlling the 
amount of resources available to it and the distribution of political 
power. The evidence presented in this study points to the continued 
vulnerability and limitations of the Kenyan economy imposed by its 
periphery role ",lithin the world economic system. 
While changes in curriculum and in the examination system may 
be expected to bring educational benefits, it is unrealistic to sup-
pose that such changes alone will improve the employment prospects of 
graduates in the labor market. The results of this study suggest 
that the roots of the unemployment problem are in the structure of 
society, and particularly in the failure of the Kenyan economy to 
industrialize and modernize at a rate that absorbs the labor force. 
These economic problems are traced to Kenya's continued dependency on 
external economic assistance, which reduces its ability to determine 
the course of national development independently. This economic prob-
lem is of such a magnitude that it can only be solved by structural 
adjustments, both internally and externally. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate those socio-
economic, historical, and political factors which best explain the 
sources of graduate unemployment in Kenya. In the academic research, 
education and economic growth are generally agreed upon to be central 
components of national development, particularly as they relate to 
the expansion of employment opportunities. However, current thinking 
on national development does not agree as to the interrelationships 
between these variables and, as a result, there is a divergence of 
opinion concerning the type of developmental approaches which should 
be taken to resolve the unemployment problem. This study is an 
attempt to empirically verify the historical roots of the prevailing 
social problem of graduate unemployment and Kenya's attempt to address 
it. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the problem, it is 
necessary to examine the socio-economic evolution of Kenya in very 
broad outline form, starting from the early colonial intrusion of 
the country. This is justified because the present economic, social, 
and institutional (educational) structure of the country has character-
istics whose origins date from different key formative periods: (a) 
the incorporation of Kenya into the international economy through the 
process of colonialism (1846-1963); (b) the shaping of Kenya's social 
relations as the country's links with the international economy 
changed in the context of decolonization (1950-63); and (c) the 
performance of the post-independence Kenyan economy as shaped by 
internal and external interplay. These externally-manipulated 
historical changes led to some structural economic changes and 
much institutional continuity in the post-independence period. 
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The central task of this study, is, therefore, to determine to what 
extent dependency conditions the relationship between the educational 
system and the economy and distorts manpower planning in Kenya. 
THE PROBLEM 
Kenya, unlike many African countries, has enjoyed a relatively 
high rate of growth (well over 6% per annum between 1964-70) and is 
regarded as a model of economic development for other African states. 
However, a closer examination of the Kenyan economy reveals many 
sources of potential conflict which have not been addressed by 
policies which emphasize economic growth. Central to the urban unem-
ployment problem is the potential conflict arising out of a rapidly 
growing number of school leavers* on the one hand, and on the other, 
the limited opportunities for a sufficient level of employment for 
this segment of the labor force. In the first few years after inde-
pendence, the problem was confined to the primary school leavers. 
* In the context of Africa, the tenn "school leaver" refers to three 
categories of students: those who complete a certain level of edu-
cation (primary or secondary) but are unable to continue due to a 
lack of school opportunities; those who drop out for any reason; and 
those who graduate. 
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But since the early 1970's, secondary and technical school graduates 
and increasing numbers of university graduates have been experiencing 
difficulties in securing employment. The school certificate is no 
more a guarantee of economic success for the majority of Kenyan stu-
dents. 
What are the factors that condition the paradox of a developing 
country such as Kenya which clearly needs more educated manpower, but 
is unable to use it when it becomes readily available? Is education 
at fault? Has it expanded too rapidly? Has it produced the wrong 
kind of manpower? Or does the fault lie e1sewhere--perhaps in the 
economy, or in economic development policies and plans? This study 
attempts to untangle the complexity of the problem by raising some 
important questions, taking into account the social, economic, and 
political predicament in which the nation of Kenya finds itself. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
For the past three decades, Western development theorists have 
been enthusiastic about the contribution of education to economic 
development and employment opportunities in developing nations. Stu-
dents of socio-economic development emphasize education as an 
agent of sociocultural change that develops human capital, influences 
the formation of elites, and modernizes attitudes and behavior in the 
general population (GR4; GR67). Economists and governmental officials 
have also emphasized that education can produce the knowledge and 
skills required for economic development (GR45; GR54; GR61; GR139). 
Based on this assessment, many developing countries have concentrated 
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on expanding the educational system from primary school through 
the university. For example, primary school enrollments in Ghana 
almost tripled between 1960 and 1970. In Gambia and Botswana, enroll-
ments more than doubled between 1960 and 1970. In Kenya. Zambia, and 
Sierra-Leone, enrollments nearly doubled during that same period 
(GR37: 20-21). This development suggests not only a general rise 
in the level of literacy. but also substantial increases in access to 
educational opportunities for Africans. 
In recent years, however, serious questions have been raised 
which challenge some of the traditional assumptions about the effects 
of education on economic growth and social mobility (GR29; for US, see 
GR19 and GR71). The efforts to rapidly expand educational opportuni-
ties have not been without problems. Despite the heavy investment in 
education, unemployment of school 1eavers has become a matter of grow-
ing concern--even political discontent--in many cases, as these 
developing countries do not have sufficient employment for school 
graduates (GR1; GR52; GR59). Even in the early 1960's, Archibo1d 
Callaway found that unemployment among primary school 1eavers in 
Nigeria had reached serious proportions (GR26). A more recent report 
found that in Western Nigeria, 41% of the primary school 1eavers were 
without employment nine months after leaving school (GR43). In 
Kenya, a 1968 tracer Project indicated that of a total of 1,186 
secondary school 1eavers, 175 (14%) remained unemployed in their first 
year after school. The remaining 1eavers were distributed as follows: 
513 (45%) undertook further education, 394 (33%) were employed. and 
the remaining 86 (7%) were untraced (GR88). In the 1975 Certificate 
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of Primary Education examination (ePE), of 220,000 candidates, 
approximately 150,000 (68%) failed to gain admission to secondary 
schools. Of these, some found work; others jOined the ranks of the 
unemployed. This growing problem suggests that the further rapid 
expansion of formal education beyond the literacy level without con-
structive efforts to create meaningful employment opportunities is 
likely to generate political as well as educational unrest. 
The unemployment situation among school leavers has worsened 
in Kenya since 1968, for two reasons. First, there is a paucity of 
secondary school openings for those who want to continue further in 
their education, even though the demand for education has increased. 
Secondly, despite an impressive rate of growth in the GNP (6% per 
annum between 1960-70), employment in the modern sector of the economy 
has not been growing in a direction that would absorb the thousands 
of school leavers. The policy measures which should be adopted to 
resolve this developmental dilemma are the subjects of heated and some-
times bitter arguments. 
Two contrasting approaches are frequently discussed in the litera-
ture to analyze the development and underdevelopment of Third World 
nations. The first is embraced by the "diffusion model ," which sug-
gests that the development of areas such as Africa will come about 
only through closer association with the developed countries of the 
West in a much more comprehensive technological, even ideological, 
sense. The second explanation, incorporated into the "dependency 
model ," views foreign penetration into the political and economic 
structure of the Third World as a conditioning factor and implies 
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that development can occur only if both internal structures and 
Third World relations with other nations undergo a complete change. 
The purpose of this critical literature review is twofold: 
(1) to outline the various explanations offered by these two approaches 
regarding the relationship between education, economic growth and 
employment; and (2) to examine the extent to which the dependency 
relationship has influenced the structuring of post-independence 
Kenyan society and the degree to which it conditions manpower planning. 
The Diffusionist Perspective and the National Development Experience 
in Africa 
During the 1950's and early 1960's, one of the major doctrines 
of the development literature was that successful economic development 
in Third World countries could be realized only through substantial 
capital accumulation and rapid industrial growth (GR4; GR136). Rapid 
growth, it was argued, is the surest means of increasing tne standard 
of 1ivinq for most, if not all, members of society. 
In addition to emphasis placed on economic growth as the key 
process in development, social scientists paid particular attention 
to the spread of the social, cultural, and political patterns of 
modernity established by the developed countries of the West, such as 
education, political parties, and urbanization (GR4; GR67). It 
was suggested that rapid growth in all of these areas would inevitably 
transform Third World nations into modern states. Based on these 
assumptions, social scientists looked to identify the proper "inputs of 
modernity," which, if installed in Third World countries, would ensure 
the progressive "stages" necessary for "take-off" (GR136). This 
view constituted the basis on which Kenya's development strategies 
have been created. 
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In order to help Third World nations such as Kenya improve their 
economic performance, flows of foreign aid and investment were 
channelled to them from the West. This policy was further reinforced 
-.. 
by bilateral and multilateral aie agencies such as the World Bank 
and the United Nations, which set growth targets and devised perform-
ance indicators on the basis of which assistance was allocated (GR34). 
In many instances, growth rates did accelerate, and the tempo of 
expansion was much faster than once thought possible. For example, 
the Kenyan economy experienced a relatively rapid rate of growth of 
real monetary GDP--well over 6% per annum for 19~4-70 (KG7. 1971). 
As a result of this trend, the average 5% growth target of the First 
United Nations Development Decade (1960-70) was achieved quite 
readily, and accordingly, the target was raised to 6% for the Second 
Development Decade (1970-80). As this study will demonstrate, an 
inevitable consequence of the emphasis on growth has been the mush-
rooming of urban centers resulting from an accelerated influx of both 
educated and uneducated workers in search of scarce urban jobs. 
Unfortunately, optimistic predictions regarding the ability of the 
modern industrial sector to absorb these migrants have not been real-
ized. In actuality, the failure of the modern urban industries to 
generate a significant number of employment opportunities is one of 
the most obvious failures of the development process over the past 
two decades. 
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The realization that growth does not necessarily mean develop-
ment has led to a re-examination of the development process itself 
in at least two important respects. First, the traditional argument 
that rapid growth is a necessary condition for higher standards of 
living for the masses has been retrospectively criticized on the 
grounds that growing inequality now is too high a price to pay for 
a future higher aggregate output. Proponents of this view urge that 
the goals of development planning or policymaking be redefined to 
include reduced inequality as well as increased output; if necessary, 
some growth should be sacrificed to achieve a better distribution of 
available output (GR2; GR2l; GR33; GR69). The re-examination process 
has also obviated the logic that without growth, there will be little 
to redistribute, now or later; many planners and academicians have 
begun to ask whether there aren't better ways to grow. This, in turn, 
has given new impetus to a fundamental debate over the sources of 
development or underdevelopment and the extent to which inequality is 
a necessary concomitant of growth. 
Education and Development: The Human Capital Approach 
A prominent feature of deliberate progress in modernization is an 
emphasis on formal education. Students of socio-economic development 
emphasize education as an agent of change that develops human capital, 
influences the formation of elites, and modernizes attitudes and be-
havior in the general population (GR1; GR4; GR67). Economists and 
government officials have emphasized that education can produce the 
knowledge and skills required for economic development (GR18; GRGR20; 
GR61; GR139). Thus, a consistent theme contained in the human 
capital literature is that accelerated development depends upon 
enlargement of the supply of educated manpower which, in turn, 
depends on a broadening of access to a formal educational system. 
This logic seems straightforward. Developing nations such 
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as Kenya were deficient in their supply of skilled manpower at the 
time of independence. Without such manpower, which it was assumed 
could be created only through the formal educational system, develop-
ment leadership in both the public and private sectors would be 
woefully lacking, and economic growth would be retarded. Rapid 
quantitative expansion of enrollments, therefore, appeared justified 
in light of the substantial manpower scarcities of the early 1960·5. 
As a result, Kenya and other developing countries have concentrated 
their attention on the rapid quantitative expansion of the educational 
system from primary school through the university. 
The role of education in the development process has been 
clearly articulated by economist, Theodore Schultz (GR139) and is 
incorporated in what is known as the human capital theory, an off-
spring of the diffusion theory. The emphasis of this theory is on 
the development of knowledge, skills, and capacities to improve the 
rate of societal economic progress. The task of translating this 
theory into application in underdeveloped countries was strongly 
influenced by the work of economists such as Mark Blaug (GR18), 
Frederick Harbison and Charley Meyers (GR61), and Mary Jean Bowman 
(GR20). The human capital theory suggests that: 
The nations of the Third World were poor not because 
of international economic relations, but because of 
internal characteristics, most notably, their lack of 
human capital. As with the poor within the advanced 
countries, nothing in the situation of the Third 
World countries called for radical structural change; 
development was possible if only they would improve 




The proponents of this school of thought argued that the rapid 
recovery of Western Europe with American capital through the Marshall 
Plan could be largely attributed to the existence of a ready pool of 
qualified manpower. Hence, less developed countries, lacking in the 
"knowledge and superior technique of production," should be provided 
with aid and technical assistance to increase the quality of their 
human capital, which would result in their achieving self-sustaining 
growth (GR80: 15). Development, in this sense, means an educated 
society and an educated labor force. Subsequently, international 
organizations (World Bank, ILO, UNESCO) and foundations (Ford Founda-
tion, Rockefeller Foundation) responded to this perceived need by 
channeling their funds into educational and training programs in 
underdeve10ped countries. As Kinyanjui succinctly put it, 
What American capital had done in Western Europe was 
expected to happen in underdeveloped countries if they 
invested more in the development of their human re-
sources and more foreign capital was channelled into 
these countries. 
(GR86: 7) 
In their well known study, Education, Manpower, and Economic 
Growth (GR6l), Harbison and Meyers stressed the point that the appraisal 
of human capital is a logical starting point for analysis of growth 
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and modernization in underdeveloped countries. They argued that 
education, in addition to being a form of consumption, is also an 
individually and socially productive investment which contributes to 
economic growth. According to Harbison: 
Human resources constitute the ultimate basis for the 
wealth of nations. Capital and natural resources are 
passive factors of production; human beings are the 
active agents who accumulate capital, exploit natural 
resources, build social, economic and political organi-
zations, and carry forward national developments. 
Clearly, a country which is unable to develop the skills 
and knowledge of its people and to utilize them effec-
tively in the national economy will be unable to 
develop anything else. 
(GR6l: 3) 
This approach to development was echoed in African countries in 
the years immediately after independence and, to a large extent, 
accounts for the rapid expansion of higher education in the 1960's 
(GR56; GR72). The result of such expansion has been ever-burgeoning 
educational budgets in most developing countries. It is estimated 
that, on the average, 16% of the national budgets of developing coun-
tries are now being spent on education. Between 1960 and 1970, the 
annual growth rate in educational expenditure was 13% in Asia, 16% 
in Africa, and 20% in Latin America (GR26: 14). Many countries, in-
cluding Kenya, allocate as high as 30% of their government's 
expenditure for education (GR37: 21). 
The influence of the human capital approach on the study of 
education and development in Kenya is clearly evident from an 
examination of various documents (both official and unofficial) that 
have been published since independence. The predominant themes of 
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these documents are: (1) that education must foster a sense of 
nationhood and promote national unity; and (2) that education must 
provide the skills and knowledge required for national development. 
These views are expressed in the Kenya Education Commission Report 
of 1964 (better known as the Omindi Report), the 1970-74 Development 
Plan, and the Report on the Educational Goals and Objectives of 1976. 
The result of this policy has been the tremendous quantitative expan-
sion of the educational system from primary school through the university. 
As a result, the educational budget now consumes nearly 30% of the to-
tal governmental expenditure (KG6, 1980). Thus, money and resources 
were channelled into tremendous expansion of a system still largely 
cast in a colonial mold. Fundamental changes of structure, curricu-
lum, examination, and, indeed, the whole style and approach of the 
educational system were postponed. 
In recent years, however, the idea that conventional educational 
expansion beyond literacy is an unmitigated social good and an engine 
for development has been fundamentally challenged. In the present 
context, the most crucial challenge is taking the form of growing 
open unemployment in urban areas. Although the evidence is fragmentary, 
the following examples provide indications of the problem. In the 
late 1960's, the rates of urban unemployment in the 15-24 age group 
reached tremendously high percentages: 40.4% in Guyana, 39.3% in 
Algeria, 39% in Jamaica and Sri Lanka, 21% in Malaysia, and 22% in 
Ghana (GR15l: 48-50). This trend suggests that the further rapid 
expansion of formal education beyond the literacy level without con-
structive efforts to create meaningful employment opportunities is 
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likely to generate political as well as educational unrest. 
Since gaining independence, Kenya has experienced economic 
growth largely continued on the lines set by the earlier colonial 
structure. Such continuity in policy has had two related conse-
quences. On the one hand, this growth has resulted in a rapid rate 
of real monetary GOP, well over 6% per annum for 1964-70 (KG7, 1971). 
Kenya's greatest advantage has been in the manufacturing sector, 
which, for example, accounted for 13% of GOP in 1979 (KG6, 1980). 
On the other hand, the so-called "Kenyan miracle" of the 1960's has 
not resulted in a similar expansion of employment opportunities to 
absorb the thousands of unemployed Kenyans, including school leavers. 
Instead, there have been serious inequalities of income among regions 
and social groups. These sharp inequalities inevitably create strong 
ambitions to migrate to the cities, to strive for higher education, 
to search for jobs. These structural characteristics, from the main 
thrust of development, constitute the basic weakness of the economy 
and militate against the effective development of the country. 
Originally, the goal of the educational policy in postcolonial 
Kenya was the production of skilled manpower. However, \'Ihen faced 
with the problem of unemployment of school leavers whose aspirations 
are oriented to urban jobs and an urban way of life, the human capi-
tal theorists have been critical of education for being dysfunctional 
in the sense of inculcating wrong values. To correct this perceived 
developmental problem, the task of the educational system was reoriented, 
not only to produce skills and knowledge required for high-level man-
power, but also to indoctrinate school leavers to settle down in the 
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rural countryside as subsistance farmers and self-employed arti-
sans. The vocational and nonformal education programs introduced in 
Kenya since the early 1970's are intended to achieve this goal. But, 
as discussed in Chapter IV, many of these educational reforms solved 
an immediate political problem by offering a new outlet for the 
economic aspirations in Kenya. The impact of these educational 
strategies on the employment prospects of school leavers has been 
severely limited by the restricted market for technical and vocational 
skills in the country. 
A Critique of Diffusion and Human Capital Theories 
Many of the early claims made on behalf of the unfettered quan-
titative expansion of educational opportunities--that it would accel-
erate economic growth; that it would raise levels of living, especially 
for the poor; that it would generate widespread and equal employ-
ment opportunities for all--have been shown to be greatly exaggerated 
and, in many instances, simply false (GR19; GR29; GR71). The most 
devastating challenge has been the glaring poverty of Third World 
countries despite three decades of developmental efforts. The failures 
of foreign aid and Western technology to transform these countries, 
the growing disparities between the rich and the poor, the relative 
poverty of Third World nations in the international community, and the 
rising unemployment of the educated in these countries demonstrate 
clearly the analytical weakness of the diffusion and human capital 
approaches. These theoretical formulations neglected the structure 
and patterns of economic growth and their distributional implications. 
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They failed to properly identify the actual beneficiaries of 
economic development. 
By far the most crucial weakness of the diffusionist model 
is its inability to address itself to structural problems of under-
development. The theoretical framework contributes very little to 
constructing explanations of change based on factors residing outside 
the national boundaries of Third World nations. The problems 
associated with imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism in the 
emergence of Third World countries are not given the attention 
they deserve. A somewhat more complex analysis is required--one which 
stresses many other factors of both an economic and a noneconomic 
nature. 
Alternative Explanations: Dependency and "Revised Dependency" 
Dependency theory has gradually emerged as a major alternative 
to the prevailing paradigm of the 1960's. The primary focus of depen-
dency analysis is on the problem of foreign penetration into the 
political economies of Third World nations (GR53; GR138; GR148). The 
basic hypothesis of the Dependency Theory is that development and 
underdevelopment are partial, interdependent structures of one global 
system. Dos Santos, for example, conceptualizes dependence as a con-
ditioning situation which determines the range of options open to 
po1icymakers: 
By dependence we mean a si, tuati on in whi ch the economy 
of certain countries is conditioned by the development 
and expansion of another economy to which the former is 
sUbjected. The relationship of interdependence assumes 
the form of dependence where some countries (the dom-
inant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining; while 
other countries (the dependent ones) can do this 
as a reflection of that expansion, which can have 




The conditioning process referred to by Dos Santos has its 
origin in the expansion of capitalism into the underdeveloped world 
over the last several centuries. The most significant consequence 
of the Western impact upon Third World societies was the fusion of 
market and social structures through the establishment of the inter-
national division of labor (GR13; GR53). Colonial areas became a 
source of cheap raw materials as well as a market for manufactured 
exports and investment capital from the West. This characteristic 
remains the basic foundation of the economic relationship between 
the developed and developing countries to this day. An understand-
ing of dependency, therefore, requires an analysis of economic 
relationships in the capitalist countries of the West and their 
expansion to the Third World, and the compromises and collusions among 
the various international and national elements which create the 
dependent situation. 
Dependency theory is probably most closely identified with the 
work of Andre Gunder Frank. In his book, Capitalism and Underdevelop-
ment in Latin America (GR53), Frank argues that the development and 
expansion of capitalism in the periphery began and furthers an unequal 
and combined development of its constitutive parts. Growth is unequal 
because dependent nations can only grow as a reflection of the expansion 
of dominant nations. He refers to development as "combined" because it 
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is the combination of inequalities plus the transfer of a significant 
part of the economic surplus produced in the Third World to developed 
countries which explains inequality, deepens it, and transforms it 
into a necessary and structural element of the world economy. Thus. 
capitalist expansion creates underdevelopment by concentrating wealth 
at one pole--the metropolis--and poverty at the other--the satellite 
(GR53: 6). These internal and external dimensions of metropolis-
satellite relations are structurally similar, interlocked. and mutually 
consistent. In Frank's view. these relationships are crucial factors 
shaping the political and economic systems of Third World nations. 
The economic and socio-political connections between satellites 
and the metropolis create mutually beneficial links between local 
elites and external interests that give the former a vested interest 
in the preservation of the status quo. Even after decolonization. 
the national elite of Third World countries pursued a policy of 
"accomodation" with the former colonial masters in order to maintain 
access to capital, technology. skilled cadres, and markets (GR137). 
Many of these leaders still view such institutional continuities as 
necessary for their immediate goal of rapid economic growth. Conse-
quently. they reject major structural changes in the inherited economic 
system so as to avoid a disruption of their valued connections with the 
West. 
For dependency theorists, the outcome of the above described 
historical process is an asymmetrical structure of relations between 
the metropolitan and satellite states, accounting for the widening 
gap in levels of development between them. Because of its historical 
perspective, the notion of dependency has come to be uniquely 
associated with international capitalism. This literature has 
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been criticized on the grounds that dependency theory cannot explain 
imperialistic relations among socialist countries, as in the case of 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (131). However, Finley's (GR49) 
preliminary research on Economic Linkage and Political Dependency in 
Eastern Europe contradicts Ray's premature conclusion. Finley con-
cludes that Eastern European dependence on the USSR both reinforces 
and complicates the overarching system of political dependence. Re-
cent political events in Poland support Finley's position. This 
suggests that dependency reduces the capacity of governments to deter-
mine the course of national development autonomously, irrespective of 
their ideological orientation. And to the extent that African nations 
remain dependent upon foreign trade, foreign investment, and foreign 
assistance for the creation of wealth and the provision of goods and 
services, demand and decisions adopted in the developed economies of 
the West become permanent inputs into the national policymaking pro-
cess. Under such conditions, dependent nations have little prospect 
of self-sustained economic growth. 
Relevance of Dependency Analysis for Africa and Kenya 
The Frankian notion that underdevelopment is a logical outcome 
of an ongoing historical process has received widespread acceptance 
among such Africanists as Rodney (GR134), Amin (GR5), Leys (GR105, 
GR106), and Arrighi and Saul (GRll). They argue that the incorpora-
tion of Africa into the emerging world capitalist economy, first 
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through a direct colonial administration and then, more subtly, 
through free trade, ensures that African production is geared towards 
producing exports for the dominant economies of the West. The politi-
cal and social system also ensures that the gains from this production 
are divided among a small African class (who use much of their gain 
for importing luxury consumer products rather than diversifying invest-
ments) and the dominant metropolitan countries. In the present context, 
this external relationship both threatens and inhibits autonomous 
and self-sustaining growth. 
Since the mid-1970's, Kenya, as well as the Ivory Coast and 
Nigeria, has become the subject of intense scholarly investigation 
which has spurred a major academic debate. One school of analysts 
has interpreted the country's performance in terms of a dependency 
framework, stressing widening inequalities and structural segmentation, 
and relating these elements to the growing ties with foreign capital 
which have marked postcolonial Kenya (GR 76 ; GR100; GR105). Another 
school, mainly "revised dependentistas," have challenged this view, 
stressing the role in Kenya of an increasingly powerful indigenous 
capitalist class, in effective control of the Kenyan state and leading 
a relatively dynamic capitalist transformation in the country (GR106; 
GR149). This debate has been significant because of its relevance to 
more general theoretical and strategic concerns regarding the economic 
prospect of "periphery capitalism" and the usefulness of a dependency 
perspective. 
The groundbreaking study on dependence and underdevelopment in 
Kenya is Colin Leys's Underdevelopment in Kenya, The Political Economy 
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of Neo-colonialism (GR105). According to Leys, Kenya has been 
incorporated into the international capitalist system since the 
colonial period, and such incorporation has deprived Kenya of the 
resources (human and material) necessary to pursue an autonomous 
development. Furthermore, external penetration served to introduce 
capitalist socio-economic structures within Kenya. The emergence of 
these structures has created a new social stratum from among the 
indigenous population, with an interest in organizing and facilitating 
the new activities involved (trade, mining, crop production, commerce, 
etc) (GR105: 9). 
The ongoing impact of external ties is shaping internal social 
relations within Kenya, maintaining the dominance of social classes 
tied to foreign interests (GR100; GR105; GR134). One segment of the 
working class, connected with the modeY'n economic sector, does indeed 
benefit substantially from the policy of IIdependent development,1I 
while the segment associated with the traditional sector essentially 
does not. The implication of this situation is increased inequality 
between the emergent IIl abor aristocracyll of workers in the modern 
sector and the mass of people who can, at best, make periodic forays 
into the wage economy as migrant labor (GR12). From the perspective 
of national planning, this structural characteristc creates a problem 
for policymakers in Kenya. As Leys points out: 
All governments of periphery countries could of course 
prefer better terms of trade and less dependence on 
foreign technology. but in most cases the social strata 
and classes which they represent have not been willing 
to make the sacrifices which a serious attack on these 
patterns would imply. It is artificial to point to 
the existence of theoretical alternatives, without 
recognizing that the status quo is underwritten by 
the social classes which underdevelopment has 
created and brought to power in the periphery 
countries. 
(GR105: 13) 
The present pattern in Kenya does not lead to "autonomous" 
development, but to a further consolidation of underdevelopment. 
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The growing inequalities among regions and among social groups, 
rising import bills, and balance-of-payment difficulties are logical 
outcomes of Kenya's subordinate role in the international economy. 
And to the extent that Kenya remains a dependent nation, the objec-
tives, intensity, and efficiency of development policies are limited 
within certain margins of flexibility. 
Similarly, Langdon (GR102) and Kaplinsky (76) argue that Kenya 
has not developed an autonomous capacity to sustain capital accumula-
tion through internal interaction among sectors of the economy. In 
asserting the dependency position, they point first to the limited 
achievement which characterizes Kenyan economic development in gen-
eral and that of industry in particular. Despite the high growth 
rate in the fields of investment and industrial output, the growth 
of employment in urban and rural areas has lagged far behind man-
power growth, which has become the most crucial developmental 
problem in the country. The growth of a modern, import-substituting 
sector has proven to be capital-intensive and labor-displacing. As 
a result, the government's ability to provide productive employment, 
even to those who are educationally qualified, is severely limited. 
The key to Kenya's dependency is the penetration of the economy 
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by multinational corporations. Langdon (GR102) and Kaplinsky (GR76, 
GR78) argue that the penetration of multinational corporations into 
the Kenyan economy has shifted the basis of metropolitan penetration 
from commerce to industry. Such penetration, according to Langdon, 
generates technological and social dualism in the econ-
omy, and these structural and distributional effects 
reshape class structure in the periphery--as parts of 
the usual class formations are integrated into the 
transnational community and other parts excluded. This 
reshaped class structure generates changed dynamics in 
the periphery political economy. 
(GR102: 27) 
Dependency analysis, therefore, views multinational corporations as 
the agency of a dual process of transnational integration and national 
disintegration (GR148). And in terms of Gunder Franks' definition, 
the multinationals are helping generate the "development of under-
development" in Kenya. 
On the whole, Leys, Langdon and Kaplinsky (all proponents of 
classic dependency analysis) agree that because of Kenya's external 
dependency, the policy decisions of the government are strongly influ-
enced, if not determined, by internal consequences of foreign trade, 
foreign investment, and foreign assistance. The result is that the 
amount of resources available to the government of Kenya to support 
public policies aimed at providing employment opportunities depends 
to a significant degree, on external rather than internal conditions. 
"Revised Dependency Analysis: the New "Orthodoxy" 
Early theories of imperialism, such as those espoused by Paul 
Baran (GR13), argued that the relationship between dependence and 
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higher levels of inequality occurred because foreign capital supported 
"semi-feudal" elites, and thus impeded industrialization. In the 
seventies, however, it seemed plausible to argue, as Bill Warren 
did, that foreign investments are likely to be associated with the 
intensification of capitalist accumulation in the Third World (GR160: 
92-107). Warren demonstrated, by way of a statistical survey, that: 
• industrial growth has taken place in the Third World since 
World War II; 
• growth in the Third World, during this period, has increas-
ingly been based on home market consupmption; 
• such growth has created important intermediate sectors; 
• foreign capital investment has been decreasing; 
• independent technological development has been occurring; 
• dependent development has become a characteristic feature of 
many formerly underdeveloped countries. 
Warren's position has won over many converts to the idea of 
"dependent development," two words considered inimical to each other 
by earlier dependentistas such as Frank. The basis of this position is 
the observation that industrialization and growth are occurring in many 
areas of the Third World, and the control which foreign capital once 
enjoyed is rapidly diminishing (GR27: 89-90; GR47: 32). This stage, 
which is characterized by an alliance between domestic and interna-
tional capital, might also describe Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast. It has particular importance 
in the Kenyan case, as argued by Leys (GR106) and Swainson (GR149). 
Whatever the differences among these countries, and there are many, 
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the common elements are the dynamic patterns of industrial growth and 
their close integration with the international capitalist system. To 
the radical academic, these countries form a "semi-peripheryll be-
tween the rich and the poor, while to many liberal analysts in the 
developed world, they are "newly industrializing countries,1I held 
up as the success stories of the 1960's and 1970's. 
The proponents of revised dependency analysis argue that Kenya 
is in a position to determine the process of economic development 
autonomously. The principal force of this process, they say, is 
the emergent domestic bouregoisie and the state apparatus under its 
control. Nicola Swainson (GR149), and most recently, Colin Leys 
(GR106), argue that since Kenya's independence, the dominant factions 
of the African capitalist class have been able to commandeer the 
state apparatus and use their power to break into areas of accumula-
tion that were off limits to Africans during the colonial period. 
They insist that the Kenyan bourgeoisie is not a foreign/metropolitan 
creation, but a class which developed within Kenya itself, and was 
subsequently held back by colonialist policies. 
Both sides in the Kenyan debate recognize the movement toward 
tighter state control on foreign capital in Kenya in recent years. 
The principal measures taken by the state to expand the sphere of 
indigenous accumulation include loans, licensing, and public invest-
ments. But their analysis of this development reflects differing 
views of the state and of class relationships within Kenya. Swainson. 
for instance, sees clearly the increased application of such controls 
as a function of the indigenous bourego;s;e's movement into industrial 
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production and use of its dominance over the state to facilitate 
private accumulation, mainly by restricting foreign capital--a sign 
of state strength. Kaplinsky and Langdon, on the other hand, see 
the roots of such efforts as attempts to deal with the growing foreign 
exchange gaps inevitably shaped by a transnationally-dominated import-
substitution industrialization strategy and as reflections of concern 
by middle-level and other state functionaries who have shared little 
in the considerable benefits of symbiosis in Kenya. 
Despite the points of disagreement, both sides in the Kenyan 
debate agree that the present pattern of development is subject to 
growing limitations and blockages and is increasingly dependent on 
external economic events. Most dependentistas agree that Third World 
nations have lost control over decisions affecting their national 
economies as a result of linkages established through foreign trade, 
foreign investment, and foreign assistance (GR53; GR105; GR138). These 
three components of national dependence emerge as significant charac-
teristics affecting the policy decisions of Third World governments for 
the following reasons: 
(a) Countries which are hosts to large amounts of foreign 
investment (relative to their wealth and population) are likely to 
experience high levels of inequality among regions and social groups 
(GR3l; GR42; GR55). The heavy penetration of foreign capital, mainly 
in the form of direct investment by multinational corporations in 
the mineral, plantation, and light manufacturing sectors, is highly 
profitable to foreign investors and results in a large return flow 
of income to metropolitan centers. 
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(b) Foreign investment enhances the possibility of the transfer 
of capital-intensive production techniques which are inappropriate 
to the needs of the developing nations, having been imported unchanged 
from the industrial countries (GR14; GR76). Capital-intensive tech-
nology generates little employment, and, if anything, it eliminates 
employment. Since investment decisions by the multinationals are 
based on a plan for improved profitability, minimizing labor cost 
is their first target. This means that the employment needs of a 
host country, such as Kenya, are relegated to a secondary position. 
(c) Countries which rely heavily on the export of a few primary 
products such as coffee and tea are likely to experience continued 
underdevelopment since international trade is characterized by unequal 
exchanges of goods and services (GR5; GR46). Because of the dominant 
position of developed economies in the world market, Third World 
governments are not in a position to bargain effectively to achieve 
a comparative advantage of trade. In effect, the demands for and 
the value of the different commodities of Third World nations is 
determined by events within the developed economies. This point is 
clearly demonstrated in the Kenyan case when, in 1977, the price of 
Kenyan coffee dropped substantially, which was responsible for subse-
quent balance-of-payment difficulties. 
(d) The transfer of public foreign assistance required for 
development carries with it elements of cost relating to structural 
dependency (GR137: 274). Aid entails a further loss of national power 
of decisionmaking and adds a new dimension to dependency. Aid brings 
with it the rights of donors to take part in policymaking and the 
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necessity for dependent countries to constantly justify their 
policies in order to continue the inflow of foreign aid (GR63; GR159). 
A final cost of aid is in the interest required in its repayment; 
this also contributes to the spiraling debt and balance-of-payment 
problems. 
On the whole, the consensus among dependentistas is that foreign 
aid, foreign investment, and foreign trade are essential components of 
the decisionmaking environment within Third World nations. Each of 
these aspects of national dependency poses both potential influence and 
potential constraints on the actions of Third World governments 
because of its impact on the amount of available resources, the 
distribution of political power, and the intrusion of external decision-
makers into the national policymaking process (GR166). Logical 
extensions of the above assumptions of dependency analysis lead to 
an expectation of the following structural characteristics in Kenya: 
• agricultural stagnation resulting from adverse terms 
of trade, urban migration, and low rates of surplus 
and reinvestment, leading to urban food shortaqe and 
structural inflation; 
• continued balance-of-payments crisis requiring depen-
dence upon foreign finance to a growing degree, and 
perhaps repeated devaluation of the Kenyan shilling; 
• noncompetitive domestic industrial sector with powerful 
trade unions, resulting in employers and unions forcing 
urban wages and prices upward to protect against rising 
import and food prices s further feeding inflationary 
tendencies; and 
• increased urban migration as agricultural terms of 
trade deteriorate, resulting in explosive growth of 
shanty towns around Nairobi. 
Educational Research and the Dependence PersPEctive 
Despite the recent interest in the internal dynamics of 
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peripheral capitalism, dependency theory has, on the whole, inspired 
very few studies on education. Indeed, the studies which have attempted 
to develop a Marxist point of view about the interaction between 
schooling and the labor market have not come from the existing studies 
of underdevelopment, but rather from studies of education in advance.p 
capitalist countries, particularly the United States (GR19; GR2l). 
There is no definitive study of education which utilizes the insights 
that have been gained from the recent debates on underdevelopment theory. 
In the case of Africa, only Walter Rodney (GR134) has attempted 
to show the linkages between the development of Western education and 
the underdevelopment of the continent. Rodney view colonial educa-
tion as merely "education for subordination, exploitation, and the 
creation of mental confusion" (GR134: 241). He argues forcefully 
that 
The main purpose of the colonial school system was to 
train Africans to help man the local administration at 
the lowest ranks and to staff the private capitalist 
firms owned by Europeans. In effect, that meant 
selecting a few Africans (a process of incorporation) 
to participate in the domination and exploitation of 
the continent as a whole. It was not an educational 
system that grew out of the African environment or 
one that was designed to promote the most rational 
use of material and social resources. It was not an 
educational system designed to give young people 
confidence and pride as members of African societies, 
but one which sought to instill a sense of deference 
towards all that was European and capitalist. 
(GR134: 241) 
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As Rodney clearly identifies, the main purpose of colonial 
education was to provide trained manpower to run the colonial eco-
nomic structure. It was not intended to give skills that would use 
African resources for autonomous development of African societies. 
The quality, context, and quantity of education given to Africans 
was different from that offered in European schools. In fact, the 
colonial education system was racially segregated. The overall 
colonial educational policy was, therefore, to reinforce the destruc-
tion of the autonomy of African economies and to reorient them toward 
production for the dominating metropolitan capitalist economies. In 
this way, colonial schooling was part and parcel of the totality of 
the forces of underdevelopment, and its reproduction in the post-
independence period must be examined carefully. As Kinyanjui (GR86) 
succinctly put it: 
Western education, like political and economic structures 
planted in the colonies, was an essential part of the 
expansion of Western capitalist system. As part of the 
superstructure of the capitalist system, it had the 
double task of incorporating the colonized people into 
that system and reproducing the emerging relations of 
production. 
(GR86: 29) 
The implication here is that the educational system, in its present 
form, can become an instrument for social control and domination. 
This is contrary to the human capital assertions which suggest that 
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there is a relationship between education and development. 
Rodney also points out that colonial dependency generated 
unequal distribution of educational resources among regions and 
social groups. The districts that were closely integrated into the 
colonial economy (such as the coffee growing regions of Kenya and 
the former settlements of the missionaries) devoted many of their 
resources to the development of education. The result has been that 
these regions emerged as more developed than those that were not 
integrated into the colonial economy. This point is fully supported 
by Kinyanjui (GR85, GR87). who argues that post-independence governmen-
tal policy seems to have exacerbated the existing regional and societal 
differences, rather than minimizing the gap. Kinyanjui attributes 
this phenomena to the continued political and economic power of 
these developed regions. 
On the whole. Africanists who adopt the dependence perspective 
in the study of the Kenyan political economy have ignored completely 
the role of education in the discussion of the underdevelopment pro-
cess. The focus of their analysis has been the economic structure; 
they have paid scant attention to the superstructure and, in partic-
ular, to the educational sector. The ways in which education and the 
educational structure are affected by dependency are not given appro-
priate attention. The primary task of this study is, therfore, to 
examine how dependency conditions the relationship between the educa-
tional system and the economy and distorts manpower planning in Kenya. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Public policy is considered to be the end product of the public 
decisionmaking process. It is, therefore, a dependent phenomenon 
which responds to changes in the factors which influence public de-
cisionmaking. Among the factors which constrain policymaking is the 
problem of external dependency; namely, foreign aid, foreign invest-
ment, and foreign trade. Each of these aspects of national dependence 
influence the formulation and implementation of policies. Thus, the 
primary goal of the analysis is to determine the consequences of 
the dependency relationship on the efforts of the Kenyan government 
toward solving the urban unemployment problem. 
The analysis of the extent to which external dependence affects 
the content of public policies is approached through an application of 
a policy analysis framework. Policy analysis combines two critical 
disciplines that are central to an understanding of the process of 
decisionmaking in the Third World: political science and economics. 
In an examination of the decisional choice by public authorities in 
achieving social, economic, and political goals, policy analysis 
framework is a useful means of inquiring into the interaction between 
social, political, and economic organization and process. 
Methodological Technigues 
The techniques of the methodology in this study include: 
historical analysis, field research, analysis of primary and secondary 
data, interviews of Kenyan governmental officials and technical 
assistance personnel. 
The following questions guide the research problem: 
• In what ways does the educational system complement or 
contradict economic planning? 
• To what extent has education met the political needs and 
priorities of the government? 
• To what extent has the type of education offered by the 
institutions matched the education and training needed 
by the labor market? 
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• To what extent does Kenya's external dependency contradict 
or bedevil manpower planning? 
Analysis of Data 
The method of analysis used in this study is part historical 
and part quantitative. The field research was undertaken in Kenya 
between September 1981 and March 1982. The historical data on the 
restructuring of the Kenyan society and economy from colonial time 
up until independence in 1963 was collected from published reports 
and colonial governmental documents deposited in the National Archives.* 
Secondary data on the economy and on education was collected 
from governmental sources (particularly the Central Bureau of Statis-
tics at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development), UNESCO, 
the Regional Mission of the World Bank, the East African Regional 
* The information generated highlighted the intense struggle between 
the colonizers and the colonized over the distribution of educa-
tional and economic resources and opportunities and the Africans' 
reaction to the colonial restrictions. 
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Office of USAID, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 
the International labour Organization (IlO), and other Kenyan govern-
mental ministries. Additional information was collected through 
in-depth interviews with leading governmental officials, politicians, 
foreign technical assistance personnel, and managers of foreign cor-
t ' * pora 10ns. 
SUMMARY 
The literature on development is replete with studies purport-
ing to identify education and economic growth as central components 
of national development, particularly their relationship to employ-
ment. Nevertheless, the interrelationships between these variables 
have not been substantiated by empirical evidence. While higher 
levels of educational expansion and economic growth, as measured in 
GNP, have been achieved in Kenya (see Chapter III), graduate unemploy-
ment has emerged as one of the most critical developmental dilemmas 
in the country. In the present context, three significant questions 
remain unanswered: (1) what are the historical roots of the prevail-
ing social problem? (2) what attempts are being made by the government 
of Kenya to address this problem? (3) did these programs in fact 
alleviate the problem significantly? The first task of this study is, 
therefore, to provide some answers to these questions. 
* 
An additional element of the study is drawn from literature on 
A total of twenty-five high-level officials from the private and 
public sectors were interviewed. The information generated through 
interviews was then used to further elaborate the secondary data 
collected. 
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national dependence in Latin America. The central theme of this 
literature is that dependence affects the resources available to 
Third World governments and leads to the intrusion of external 
decisionmakers into the national policymaking process. As a result, 
the policy decisions of these governments may be strongly influenced, 
if not determined, by the internal consequences of foreign aid, 
foreign trade, and foreign investment. The second task of this study 
is to determine to what extent dependency conditions the relationship 
between the educational system and the economy and distorts manpower 
planning in Kenya. 
Although theorists have ignored the role of education in the 
discussion of the underdevelopment process, this study is an attempt 
to refine the components of dependency theory as they relate to policy 
decisions within Kenya by establishing empirical evidence as to the 
proposed consequences of dependency upon the linkages between educa-
tion, economic growth, and employment opportunities in Kenya. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN EDUCATION IN KENYA, 1846-1980: 
A CASE OF DEPENDENCY RELATIONSHIP 
This chapter examines the development of Western education in 
colonial and post-colonial Kenya. Part I of this chapter investigates 
the intense struggle which took place between the three principal actors 
involved in the formulation of educational policy in colonial Kenya dur-
ing the period between 1846 and 1963: (a) the European missionaries, 
(b) the colonial administrators and European settlers, and (c) the 
indigenous African population. Part II examines the relationship be-
tween the colonial legacy of Kenyan education and the pattern of 
national development since Kenya's achievement of independence in 
1963. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL 
Colonialism and Economic Change 
Kenya's links with Western capitalism were forged in the late 
nineteenth century, when the world market was dominated by a few indus-
trial giants such as Britain, France, and Germany. Kenya became a 
protectorate under Britain in 1895 and a Crown Colony in 1920 (GR22; 
GR149: 22). Although missionary work in Kenya started as early as 1846, 
it was not until the construction of the Uganda Railway in 1901 from 
r10mbasa on the coast to Lake Victoria that significant European influence 
took place in Kenya (GR15; GRl12: 1-7). The construction of the railway 
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spearheaded the integration of Kenya into the colonial system. The 
British policy during the following years was determined by the need 
to make the colony pay its own way, that is to pay back the loans for 
the railway and to put an end to the need for annual grants from Britain 
for the administration of the Protectorate (GR105; GR149). The way 
chosen to accomplish this was to try to establish a white settler 
agriculture which could produce for export. The administration encour-
aged European settlers from South Africa to come and settle in Kenya. 
The result was that Kenya began to play the classic role of a country at 
the periphery of a capitalist system providing raw material exports for 
metropolitan manufactured goods. 
The dominant concern of the colonial authorities during the first 
decades of their rule was the provision of good and cheap agricultural 
land for the settlers. Through their political domination, the settlers 
constructed an economy which would benefit them exclusively. Large areas 
of land were allocated for them by the colonial state; tribes such as 
the Kikuyu, the Maasai, and the Nandi had to give up land which pre-
viously had been under their control (GR168: 63-67; GR105; GR156). The 
land was sold to the settlers on favorable terms. For example, in the 
Crown Land Ordinance of 1915, leases for 999 years were given out at 
very low prices. In the 1930's, the Carter Commission set aside nearly 
17,000 square miles, or twenty percent of Kenya's best land, for exclus-
ive White settlement (GR64: 87; GR156: 34). 
Despite the expropriation of land from the Africans, the settlers 
had a difficult time making their farming a profitable venture due to a 
lack of both knowledge and capital. This was the main cause of the 
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enormous exploitation of labor that took place in Kenya; the settler 
farms had to have cheap wage labor to be economically viable. In 
addition, the settlers were cognizant of the fact that African peasant 
farmers, who worked for less money, who had lower personal consumption 
demands, and who used more labor-intensive techniques, could produce 
and sell at lower prices. If this situation were allowed to continue, 
African production would undercut European production in the product 
market, and, by offering an alternative source of cash income, drive up 
wage rates on European farms and plantations. Indeed, between 1912 and 
1913, African production had accounted for at least 70% of exports 
GR105; GR99). This sentiment was clearly expressed by Lord Lugard in 
1922: 
The requirements of the settlers, to put it bluntly, are 
incompatible with the interests of the agricultural tribes, 
nor could they be otherwise than impatient of native devel-
opment as a rival in the growing of coffee, flax, and sisal. 
(GR108: 397) 
To forestall or permanently prevent this competition, two specific 
strategies were developed by the colonial government. The first strategy 
was directed toward forcing Africans to work as laborers on European 
farms, partly by force, partly by taxation, and partly by preventing 
them from having access to enough land or profitable crops to enable 
them to pay the various taxes without working for wages (GR105: 10; 
GR22; GR170). In this fashion, a considerable supply of African labor 
was available for the benefit of European settlers. It has been esti-
mated that in the mid-twenties, more than half of the able-bodied Luos 
and Kikuyus were employed on European farms (GR105: 31), and in total 
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about forty percent of all eligible males worked on European farms 
(GR168: 63-77). 
The second strategy was directed toward increasing the monopoly 
power of the settlers through control of the main state agencies such 
as the marketing and regulatory boards, production committees, and credit 
institutions. Through control of the state, the settlers were able to 
manipulate the legal framework of colonial rule and to prohibit the 
Africans from growing cash crops and from establishing commercial 
enterprises. The system of racialist rules and regulations worked to 
guarantee highly differentiated access to resources and opportunities 
among Europeans, Asians, and Africans. The Coffee Plantation Regulation 
Ordinance of 1918, the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance of 1935, and 
the Credit to Native Control Ordinance of 1903 and 1948, for example, were 
measures designed to restrict significant African participation in Ken-
ya's political economy (GR73). 
The infrastructural development also favored the settlers. The 
railway served the areas of White settlement, and different prices were 
charged for the shipment of European and African produce. The pricing 
of commodities also discriminated against the Africans (GR105; GR22). 
The tax system served to transfer money from the poor African areas to 
the wealthy White areas. Despite the fact that in 1920-23 Africans paid 
approximately 70% of all taxes in Kenya (GR22: 193), the Whites reaped 
nearly all the benefits of government services such as agricultural exten-
sion and credit. Given all these restrictive and discriminatory policies, 
it is no wonder that the European settlers dominated Kenya's colonial 
economy. This domination was not a function of the Europeans I productive 
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efficiency nor their propensity to innovate. Their domination was the 
consequence of the prohibition by force of African competition as well 
as the exploitation of Africans in the production process. 
Thus, early on, Kenya was characterized by a regulated and con-
trolled economy. Far from operating in an open, competitive frontier 
economy where riches were to be seized by the bold and adventuresome, 
European settlers entered a political econonlY in which they were pro-
tected, nurtured, and fostered through their control of the State's power. 
These factors meant that Kenya was involved in a dependency relationship 
rather different from the simple staple export pattern; its dependency 
was characteristic of what Apollo Njonjo (GRl17) refers to as "Apartheid 
capitalism," involving the dependence of dominant local forces (partic-
ularly the settlers) on the colonial state's resources and actions, which 
were significantly--though not wholly--shaped outside Kenya (GR99: 20). 
Had access to resources and opportunities not been restricted, European 
dominance over African interests would have been impossible. The cor-
responding educational system also mirrored that same ideology which 
justified access to resources according to race and class. This restric-
tion of access and formalization of privileges remains the principle of 
economic organization in Kenya at the present time. 
The particular pattern of Kenya's incorporation into centers of 
metropolitan accumulation shaped the dialectics of African nationalist 
opposition, resulting in the emergence of the Mau Mau movement which 
militarily challenged European occupation of Kenya. The crisis which 
this movement generated led to a series of constitutional changes which 
preceded formal political independence (GR135; GR16l). The 1954 Lyttleton 
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Constitution and the 1958 Lennox Boyd Constitution sought to establish 
the economic foundation of Black conservative rule in Kenya (GR140: 56-57). 
As a result, African participation in the legislative council was accel-
erated. The 1954 Swynnerton Plan introduced reforms into African 
agriculture for the first time. The plan called for the development of 
extension services in the African areas, permission to grow cash crops, 
access to credit, and land consolidation and registration. In short, 
these reforms attempted to introduce capitalist agriculture and commerce 
to African areas. 
Despite the military defeat of the Nau r·1au, African nationalism 
in this period succeeded in creating a ne~ political context in which 
successive colonial administrators accepted the urgent need for political 
and economic changes for Africans. This shift represented, however, 
simply an extension of privileges to very few educated Africans, partic-
ularly the Kikuyus, who would cooperate with their formal colonial masters. 
The existence of an African petit bourgeoisie class facilitated the trans-
ition of the Kenyan political economy from colonialism to a neocolonial 
relationship, further tightening the links of dependence (GR161; GR22; 
GR105). The important question of structural transformation for the 
majori ty of Kenyans who had formed the most potent Mau r·lau base was 
put aside. 
By 1963, Kenya inherited, along with independence, a very disinte-
grated political economy, already organized for the benefit of Europeans 
and those African petit bourgeoisie who came to dominate the State. 
With few exceptions, Europeans occupied the top brackets of the income 
scale, the Asians the middle, and the Africans the bottom. Inequality 
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was deeply embedded within the society. The government's response to 
the existing dependency relationship has focused on Africanizing* the 
schools, businesses, the civil service, and commerce, thus keeping the 
major tenets of dependency intact. In the present context, such 
dependency distorts the relationship between the educational system 
and the economy and conditions manpower planning. 
Educational Policy in Colonial Kenya 
The economics and politics of European dominance in Kenya required 
an educational system that would enhance the privileged positions of the 
European settlers and the traditional elites (and hence their offsprings) 
who collaborated with the colonizers. To achieve that end, tremendous 
cooperation was required between the colonial administration, the mission-
aries, and the European settler class (GRl12; GR140; GR142: 32-47). This 
symbiotic relationship, which lasted until the mid-1950's, had a tre-
mendous impact on the development of education in Kenya and the present 
political-economic relationships within the country. 
More than fifty years before the British incorporated Kenya as a 
protectorate, European missionaries of different denominations had al-
ready established schools to spread Christianity. The first mission 
school was established at Rabai, near Mombasa, in 1846, but little pro-
gress was made in establishing schools further inland until the contribution 
of a railway which enabled the missionaries to expand their evangelist 
* Africanization refers to the process by which African governments 
attain national control of their economies, by replacing their own citi-
zens with expatriats in the strategic areas of the economy. 
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activities (GR15: 12; GRl12; GR142: 5). By 1906, fifty mission schools 
had been established in Kenya. This number reached 105 by 1916 (GRl12: 
119). Indeed, missionary influence remained the dominant force until 
the mid-1920's when it had to submit to the rule of colonial administra-
tion. Even then, the missions continued to operate their schools 
independently. 
In 1909, the British Government commissioned a study of Education 
in British African territories. The Frazer Report recommended the estab-
lishment of education in British territories on a racial basis. The 
reason for this segregationist policy was summed up in the Beecher Report 
of 1949 which stated that 
African education cannot be compared with education in 
European or Asian society. . . . The peculiar nature 
of African education, with its limited achievements, is 
such that long-term planning alone is appropriate. We 
are only (with African education) at the state of 
establishing standards,while European and Asian educa-
tional systems are concerned with maintaining long and 
well established standards. 
(GRl12: 132) 
The argument supporting segregation is academic. The material 
reason for segregation was that the three racial groups of Kenya were 
being trained to maintain their respective social statuses. The Euro-
peans were being trained to be the masters, the supervisors, the leaders; 
the Africans to be the servants, the laborers. Each had to be educated 
to take his place in society, not according to his ability, but according 
to his race. The context and purpose of education was set by occupation 
as well as by social and political limitations. 
As a result of this policy, the educational systems were treated 
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differently in terms of financial support. Financial provision for 
African education was not seen to be of vital importance and was, 
therefore, always considered in relation to the country's ability to 
pay. In 1925, the per capita cost of African education was tl.6, while 
the European cost was ~41.6; in 1931, the figures were t3.5 and L42.6; 
and in 1935, to.8 and t36.7 respectively (GRl12: 145). In the late 
1940's, the African population was estimated to be at least three hun-
dred times as large as the European, yet expenditures on education for 
the two races was almost equal; and in some years, the expenditure on 
European children was greater (GR66: 337). 
TABLE I 
ALLOCATION OF COLONIAL REVENUE ON EDUCATION FOR 
THE DIFFERENT RACES, 1926-1949 IN tIS 
African Indian European 
Year (92%) (6%) (2%) 
1926 47,797 14,471 28,815 
1927 52,431 17,318 36,032 
1928 72,003 22,963 42,294 
1929 74,131 25,603 49,360 
1930 83,088 30,582 49,310 
1931 82,823 34,348 49,189 
1932 76,472 32,371 48,126 
1933 70,594 41,675 42,400 
1934 72,411 33,818 44,011 
1935 74,097 34,060 44,041 
1936 70,154 37,341 46,529 
1937 77 ,193 39,140 49,255 
1930 80,130 43,861 49,003 
1939 81,869 45,602 51,881 
1940 79,936 48,094 50,655 
1941 75,030 48,327 54,338 
1942 81,221 49,820 66,800 
1943 75,118 52,040 87,845 
1944 93,968 63,647 119,631 
1948 211 ,953 137,313 207,622 
1949 323,340 206,969 285,459 
Source: (GR1l2: 136) 
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The distribution of educational resources and opportunities was 
also uneven among the three racial groups. From the early years of 
colonialism, education was compulsory for European children between 
the ages of 7 and 15 (GR85: 4). Education for Africans was not compul-
sory until after the Second l'Jorld War. The numbers of schools available, 
as well as the rate of enrollment for these three racial groups, differed 
markedly. Hhile the Europeans had secondary schools as early as 1915 
and Asians had them in nearly every major town where they had settled 
by 1923, the Africans opened their first secondary school in 1926 and 
only four secondary schools in the 1940's (GR81: 29; GR142: 50-68). 
In 1911, the Colonial authorities in Kenya took the first step 
towards what the missionaries considered an invasion into their domain 
by forming a Department of Education. The fear on the part of the mis-
sionaries that the government intended to take control over all education 
was strengthened when, in 1915, a State school for Africans was opened 
at Machakos (GR75: 150-151; GRl12: 37; GR140: 73). The missionaries 
refused additional Government educational grants on the grounds that 
financial control was the first step towards a final takeover. Never-
theless, as the colonial authorities in Kenya and Britain began to take 
interest in education and the missionaries found it increasingly diffi-
cult to finance the school system on their own, a pattern of cooperation 
developed in which missions came to depend largely on governmental finan-
cial support. The State left the responsibility for supervision and 
management of the schools to the missionaries. 
Initially, the Department of Education was concerned primarily with 
the education of European children. No serious thought was officially given 
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at the outset to education for Africans. Shortly thereafter, however, 
the colonial administration and the settlers both recognized the need 
to educate Africans if economic sufficiency were to become a reality for 
the European community. The education of the Europeans and Indians 
provided the managerial and artisian classes of citizens. The education 
of the Africans was intended to provide a more productive menial class 
of workers. Therefore, cooperation among all European interests in Kenya 
was seen to be vital to the success of this undertaking. This initial 
agreement among the administration, the missionaries, and the settlers 
formed the starting point, and only later did disagreement arise regard-
ing what form this education should take, what methods should be adopted, 
and to what extent it should be carried out. 
Initial governmental interest in education for Africans was moti-
vated by two needs: the need to make the colony self-sufficient and the 
need for an enlightened class of Africans to put into effect the British 
doctrine of "indirect rule." The settlers also needed an enlightened 
labor force, capable of taking instructions; and they turned to schools 
to provide it. The missionaries, on the other hand, wanted only to spread 
the teachings of tile B.i.ble in the quickest and most effective way and 
saw education as the easiest means of doing so. With the administration 
and the settlers entering the field, however, the missionaries were forced 
to extend their educational services to cover secular education and 
technical training for the economic development of the country. Thus, 
in 1919, a joint government-missionary-settler commission agreed that a 
minimal amount of academic education for Africans was necessary (GR140: 
17). There was some fear in the European community that academic studies 
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would discourage African children from becoming laborers. As a result 
of this fear, it was decided that only selected individual Africans 
should receive a general education and only to eleven years of age. 
any further education should be vocational. Deliberate preference 
was given to the children and close relatives of those recognized as 
traditional political leaders such as chiefs and representatives of 
local native councils in exchange for translating to the Africans the 
policy of indirect rule. In essence, the new policy created a strati-
fied educational system within the African community (GRl12: 59-61). 
Although the different European groups wanted the Africans to 
be educated, soon the divergence of their aims and motives, the differ-
ent interpretations given to education, and the differing goals became 
apparent. First, there was the major conflict between the Africans and 
the colonists regarding the role of education. The higher wages com-
manded by Africans who had been to school, their apparently favorable 
relationship with the colonists, and their generally higher status 
compared with their illiterate contemporaries all seemed to point to 
education as the secret of power and material progress. The Africans, 
therefore, not only rejected the restriction imposed on their educational 
advancement, but they also rejected an education tailored to keep them in 
subservience to the Europeans (GR103; GR140: 24). 
Secondly, there were conflicts between the missionaries and the 
colonial administration as the former sought to keep their adherents 
from attending government schools by discrediting the staff in those 
schools on moral grounds. The latter, in turn, charged the missionaries 
with disrupting the African way of life. This was expressed in the 
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circumcision controversy of the 1930's. Missionary control of primary 
schools and the missionaries' ambivalent stand on matters related to 
African traditions were to lead to the opening of Independent Schools, 
particularly among the Luos, the Kikuyus, and the Pokomos (GR7; GR140: 
27; GR142: 149). 
Thirdly, there was internal conflict created by the missionaries. 
They had, from the beginning, worked on the doctine of divide and con-
quer. Those Africans who accepted Christianity were able to receive 
preferential treatment in the field of education, while non-Christians 
were discriminated against. This, for all practical purposes, also 
meant preferential treatment in the labor market. This group of Afri-
cans included the sons of chiefs, the preachers, and the businessmen. 
This point must be stressed because the graduates of missionary schools 
(the collaborators of colonialism) are now the most influential people 
in the government; and by virtue of their position, they stand to gain 
from the present setting of economic development and have established a 
base from which their offspring will always benefit if the system remains 
unchanged (GR85). 
Legal recognition of education in the colony came in 1924 with the 
legislative council's passage of the Education Ordinance. In theory, 
the 1924 Ordinance gave the right to inspection of schools to the Dir-
ector of Education. Under the ordinance, missionary schools were 
recognized as voluntary agencies and became eligible for grants-in-aid 
(GRl12: 89; 140; 142). Despite the ordinance, missionary influence on 
African education remained very strong until the time of independence. 
Prior to 1925, therefore, neither the officials in Kenya nor those 
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in London had any clear idea of what should constitute education for 
Africans. apart from the fact that it should be geared towards economic 
development and hence self-sufficiency of the colony. Directives from 
the Colonial Office were vague and open to different interpretations. 
In many cases, the policy laid down did not meet practical circum-
stances and was frustrated by the conflicting interests of the 
administrators, the settlers, the missionaries, and later the Africans. 
Educational Policy After 1925 
In 1925, the British Colonial Office issued its first statement 
on African education. The 1925 Memorandum laid down the thirteen princi-
ples which became the basis of educational policy in all British African 
colonies for the next quarter of a century (GR104: 13; 140). Drawing 
heavily from the 1924 Phelps-Stokes Report, which sought to develop the 
"right sort" of education for African children (i.e., vocational educa-
tion), the memorandum initiated a process of experimentation aimed at 
adapting education to African life and cultural heritage. This position, 
maintained through WW II (and being perpetuated in the post-independence 
era), was interpreted as meaning education that would not overly stimu-
late the outside interests of rural African children; it would encourage 
them to remain farmers and not to seek other kinds of employment in 
urban centers (GR75: 150; GRl12: 59). Ironically, these views are 
expressed in the Report on Educational Goals and Objectives of 1976 and 
also in the 1979-83 Development Plans. In both instances, no serious 
program was pursued by the government to transform the social and economic 
conditions of Kenyans, particularly in agriculture. 
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The 1925 t1emorandum and those subsequent to it compl etely i g-
nored the felt needs of the African community for equal access to 
resources and opportunities. The different racial groups were educated 
according to the social and occupational role their members were expected 
to play in national development. Apartheid capitalism in Kenya was also 
expected to survive indefinitely. The events of the fifties, particularly 
the Mau Mau struggle, were to shatter these assumptions. 
As early as 1924, the Afri can community had shown an a\'/areness that 
colonial policy was designed to perpetuate their state of subservience 
to Europeans. They had also begun to question the imbalance between 
their contribution to colonial revenues and the social benefits that 
they received in return. For example, Direct Tax in the Nyanza Province 
showed an increase of 325% between 1905 and 1910, whereas the non-
African revenue of the country in general showed a decrease of 12% 
(GRl12: 134). Africans then began to express the view that part of 
their taxation should be earmarked specifically for the development of 
their own areas. The Education Ordinance of 1924 established an 
Advisory Conmittee on which Local Native Councils were represented. 
Gradually, the idea that responsibility for primary education should 
rest in local hands became accepted. The Africans seized the opportun-
ity offered by local native councils to tax themselves to finance 
education and ta open up new schools in their respective communities 
(GRaS; 165). The extent of local contribution is shown in Table II 
on the following page. 
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TABLE II 
LOCAL NATIVE COUNCILS EDUCATION EXPENDITURE: 
IN SHILLINGS 1926-1931 
Council 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 
NK 20,000 100,000 211 ,000 251,000 196,000 
CK 30,000 40,000 110,000 213,894 244,770 32,096 
S Lumb\'1a 2,200 300 20,300 300 14,700 10,000 
Kiambu la, 000 120,000 120,500 112,900 57,000 
Fort Hall 40,000 31,500 99,700 95,200 
S Nyeri 100 100 600,100 100,500 150,500 160,500 
Embu 980 
Meru 400 500 2,500 
Machakos 24,000 22,500 16,880 21,000 1,000 19,000 
Taita 100 200 
Ki tui 6,000 6,000 7,000 2,000 500 1,000 
Digo 1,000 3,200 3,200 3,000 
Giriama 21,000 500 
Elgeyo 3,000 37,600 16,700 15,420 
i~arakwet 1,000 6,400 3,340 6,980 
Nandi 10,000 6,000 6,400 10,250 6,250 10,850 
W Suk 2,000 13,000 10,000 
Baringo 2,000 
Narok 
Kajiado 20,000 30,000 22,500 40,100 31,300 34,335 
Source: (GR1l2: 150) 
The decision to entrust Local Native Councils with the responsi-
bility for primary education was calculated to shift the financial 
burden from the government. Although the Councils welcomed the idea 
as an opportunity to develop their own schools, by 1942, their financial 
situation was in desperate shape. Educational expenditures continued 
to rise to the detriment of other social services such as rural access 
roads, health services, and marketing facilities (GRl12: 151). 
From the 1920's until the mid-1940's, the institutional framework 
for the formulation and implementation of policies for African education 
included the joint participation of colonial administrators, missionaries, 
and European settlers. The colonial administrators repeatedly sought to 
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free themselves from this burden, but political pressure by Africans for 
more rapid expansion forced them to accept responsibility after the Second 
World War. At this point, the old colonial policies of "self-sufficiency" 
and "trusteeship" were dropped and' ,"partnership" was substituted ,(GR129:7; 
GR140). The British Government recognized the growing political role of 
Africans and began to create more of a progressive political situation 
in the colonies. 
Educational Policy After World War II 
After the War, the British policy began to change in the face of 
African nationalism. The British began to accept the idea that many 
British colonies would soon be independent (GRl12: 63; GR129: 8; GR140). 
In 1948, therefore, the Advisory Committee drew up a memorandum entitled 
Education for Citizenship in Africa, in which it was argued that mass 
education would be valuable only insofar as it trained young Africans 
to become responsible citizens of free countries. There is nothing to 
suggest that the intensified local educational activity of the late 
1940 l s and the early 1950 l s was the result of the recommendations of this 
committee. Rather, the activity could be more justifiably attributed to 
the changed local political condition in Kenya. 
The 1948 Ten-Year Plan for education in Kenya (CG3) aimed to qive 
50~~ of school age chi ldren an education 1astino 6 years and recommended 
that primary schools should be controlled by local authorities. Further-
more, the Plan called for local authorities to increase their expenditures 
for primary schools from tlOO,OOO in 1948 to ~234,000 in 1957 (GR129: 8). 
But the demand was such that further expansion of government schools was 
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beyond the financial means of local authorities. Africans took this 
opportunity to begin to build their own schools using funds generated 
through individual contributions. The self-help efforts led to the 
emergence of a shadow school system, unregulated by the government. 
This system now accounts for 60% of the secondary school enrollment in 
the country (KGS, 1977). The central government felt increasingly 
uncomfortable about its inability to give the desired level of super-
vision and financial assistance to unaided schools (GR142: 148). This 
situation has remained unchanged and is the major headache of the post-
independence government. In order to limit an influx of African pupils 
into upper primary and secondary schools, the government introduced a 
pyramid structure into African education which allowed a large number 
of pupils to enter primary schools and then progressively restricted 
opportunities as the students climbed the educational ladder through 
secondary school to the university. Each grade had to be passed in 
succession if a pupil were to proceed. 
The Beecher Commission (1949) introduced a 4-4-4 system of pri-
mary, upper primary, and secondary schools to replace the previous 
6-2-4 system. The Commission based its recommendations regarding 
educational structure on a 50% dropout rate. As soon as the dropout 
rate fell and more Africans remained in schools, examinations played 
an even more important role in limiting the numbers that ascended each 
successive rung on the educational ladder (GR140: 41-43; GR164: 6). 
The grading of classes and schools and the provisions for expansion were 
based on the assumption that of the pupils who entered primary schools, 
50% would drop out. In other words, for every 100 children entering 
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primary school, only 8 would proceed to intermediate schools (upper 
primary), and only 2 would finally enter secondary schools (GRl12: 110). 
The aim of this policy was clearly to limit the number of educated 
Africans who could qualify for the franchise, thereby preventing their 
influx into the labor market. The fear was that too many educated 
Africans would put pressure on the government and on employers to offer 
them occupations which had traditionally been held by Europeans; they 
also feared that a large reservoir of trained but unemployed Africans 
might lead to political unrest. In 1963, the combined result of drop-
out and examination failures appeared as presented in the table below. 
TABLE I II 
WASTAGE AND RETENTION IN KENYAN SCHOOLS, 1963 
Primar~ School Secondarl School 
Year Degree of Wastage (%) Year Degree of Absorption (%) 
----
I 44~ Jr I 44 
II 20 II 38 (KAPE) 
III 14~ Sr III 5 
IV 10 IV 3~ (KASE) 
V 8~ (Common Ex) V 1 
VI l~ VI ~ (School Cert 
VII-VIII ~ Univ Exam) 
Note: Of those who finished their primary course, only 44% proceeded to 
the first year of secondary courses. 
Source: (GRl12: 112) 
It is not surprising that Africans opposed these recommendations 
which recognized the termination of education for half of the children 
after only four years of schooling (at the age of about ten). They felt 
justified in concluding that the Beecher Commission was designed to pro-
vide cheap, maleable. and constant labor in the form of eleven 'year olds, 
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to the settler community. Thus, dissatisfied with the education pro-
vided by the missionaries and the negative response of the Beecher 
Committee to any of the African concerns, Africans sought, from their 
own pockets, to provide themselves with education. This gave rise to 
the Independent Schools Movement, the gravest reflection on the entire 
educational policy and a serious charge against the colonial government 
in Kenya. 
Although many of the points stated in the Beecher Report were 
not implemented because of the Emergency, the planning and implementation 
of educational policy nevertheless remained isolated to a great extent 
from developments in other areas until the time of political independence. 
At the Lancaster House Conference of 1960, the central question raised 
by the colonial authorities was on what terms political independence 
would be granted to Africans. The most critical issue politically was 
the land question (GR105: GR161; GR162). The aspirations of the Afri-
can public were far-reaching. The solution should, therefore, at least 
satisfy the minimal expectations of the most land-hungry groups in Kenya. 
The British, on the other hand, were not willing to accept any takeover 
of land by Africans without adequate compensation to the European settlers. 
Ultimately, an agreement was reached which satisfied both the Africans 
and the Europeans. 
The essence of the agreement was that Africans buying land in the 
White Highland should pay for it with loans from the Kenyan governmenti 
the Kenyan government, in turn, was to obtain considerable sums of money 
(approximately taO million) from the British for this purpose (GR159; 
GR161). The transfer of power could then take place in an orderly 
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fashion, and the respect for private property would be upheld. The 
pattern of decolonization was, therefore, carefully influenced exter-
nally to detach that emerging African bourgeoisie class from the 
squatter wage worker radicalism of the Mau Mau. It led to much 
continuity in the regulative, restrictive, and unequal internal relations 
of the colonial past in Kenya (GR102: 41). The internal pattern of 
exchange relations, education, and the civil service was Africanized. 
Against a backdrop of dramatic political and economic activity, Kenya's 
educational system underwent a series of organizational changes, both 
before and after independence (GR87). The transfer of political power 
to Africans in 1963 did not bring fundamental changes in the economic, 
political, and educational structures of Kenya (GR87; GR105; GR162). 
African Reaction to Colonial Restrictions 
Although educational administrators in Kenya spent considerable 
time and effort on programs designed to adapt Western educational forms 
to their conception of African needs, they paid little attention to the 
integration of Africans into the new occupational structure except as 
adjuncts to positions held by Europeans. Until the pace of political 
development increased markedly in the mid-1950's, authorities tended to 
restrict the output of post-primary institutions to the immediate and 
visible needs for middle and low-level manpower. The priority for edu-
cational expansion, such as it was, focused on the spread of mass 
primary education with a vocational emphasis. 
The African reaction to the colonial restrictions manifested itself 
in the form of independent churches, particularly in Western Kenya, while 
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in Central Province, the African response to missionary control took 
the form of a revolt in the 1930's and subsequent establishment of 
independent schools (GR7; GR9; GR140: 27). Dissatisfied with 
mission education, the African community, particularly the Kikuyu of 
Central Kenya, began to organize themselves to establish their own 
independent schools. Christian missionary control of primary schools 
and the missionaries' ambivalent stand on matters relateG to African 
traditions (particularly the controversy surrounding circumcision), 
led to the opening of Independent Schools, particularly among the Luos 
and Kikuyus. 
The vocational emphasis on African education was seen by the 
Kikuyu as a second-rate education designed to keep them as permanent 
laborers for the Europeans (GR129: 5). So far as the Kikuyu were con-
cerned, the missionaries were apparently cooperating with the European 
settlers who were intent on alienating the land and forcing the Kikuyu 
into the role of a semirural labor force. As a result, the Kikuyu were 
determined to boycott missionary education since it symbolized colonial 
oppression. The special situation of the Kikuyu and their close prox-
imity to European settlements led to rapidly extending political concerns 
and also to a more sensitive appraisal of the political implications of 
education. According to Anderson, the Kikuyus 
..• sought to create a generation of Africans sophis-
ticated and able enough both to argue their case for 
self-determination and to demonstrate their competence 
to benefit by it, and thus obviate any resource to the 
violence latent in the colonial situation. 
(GR9: 14) 
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In other words, the Kikuyus were aware of the importance of education 
for political emancipation. But more importantly, they were determined 
to excel in education so that they could control the political struc-
tures of the State at independence. The evidence presented in this 
study suggests that, after assuming leadership in 1963, the educated 
Africans (Luos and Kikuyus) have instead, ironically, contributed to 
the perpetuation of neocolonialism in Kenya. This raises the suspic-
ion that personal interests of the Kikuyu-Luo-educated class dominated 
their desire to overthrow the colonial system. Recent political events 
in Kenya, particularly the imposition of a one-party State in r1ay 1982 
and the attempted subsequent coup, demonstrate in clear terms the 
determination of this educated political clique to subordinate Kenya's 
interests to the clique's own personal interests. 
Although early African organizations such as the Kikuyu Associa-
tion were formed at Government urging and served as a buffer between 
tribal grievances and the central government, those established later on 
were more instrumental in confronting colonial authorities on various 
issues (GR15: 119-122; GR96; GR13G). For example, the Young 
Kikuyu Association, which was established in 1921, often confronted 
the authorities over issues of land, labor, and taxation. When its 
leader. Harry Thuku. was detained in 1922. the association was able to 
organize a massive demonstration of approximately 8,000 people (GR66: 
279-281; GR135: 251). The Young Kikuyu Association was later named the 
Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) under the leadership of educated men 
such as Jomo Kenyatta. The reason that such educated Kenyans became 
the leaders of the independent struggle is explained by the fact that 
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many of them were deprived of any meaningful role in the colonial 
structure. They therefore directed much political activity toward 
permanent opposition to established authority--European as well as 
the chiefs and elders who served as tools of European domination. 
In a similar fashion, the lack of any meaningful role for school 
1eavers in contemporary Kenyan society may lead to permanent opposi-
tion of the present government. In fact, in recent years, there have 
been many student strikes against the government, resulting in the 
frequent closure of the University of Nairobi (GR89; Weekly Review, 
March-August, 1982). 
At the height of the Emergency in late 1952, the Kikuyu Inde-
pendent Schools Association claimed over 400 schools, and the expansion 
came to an end when the government closed these schools for allegedly 
subversive activities (GR165: 7). In short, colonial educational poli-
cies and practices in Kenya did profoundly influence the nature of 
politics, acting as a catalyst in the growth of resistance to foreign 
domination and, more importantly, in the recruitment of elites committed 
to the achievEment of political independence. 
Summary 
The allocation of colonial State revenue, the ideological outlook 
and the skills imparted in each of the educational systems reflected the 
expected positions its products would occupy in the colonial hierarchy. 
African education was particularly geared to produce a better worker and 
a more useful servant to the Europeans. The combined effect of this poli-
cy was to reduce effectively the numbers of qualified Africans who would 
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participate in the emerging modern industrial and commercial structure 
of the country. For example, in 1964, a Kenyan survey on high level 
manpower revealed how few Africans there were in the professions: 36 
doctors, 20 electrical engineers, 17 university professors, and 7 
economists (KG:ll). Thus, by the time of independence, there were 
serious shortages of indigenous high- and middle-level manpower required 
for modernizing the economy. The developmental dilemmas which Kenya 
encountered at independence were simply the results of its position at the 
periphery of Western capitalism since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. 
REAPING THE FRUIT OF IIUHURU II 
Educational Policy in Post-Independent Kenya, 1963-1980 
At independence in 1963, Kenya inherited a very disintegrated 
political economy, already organized for the benefit of European settlers. 
The entire setup of the political, economic, and social interaction was 
intended to reflect and to justify supposed racial differences and hence 
differential access to economic opportunities. The ILO Mission (GR69) 
estimated that by 1960, fewer than 4,000 European farmers owned approxi-
mately 3 million hectares of land, 4/5 of the total area of the country 
having reliable rainfall. Europeans dominated agricultural production 
completely. 
During the same period, the average earnings of the 22,000 Euro-
peans in wage-employment was more than Ktl,300 compared with those of 
38,000 Asians of just over Kt500, and those of an estimated 530,000 
Africans of Kt75 (GR69: 91). The corresponding educational system also 
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mirrored that same ideology which justified separate educational 
institutions for the three racial groups. The provision of elementary 
and secondary education on the eve of independence reflected a racial 
pattern which was characteristic of the colonial mode of development. 
The secondary schools were concentrated in the areas near European 
settlement and urban centers. In 1963, about 30% of all secondary 
schools in the country were in the urban areas, and these mainly 
catered to the Asians and European communities which formed about 3% 
of the total Kenyan population (GR85: 4). 
The table below indicates primary school enrollment on the eve 
of independence and reflects a similar racial pattern. 
TABLE IV 
PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY RACIAL GROUPS 
1963 
Racial Groups # of Pupils Corresponding School-Age Pop. 
Total # of % of Pop. Chi1d-
Chil dren ren in School 
African 840,677 2,421,300 34.7 
Arab 3,322 9,000 36.9 
Asian 40,915 52,800 77.5 
European 6,639 8,900 74.6 
Note: School age was estimated to be 5-14 years. 
(KG7, 1965: 6) 
While 75% of the European school age population was in school in 
1963, the corresponding figure for Africans was only 35%. Inequality 
was thus deeply embedded within the economy and the educational system. 
It was obvious that something had to be done in the immediate post-
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independence period. 
Africanization of the political economy was the political ans-
wer to the problem. The main features of this strategy were formulated 
in the government document, African Socialism and its Application to 
Planning in Kenya (KG1), 1965. According to this document, the achieve-
ment of a rapid growth rate is the primary focus of government policy 
in Kenya. This approach to development made no attempt to restructure 
the political and economic institutions established in the country dur-
ing the colonial period. Chief among these institutions is the educational 
system, with many of its colonial legacies, such as the different school 
systems catering to the different social classes and the emphasis on 
academic criteria for advancement within the system. In fact, to a large 
extent, the educational system has remained the pillar of neocolonialism. 
Kenya's response to the inherited educational disparities in-
volved (a) Africanizing enrollment in the schools, and (b) expanding 
access to opportunities by accelerating the supply of educational facili-
ties. Rapid expansion was also justified for achieving a rapid rate of 
economic progress (KG12; KG15). An impression of the educational 
expansion which followed independence can be oained from the follow-
ing diagram which shows the level of primary and secondary school 
enrollments for the period 1961 to 1979. The figure shows that primary 
school enrollment jumped from 870,000 in 1961 to over 3.5 million in 
1979. Secondary school enrollment reached 378,000 in 1979 from a mere 
22,000 in 1961. Educational opportunities for girls, however, have tended 
to be lower at every level of education when compared with those of boys. 
The situation has improved tremendously with the passage of free education 
in 1974 for the first four years of primary school. 




, , ... 
: : I 
" , ' 
/ ! 
I ' ,
..... , .. -' 
".,."","'."''' 
~ , I , 
:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -,- - - - - - - - - - -
, , , 
"'0 






INO I , II ,.. .... r' 
.... ~l /'/ ! , 
: ... -...... --- ... -.. - . - -.,,_#I'-:~ . -- . - - ~ ----... - . - . - . - .. : 
I I .. ..,.,... I r 
1.-' I ,,-______ ..,....  
, ," . 
. ----------" , 
IIl0 
, , 






------.-. ..-:~: ..--:-,------.-.-.--.--.---.---...... -.. -.. -.~.- ... -- .... -.... --.--- ... -._._ .. I: 
.•.. -I.·· •....... 
11'JNr'1 
, .. , " .. , ... ,.. .. 6' .. ... lit " " ." ,. 1"'. ,. 77 71 po, 
Figure 1. School Enrollments. 
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As a consequence of the rapid growth of enrollments following 
independence, government expenditures on education likewise increased 
rapidly and education's share of the governmental recurrent budget 
also increased, as indicated in Table V, on p 63. By 1976/77, the 
Ministry of Education was consuming close to 30% of the budget. As 
Nkinyangi (GR118) explains, this pattern of expenditure attests not 
only to a high social demand for education, but is indicative of the 
faith the masses and po1icymakers ascribe to the role of education as 
a panacea for societal development. It also points out the serious 

















APPROVED GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (NET) ON EDUCATION 
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(a) Totals in table are at current prices (not adjusted for inflation) 
(b) Figures are not comparable for all years. For instance, in 1970 
the Central Government took over responsibility for financing 
primary education from County Councils. 
(c) Figures for 1976/77 are revised estimates. 
* Expenditures financed by current receipt from internal borrowing 
and loan repayment receipts, direct and indirect taxation. 
Source: (KG?) 
Table VI summarizes the location of financial resources to the 
various educational systems in the country. Primary education contin-
ues to receive the largest allocation, accounting for 58% of the total 
recurrent expenditure. This despite the insistence of the Kenya Educa-
tion Commission (KG12) to assign greater urgency to secondary and 
postsecondary education to meet the manpower needs of the country. 
Secondary education received only 12% of the education budget in the 
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1978/79 fiscal year. On the whole, the large expenditure on education 
attests to a high social demand for education and also reflects planners' 
and politicians' perceptions of the importance of education in develop-
ment. 
Within the Ministry of Education budget, expenditures are distrib-
uted as shown below. 
TABLE VI 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION 




Education Section ture in Kt' s 
Administration and Planning 4,428.7 
Primary Education 59,740.1 
Secondary Education 13,003.4 
Technical Education 1,093.9 
Teacher Education 3,239.6 
Education for Handicapped 392.1 
Polytechnic Education 1,542.0 















Note: The table excludes expenditure on education by other ministries, 
notably on primary education in municipalities and on adult 
education. 
Source: (KG6, 1980: 178) 
The basic characteristic of educational policy in postcolonial Kenya 
has, therefore, been the perpetual expansion of the school system as 
a means of redressing past disparities. From the pOint of view of a 
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long term employment objective, the most damaging aspect of these events 
may be the effects of undifferentiated quantitative expansion on the 
educational system itself. As in the economy, basic structural changes 
were required in the educational system inherited from the colonial peri-
od. Yet the pressure of sheer expansion left little time for qualitative 
changes. Such expansion was supported by both young people and their 
parents who contributed enormous sums of money toward education. Thus, 
money and resources were channeled into a tremendous quantitative expan-
sion of the system still largely cast within a colonial mold. Fundamental 
changes of structure, curriculum, examination and, indeed, the whole style 
and approach of the educational system were postponed. In a sense, the 
growth of the system and the Kenyanization of enrollments had prevented 
the educational structure from being adapted to national needs and made 
more equitable. 
Despite the evident strides made in expanding educational oppor-
tunities, certain serious problems have emerged in recent years that 
deflect the country's educational goal and the reality of the economy: 
rising costs, educated unemployment, and regional disparities. This 
section will focus primarily on the distribution of educational resources 
and opportunities among regions and social groups and examine the extent 
to which such disparities have deflected the government's stated objectives 
of regional socioeconomic equity. Since education is viewed as a vehicle 
for social mobility, the analysis of educational inequality is fundamental 
to an explanation of the problem of unemployment in Kenya. 
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The Distribution of Educational Resources Since Independence 
Since independence, the government of Kenya has, in various docu-
ments, emphasized the need to distribute the fruits of development 
equitably. In Sessional Paper No. 10 (KG1), the official objectives 
were stated as: continued expansion of the economy, wider sharing of 
the benefits of expansion, national integration of the economy, and 
an attack on extreme imbalances and disparities. These objectives have 
subsequently been reflected in the country's four development plans pub-
lished since independence (1966-70; 1970-74; 1974-78; 1979-83). However, 
the development policies pursued so far have been limited, relative to 
the objectives these policies were intended to attain. In fact, they 
have produced results which often have reinforced the existing class 
and regional differences characteristic of the colonial mode of develop-
ment (GR17; GR69). The ILO Report speaks of these disparities: 
Differential access on a regional basis to such advan-
tages as roads, education, and development projects is 
closely related to economic disparity, and is thus a 
major force behind migration, both from the country to 
the towns and from one rural area to another. Particu-
larly serious is the way in which regional imbalances 
interact with tribal fears and forces, partly as a cause 
and partly as a result. 
CGR69: 301) 
The disparities described above are particularly expressed in 
the provision of educational opportunities at the regional level. Gross 
disparaties remain between provinces and districts in such areas as the 
proportion of the primary age group actually in school, distribution of 
qualified teachers, distribution of secondary schools, etc (GR85). Al-
though the disparities had their roots in the colonial political economy, 
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they have been intensified by the development policies of the post-
independence government. The disparities not only affect the structure 
and nature of the educational system, but also have a strong bearing on 
such issues as social mobility, income distribution, and social differ-
entiation. 
Primary School Enrollment. The outstanding feature of Kenyan 
education since independence has been the rate of expansion. As indi-
cated in Table VII, primary school enrollment jumped from one million in 
1965 to nearly 3 mission in 1978. However, access to primary education 
is unevenly distributed. The overall enrollment ratio (of the official 
6 to 12 age group) in 1978 was 81%. Provincial enrollment ratios ranged 
from 101% for Central Province, 99% for Eastern, 89% for Western, and 
73% for Nairobi to 56% for Coast and 11% for North Eastern Province. 
TABLE VII 
PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 1965-78 AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE PROJECTED 
SCHOOL AGE POPULATION (6-13) 
1965 % of Pop. 1978 % of Pop. 
Province Enrollment Aged 6-13 Enrollment Aged 6-13 
Central 238,001 68 615,000 100.8 
Coast 57,523 33 170,000 56.4 
Eastern 199,107 52 601,000 99.3 
N Eastern 912 2 9,000 10.8 
Nyanza 162,229 36 498,000 68.0 
R Valley 161,272 35 570,000 75.4 
Western 146,679 51 415,000 89.0 
Nai robi 45,096 57 90,000 72.6 
Kenya 1,010,889 45 2,976,900 81.0 
Source: (KG8; KG7: 1979) 
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The four provinces (Central, Eastern, Western, and Nairobi) had a head-
start in Western education because of missionary activity in the early 
days of colonialism. And since independence, these four provinces have 
been very active in lobbying for central government resources. The same 
cannot be said about North Eastern and Coast Provinces which are lagging 
well behind because of geographical and historical circumstances. Tra-
ditionally, the predominance of Islam in these two provinces restricted 
missionary expansion, resulting in a delay in Western education reaching 
them. 
The national figures on access to primary education hide sizable 
provincial differences. On the basis of data put together by Kinyanjui 
(GR86) and presented in Table VIII, there are indeed substantial dispar-
ities among provinces and districts. The explanation for these disparities 
is partly historical and partly due to a combination of political and 
economic factors. Historical factors include early missionary activity, 
particularly in Central and Western Provinces, a strong tradition of 
self-help in the former African Reserves, and the development of export 
agriculture, notably, coffee and tea in the former White Highlands. Most 
of the privileged districts had a head start in Western education because 
of a combination of these historical and economic factors and have managed 
to maintain their lead in the post-independence period because of their 
economic and political power. 
In contrast to the high participating districts, there are many 
districts with lower participation rates. These include districts in 
Coast Province where resistance to missionary evangelism and the pre-
valence of Islamic schools prevented the spread of Western educational 
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TABLE VIII 
THE PROPORTION OF SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN (6-13) ENROLLED IN 
PRIMARY SCHOOL BY DISTRICT, 1971 AND 1975 
# of Children in School as a Propor-
tion of Projected 6-13 School Age 
Population, 1971-1975 
1971 1975 
Province District % 
-.!.... 
Central Ki ambu 99 112 
Kirinyaga 67 107 
Murang'a 95 124 
Nyandarua 80 112 
Nyeri 97 120 
Coast Kil i fi 31 56 
Kwale 33 68 
Lamu 29 101 
Taita Taveta 71 99 
Tana River 41 61 
Mombasa 58 65 
Eastern Embu 67 107 
Is1010 52 59 
Kitui 56 98 
Marsabit 31 38 
Machakos 89 129 
Meru 62 92 
N Eastern Garissa 15 16 
Mandera 5 8 
Wajir 8 11 
Nyanza Ki s i i 52 114 
Kisumu 48 99 
Siaya 57 100 
South Nyanza 36 80 
R Valley Bari ngo 38 90 
Nakuru 48 91 
Laikipia 71 120 
Narok 26 50 
Kaj i ado 45 69 
Kericho 41 73 
Samburu 16 21 
E/Marakwet 39 85 
Nandi 51 102 
Uasin Gishu 39 76 
West Pokot 25 54 
TransNzoia 49 99 
Turkana 5 11 
Western Bungoma 63 113 
Busia 49 102 
Kakamega 62 116 
Nai robi 72 77 
Source: (KG8, 1971, 1975) 
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forms. Included also are the arid and semi-arid districts, mostly 
inhabited by pastoralists, and the four main urban centers of Kenya: 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru. The explanation for the low 
participation in urban centers is a simple one. While participation 
is universal among high and medium income groups, it may well be very 
low among the urban poor and the unemployed. The rising urban squatter 
settlement in these towns points to this likelihood. 
Distribution of Qualified Teachers. The shortage of qualified 
teachers has been a common problem of developing countries since inde-
pendence. Generally, Kenya has done well in comparison with other 
African countries. In 1979, nearly 75% of the primary teacher force 
was trained to teach, 37% of which had four years of high school plus 
two years of teacher training (KG6, 1980: 183). But the distribution 
of qualified teachers among the various provinces is extremely uneven. 
As shown in Table IX, 99% of the primary school teachers in Nairobi 
(for 1978) were professionally qualified, followed by Central Province, 
which listed 87% of its primary school teachers as professionally quali-
fied. The Coast Province, with only 59% of its teachers trained, ranked 
last on the list. The largest number of trained teachers was found in 
the Central, Eastern, and Rift Valley provinces, and the least number 
of untrained teachers was in Nairobi. The explanation for Central Pro-
vince and Nairobi IS share of qualified teachers is partly historical 
and partly due to a combination of political and economic factors. 
Proximity to the enclaves of European settlement and the urban center 
of Nairobi, the early missionary activity and a strong tradition of 
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1978 Absolute Numbers of Teachers 
% TRAINED UIHRAmED 
99 2,935 35 
87 14,911 2,132 
64 225 127 
64 10,800 6,088 
65 11,247 5,948 
65 12,057 6,754 
63 8,415 4,962 
59 3,312 2,416 
63,912 28,134 
Sources: (KG7, 1974, 1976, 1978; 
KG8, 1974, 1976,1978) 
Province's lead in education. Nairobi's position at the seat of qovern-
ment and industrial establishment, and a large European cOnTJ1unity, explain 
its lead in education. Therefore, there is a clear tendency for the 
relative position of the disadvantaged provinces (Coast, North Eastern, 
and Rift Valley Provinces) to have worsened over time while the privileged 
provinces have maintained their lead. The pattern is expected to be the 
same in the provision of secondary school resources and opportunities. 
Distribution of Secondary School Resources. 
(a) Secondary School Expansion. At the time of independence, the 
government of Kenya was committed to as large a secondary expansion as 
it could afford because there was actually a shortage of students suf-
ficiently qualified to replace the departing expatriates. Rapid expansion 
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was also justified to provide a sufficient number of secondary schools 
for a large number of primary school graduates. 
One of the best indicators of secondary school expansion is the 
immediate success of Harambee, or self-help schools, which were initiated 
on the basis of a felt need within each community for additional edu-
cational opportunities. Since 1967, Harambee schools have been the 
expanding edge of Kenya's secondary school system. Figure 2, following, 
illustrates the extent of the expansion. For example, in 1966 there 
were 206 government-maintained schools and 336 Harambee secondary 
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Figure 2. Secondary School Expansion, 1964-77 
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The Harambee school system is not under the jurisdiction of the 
government. The Ministry of Education has little to do with this 
school system other than to certify its existence. Initially, these 
self-help initiatives were welcomed by the authorities as a sign of 
the new modernizing spirit by the majority of Kenyans. In recent 
years, however, this uncontrolled expansion of Harambee schools has 
done much to destabilize any government effort toward a balanced ap-
proach to educational development in the country (GR81). The following 
have been the unhappy consequences of this rapid spread: (1) qualified 
teachers in Harambee schools are in short supply; (2) standards of cur-
ricula are uneven, and it is often hard to control the enforcement of 
certain minimum requirements; (3) the growing demand for academic school-
ing by the different ethnic groups hinders balanced national educational 
planning as the richer districts maintain their lead by building more 
schools and hiring the qualified teachers away from the deprived districts. 
(b) Secondary School Enrollment. Secondary education, like primary 
education, at the time of independence consisted of three separate, 
racially divided systems in which Africans made up about 37% of the to-
tal student body (GR75: 154). In 1963, about 30% of all secondary 
schools were in the urban areas, catering to the Asian and European 
communities which formed only 3% of the total Kenyan population (GR8S: 
4). In a more determined step in 1967, the government directed that 50% 
of all entering students must be Africans; and that year, the overall 
proportion of Africans in secondary schools reached 82% (GR7S: 154). The 
trend continued; and by the mid-1970's, the vast majority of students were 
Africans, although some so-called "high-cost" schools stilL.included ., 
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substantial percentages of non-Africans. 
Progress in secondary education may be judged by the fact that 
secondary enrollments increased almost ten fold in a period of thir-
teen years (see Figure 3, below), from 35,921 in 1964 to 320,000 in 
1977. Harambee schools accounted for 60% of the total secondary school 
enrollment in 1977, which implies that a high proportion of the coun-
try's secondary school students were being trained in institutions of 
low curricular quality, inferior in equipment, and inadequate in terms 
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Fiqure 3. Secondary School Enrollments 
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The low standard of education at the Harambee schools was shown 
to have a significant negative impact on the employment prospects of 
graduates from these schools. Kinyanjui (GR88), for example, reported 
that of the 1,186 secondary school leavers he traced, 37% of the 
Harambee school leavers were unemployed in their first year after 
leaving school. The corresponding figures for aided national and pro-
vincial schools were 6% and 5%, respectively. This evidence suggests 
that the different school systems in Kenya are having differential 
social impact. 
(c) Allocation of Public Funds for Secondary Education. Since 
so little data are available on the provincial allocation of government 
expenditures for education, it may also be of some interest to see how 
capital expenditures are allocated (even though this type of expenditure 
is small compared with recurrent expenditures). Only data for secondary 
schools are available (see Table X, below). 
TABLE X 
PER CAPITA DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE ON SECONDARY 

















Source: This table is taken from Bigsten (GR17), who 
made his calculations from Development Estimates. 1974/75-
1975/76 figures concern approved expenditures; 1977/78 data 
concern estimated expenditures. 
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Because these data indicate where new schools are built and where 
old ones expanded, one might expect the biggest share to go to the 
provinces, where the largest increase in enrollment has occurred. The 
Central Province had the largest increase in enrollment and also the 
largest share of development expenditures--actually more than twice 
what it would have received had the money been distributed on a percentage 
basis according to population size. Nairobi and the Coast have also 
obtained considerable sums, despite the fact that the number of pupils 
enrolled there has increased slowly. This is probably due to the fact 
that old, established, high-quality schools are well provided for. The 
Nyanza Province gets the least money per capita in development expendi-
tures. 
These partial data seem to support Nyangira's (GR12l) hypothesis 
that the money tends to flow to the most developed regions. Kinyanjui 
(GR8S: 39) also concludes from his study that educational benefits are 
being distributed in favor of the economically and politically powerful 
districts and provinces in the country. In the context of this study, 
one important qualification must be made: although the distribution of 
educational expenditures among provinces reflects inequalities, they 
are still considerably more evenly distributed than economic activity 
in general (see Appendix A). They can, therefore, to some extent be 
assumed to counterbalance the regional disparities generated by the 
production apparatus. 
(d) Distribution of Secondary Schools. In the past eighteen years, 
Kenya has achieved tremendous expansion in education, but regional inequal-
ities have remained intact, and in some cases, have worsened. The 
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distribution of secondary school institutions in 1977, shown in Table 
XI, illustrates once again the disparities which exist among the pro-
vinces. 
TABLE XI 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 1977 
% of Nat'l Aided Schools Unaided Schools Total 
Province Po~. (l969~ # % # % % 
Central 15.3 101 22 275 26 24 
Coast 8.7 31 7 40 4 6 
Eastern 17.4 76 17 198 19 18 
Nairobi 4.7 30 7 29 2 5 
N Eastern 2.2 4 0 0 
Nyanza 19.4 80 18 170 16 17 
R Valley 20.2 62 14 126 12 13 
lies tern 12.2 60 13 204 19 16 
Totals 100.0 444 100 1,042 100 100 
Source: (KG8, 1977) 
According to the figures, Central Province, with less than 15~'; 
of the national population, contained 22% of the aided schools and 26% 
of the unaided schools, with a total of 24% of the secondary schools 
in the country. The explanation for Central Province's large share of 
educational institutions is partly historical and partly due to a com-
bination of political and economic factors. Historical factors include 
the proximity of the province to the enclaves of European settlement and 
the urban center of Nairobi, early missionary activity, and a strong 
tradition of self-help in education, exemplified by the Kikuyu Indepen-
dent Schools Movement of the early 1930's. The agricultural development 
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of the area, primarily in the White Highland, and the political dom-
inance of its residents (notably the Kikuyu) have also helped to 
consolidate this lead. 
The province with the second largest provision of secondary school 
institutions was Eastern, with 18% of the total secondary institutions 
in the country. Nyanza Province had the third highest percentage of 
secondary schools in the nation, with 17. Western Province had 16%. 
These four provinces had a head start in Western education because of 
missionary activities in the early days of colonialism. Since inde-
pendence, these four provinces have been very active and sometimes very 
successful in lobbying for central government resources, in contrast to 
North Eastern, Coast, and some of the districts in Rift Valley Province. 
Although people in these areas are becoming aware of the disparities in 
education, they must contend with political and economic difficulties 
if they are to catch up. The urban areas, by comparison, are relatively 
well endowed with secondary schools. Nairobi, for instance, contained 
5% of all secondary institutions in 1977, although the figure does not 
include the elite, privately-owned schools. 
(e) Distribution of Secondary School Teachers. Secondary schools 
in Kenya are also very short of qualified teachers. As a result, the 
government has sought technical assistance personnel from friendly 
foreign countries in the form of trained teachers to overcome the exist-
ing shortages. As Table XII shows, this noncitizen assistance has been 
significant. For example, in 1970, 35% of the technical assistants in 
the country were working for the Ministry of Education (GR129: 30). In 
addition to expatriate teachers who are supplied to the government 
through bilateral aid, there are also volunteer teachers serving 












DISTRIBUTION OF QUALIFIED SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS 
BY PROVINCE AND CITIZENSHIP, 1977 
Aided Schools Unaided Schools 
Non- Non-
Citizen Citizen Total Citi zen Citizen 
943 279 1,222 290 241 
243 121 364 42 105 
551 125 676 221 121 
454 252 706 34 166 
24 24 
590 122 712 150 95 
496 145 641 126 12S 
442 44 486 68 112 











Source: (KG8, 1977) 
Of the total of 6,727 professionally qualified teachers in Kenyan 
secondary schools in 1977, 72% were located in aided schools, while 
only 28% were employed in Harambee and other unaided schools. In 1970, 
82% taught in aided schools, while only 18% were employed in Harambee 
schools (GR8S: 35). In 1977, Central Province had 26% of all qualified 
secondary school teachers. The province with the second largest provision 
was Eastern with 15%; Nyanza, Rift Valley, and the city of Nairobi had 
14%, 13%, and 13%, respectively. This again indicates the existence of 
long-established regional differences which had roots in the colonial 
period and which were accentuated in the post-independence era. 
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The citizenship profile of secondary school teachers indicates 
that nearly 31% of the qualified teachers in secondary schools are 
noncitizens. Noncitizens account for 22% of the qualified teachers 
in aided schools and 50% of the qualified teachers in unaided schools. 
In the city of Nairobi, noncitizens make up 83% of the qualified 
teachers in unaided schools. This is an indication that a high pro-
portion of the private, elite schools are concentrated in Nairobi, 
catering to the ruling classes. 
The Harambee School as a Shadow System of Education 
The Harambee School Movement, which gained momentum in the post-
independence era, had its roots in the colonial period as exemplified 
by the Kikuyu Independent Schools Movement discussed in a previous 
section. A Harambee school is usually initiated on the basis of a 
perceived need within a community for greater educational opportunity 
for its children. The people of a community raise the funds for their 
schools; they lend their labor for its construction; and they, most often 
without any governmental assistance, maintain the schools over time 
with the hope that the government will eventually step in and begin to 
materially support them. 
Despite an initial government stand on the 1964 Kenya Education Com-
mission (KG12) recommendation that Harambee schools be strictly controlled, 
there has been a gradual swing towards accommodating them. In the 
1970's and 1980's, politicians began to offer SUbstantial support for 
these projects (GR16; GR81; GR129). It is commonplace for politicians 
of national prominence to become involved with school movements. A 
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great deal of importance is placed upon the participation of members 
of parliament and local government officials. This decision was, how-
ever, calculated to shift the financial burden from the government's 
shoulders while the different communities welcomed it as an opportunity 
to take a greater role in the education of their children. 
In order to understand this apparent contradiction between stated 
objective and actual policy choice, one must place Kenya's national 
development policy in perspective. Kenya is committed to an overall 
development strategy which emphasizes gross economic growth, even at 
the expense of social equity when necessary (KG1: 18). This commitment 
underlies whatever other national choices are made. In a patron-client 
state such as Kenya, political choices are more often made which may 
not appear to make sense in strict economic terms, but which are 
nevertheless believed to enhance the attainment of broad economic goals. 
Often, social policies are adopted mainly because of the social-symbolic 
functions they serve and not because they distribute lithe most good to 
the greatest number of peop1e" (GR16: 101). 
The policy of endorsing unrestrained expansion of secondary edu-
cation, in particular the Harambee schools which are below recognized 
standards, can only be understood when political payoffs are considered. 
The growing number of Harambee schools has been complemented by an escalat-
ing demand from the general public that the government reward their 
efforts by relieving them of the tremendous financial burdens involved 
in sustaining such institutions. Through local patrons such as chiefs, 
elders, and KANU party officials and through their representatives in 
Parliament, local communities make demands upon the government to 
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contribute to the support of their schools. The government's response 
to public demand has been to incorporate 25 to 30 Harambee schools 
annually into the "aided" system. In addition, the government insti-
tuted a scheme of aid to the Harambee secondary schools in 1975 entitled 
the "Harambee Package Programme" (KG4: 420). Under this plan, fifty 
schools are offered government aid in the form of fully qualified 
teachers, audio visual equipment, and annual assistance from the Inspec-
torate. 
If a particular community lags considerably behind in education, 
the blame is always passed to the local representative, who is considered 
ineffective and is subsequently voted out of office. Consequently, 
community dissatisfaction is directed toward the local government repre-
sentative (or patron) rather than toward the national political elite 
in Nairobi. Thus, by its political-economic balancing act, the govern-
ment of Kenya is able to satisfy many demands and present the image of 
satisfying several others (GR16. GR122). As a result, an aura of sta-
bility and progress emerges which creates a climate favorable to sustained 
economic growth. In reality, however, the practice of selective incor-
poration of Harambee schools into the aided school system represents a 
token response from the government in that schools are expanding so 
rapidly that the present rate of supplying teachers or taking over 
schools is not sufficient to insure that the secondary system will be 
unitary in the near future (GR38). The merit of this paternalistic 
policy is not so much the tangible effect it has, but its symbolic 
effects. By presenting the image of doing something for the people, 
the government is able to elicit support for its policies, however 
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limited their effect may be. 
Local and national politicians justify the existence of the Haram-
bee schools on the basis of political considerations. They express 
the view that unless the people are allowed to have their own schools, 
political unrest could develop. What these politicians ignore, however, 
is that the current school phenomenon exacerbates existing regional, 
ethnic, and class inequalities, which would have a devastating effect 
on the course of general national development. In addition, the fact 
that Harambee schools are only symbolically linked to the total educa-
tional system, education inspectors could not effectively monitor the 
activities of these schools. What results is a very imperfect attempt 
by the government to determine the direction of educational policy in 
the country. 
In the final analysis, the evidence presented in this chapter 
leads to the conclusion that the development policies adopted by Kenya 
since independence did not lead to structural changes per see Instead, 
the government devoted large sums of resources to education under the 
assumption that such an investment would lead to development. The 
impact of this misguided strategy on employment will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
Summary 
In the colonial period, the role and extent of education for 
Africans was dictated by the differing interests of al1 the communities 
who played a part in the formulation of educational policies, but even 
more by those who directly controlled it. The missionaries, the 
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administration, and the Europeans formed a limited partnership. 
Later, the Africans became a fourth force; and when they failed to 
be recognized, they established their own schools outside the officially-
recognized educational system. 
The sharp inequalities among the three racial groups in the 
economic, political, and educational arenas became a major catalyst 
for the Mau Mau uprising in the early 1950 1s. The rise of African 
nationalism in this period succeeded in creating a new political con-
text in which successive colonial Secretaries accepted the urgent need 
for political and economic changes in the African community. Impor-
tant though these changes were, the underlying philosophy concerning 
development since independence was largely unchanged. The pattern of 
deco1onization was carefully controlled to bring to power an African 
petty bourgeoisie class fully committed to the maintenance of the 
status quo, thus perpetuating neocolonialism in all aspects of Kenyan 
society. Structural transformation of the Socialist type was ruled 
out from Independence Government policy. Instead, Africanization of 
the political economy became the hallmark of Kenya1s development policy 
after independence was achieved. In the educational field, this meant 
integrating a small segment of Africans into the former colonial 
institutions, thereby altering the racial composition of the schools 
without fundamental change to the structure of the educational system as 
a whole. 
The political and social forces which existed during the colonial 
period have changed somewhat with time. But, by and large, they shaped 
the development of education and particularly the inequalities which 
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occurred during the colonial period, some of which have persisted 
during the twenty years since independence. Indeed, some of the 
developments of the colonial period, such as self-help, the Harambee 
schools, and the use of examinations as a criterion for advancement, 
have gained momentum since independence. Thus, some of the dependency 
relationship has remained strong even though political independence 
has been achieved. This relationship has, however, been modified by 
the development strategies currently being applied in Kenya. 
CHAPTER III 
KENYA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE: PITFALLS IN 
PAST AND PRESENT DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
This chapter examines the relationship between the private and 
public sectors of the Kenyan economy and the pattern of national 
development since independence. Specifically, this section demon-
strates how Kenya's continued dependency on external economic actors 
has created a development pattern that cannot generate enough employ-
ment opportunities to meet the needs of Kenyan school 1eavers. 
Since independence in 1963, Kenya has attracted attention as 
one of the success stories of Africa, both politically and economically. 
The evidence presented in this chapter questions this assumption and 
points to the continued vulnerability and limitations of the Kenyan 
economy imposed by its periphery role within the world system. 
Kenya's economic difficulties came to a head in the late 1970's, 
then spilled over into the 1980's as real growth lost pace with the 
country's soaring population increase, causing a decline in per capita 
gross domestic product (GOP). The principal factors leading up to 
the economic stagnation are: a high-priced, import-intensive indus-
trial sector; low world prices for coffee and tea; continued bottle-
necks in the agricultural sector; and rapidly increasing prices for 
manufactured imports. Declining export receipts and high import 
dependance contribute to chronic balance of payments deficits and more 
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hard times ahead for the Republic of Kenya. These economic problems 
diminish the aspirations of school graduates in obtaining attractive 
modern sector jobs. 
PRIORITIES IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Kenya has defined development in terms of the continued gl"owth 
·,and elaboration of the political and economic institutions established 
in the country during the colonial period. With respect to economic 
policy, the government has concentrated its attention on the achieve-
ment of rapid economic growth rates which it considers necessary to 
raise the standard of living in the country. The government's docu-
ment outlining the official development ideology is titled, African 
Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya (Sessional Paper 
No. 10, 1965). The document's emphasis on fast economic growth is 
based on the assumption that social justice can be achieved only by 
sharing wealth, not poverty. The document points out that 
The most important {policy} is to provide a firm basis 
for rapid economic growth. Other immediate problems such 
as Africanization of the economy, education, unemployment, 
welfare services~ and provi~cial policies must be handled 
in ways that will not jeopardize growth. The only perma-
nent solution to all of these problems rests on rapid 
growth. If grcwth is given up in order to reduce unem-
ployment, a growing population will quickly demonstrate 
how false that policy is; if Africanization is undertaken 
at the expense of growth, our reward will be a falling 
standard of living; if free primary education is achieved 
by sacrificing growth, no jobs will be available for the 
school leavers. Growth, then, is the first concern of 
planning in Kenya (emphasis added). 
(KG1: 18) 
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The government has sought to promote rapid economic growth 
by means of encouragement of. both small-holder and large-scale farming, 
public investment and accelerated industrialization by providing in-
centives for private investment in modern industry, including foreign 
investment. The commitment to private investment, foreign investment 
in particular, is clearly stated in the latest Development Plan: 
The government will continue to maintain the policy of 
a mixed economy. The target of high growth rate of the 
sector will require substantial resources for investment. 
Greater reliance will be placed on the private sector 
investment, which will include investment from abroad. 
As in the past, the government will continue to welcome 
foreign investment and to provide adequate measures to 
safeguard such investments. Foreign enterprises will be 
welcomed and will be assured the ossibilit of ade uate 
repatriation of profits. emphasis added. 
(KG5:332) 
In short, the Kenyan development model can be characterized as 
"mixed;" it incorporates a diversity of organizational forms and 
incentives, and combines private enterprise with significant govern-
ment participation and guidance. This approach, from the standpoint 
of the main thrust of growth, reflects the belief that broader social 
justice for the majority of Kenyans could only be achieved by pursuing 
a development strategy similar to the colonial economic structure. 
The new strategy in essence advocated that all the main elements 
of the colonial economic planning approach remain intact except for 
(a) the conversion of parts of the former White Highlands from large-
scale farming to small-scale household plots for the most land-hungry 
peasants; and (b) ending the colonial restrictions of cash crop pro-
duction in the former African Researves (CG2). Important though 
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these changes were, the underlying philosophy concerning economic 
development was on maximizing growth, as measured in GNP. In order 
to obtain this narrow economic goal, imported capital, skills, and 
enterprises were to be the main sources of this developmental objec-
tive. The result of such strategy has been the concentration of 
political and economic power in one or two urban centers while 
effectively ignoring the development potential of the rural areas 
, . 
where 90% of Kenya's population resides. In other words, the demand 
for infrastructure grows where political power to obtain it is the 
greatest. 
THE STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE KENYAN ECONOMY 
SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1963 
The first feature of the Kenyan economy revealed by an examina-
tion of the national accounts is the existence of subsistence 
semimonetary) and modern (monetary) sectors and a long-established 
tradition of exchange relations between them. There is a wide discrep-
ancy between the two, each commanding unparalleled strength and 
influence in the economy. Most of the production in the traditional 
(or semimonetary) economy is agricultural, and a large part of the 
rural population's food is produced and consumed with only minimum 
intervention of a monetary economy. The relative contribution of the 
subsistence sector to the welfare of the population is greater than 
its relative monetary importance in terms of the gross national product. 
Table XIII details the percentage of the semimonetary sector's 
contribution to the GOP. 
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TABLE XIII 
PERCENTAGE OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SEMIMONETARY SECTOR TO GDP, 
1964-79 
1964 1970 1972 1974 1976 1977 
Agri culture 22.9 20.0 17.6 16.5 15.3 14.6 
A 11 other 4.1 3.5 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 
Total nonmonetary 27.0 23.5 21.9 20.8 19.5 18.7 
Total Monetary 73.0 76.5 78.1 79.2 80.5 81.3 
Total Economy 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: (KG6, 1975, 
It is estimated that over 90% of Kenya's 16 mill ion people 
1 i ve in the rural areas where they earn their livelihood. A large 
1978) 
proportion of the rural population is engaged in subsistence farming, 
characterized by low earnings and often temporary employment (GR152: 2). 
Because of population pressure and limited land for farming, the vast 
majority of the rural population frequently migrate to the cities in 
search of jobs or they work on a part-time basis in the cash crop 
growing multinational farms. According to one estimate (GR107), 
approximately 60% of the rural labor force is migrant in anyone 
season for two reasons: (a) jobs that occur in the modern sector are 
considered to be more permanent and rewarding than those in the tra-
ditional sector, and (b) in the modern sector, wages are much higher 
due to labor productivity resulting from scientific production methods. 
This has intensified competition for modern sector jobs, particularly 
among those with some years of formal education (GR132). 
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Within the modern sector, agriculture is, of course, a major 
component of the economy, accounting for 34% of GOP in 1979 (See Table 
XIV). The figure for 1964 was 23%. This does not mean that Kenya 
was becoming more agricultural in the sense that more of its resources 
were being devoted to agriculture. On the contrary, the growth in the 
importance of agriculture in GOP has nothing to do with any actions by 
Kenyans. It is the result of a rise in the world price for Kenya's 
agricultural exports, notably coffee and tea. The export price of 
coffee rose from K.shs. 10/71 per kg in 1974 to K.shs. 43/33 in 1977. 
The price of tea rose from K.shs. 7/82 per kg to K.shs. 20/44 in the 
same period (KG6, 1978). In 1975, the contribution of agriculture to 
monetary GOP was 18%, yet two years later it was marginally under 30%. 
No shift of resources into agriculture could have accounted for such 
an enormous change over so short a time. Its contribution has increased 
simply because world prices have increased. This description reflects 
once again the importance of semimonetary as well as monetary agri-
culture in the country's economy. 
Since independence, the Kenyan economy has performed remarkably 
well despite the setbacks in the latter half of the 1970's. As shown 
in Table XV, there were sUbstantial variations over the period 
under review, ranging from a record 7.8% in 1968 to a dismal all-time 
low of about 1% in 1975. Oue to increases in the price of coffee 
and tea in 1976 and 1977, the economy achieved a growth rate of 7.3% 
in 1977. The dependence of the economy on a few cash crops and its 
consequent vulnerability can be seen from the low rate of growth 
achieved in 1979 and 1980 due to fluctuation in the world price for 
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TABLE XIV 
GOP BY SOURCE, AT CONSTANT PRICES 
1964 
Sectors 1964 1968 1973 1974 1977 1979 1973-77 
Agriculture, 39.8 36.3 34.6 29.8 29.0 36.0 - 0.1 
forestry, & 
fishing 
(semi monetary) (22.9) (21. 0 (18.5) (15.3) (14.6) ( 0.7) (-1.1) 
(monetary) (16.9) (15.3) (16.2) (14.5) (14.4) (35.3) ( 0.9) 
Manufacturing 10.4 10.4 11.6 13.3 15.6 13.2 1 Q.8 
repairing 
Building & 3.8 4.3 4.2 6.5 5.3 3.9 11.0 
construction 
Electricity & 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.8 2.4 1.3 8.3 
water 
General govern- 12.8 14.6 16.8 15.1 17.8 14.5 5.5 
ment Services 
Other Services 31.1 32.5 30.7 33.5 29.9 13.5 3.3 
Total 
Economy 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.0 
Sources: (KG6 & KG7, 1973-80) 
coffee and tea as well as the increase in the price of imported oil. 
The growth rate is likely not to exceed 3% before 1984, still well be-
low the targeted rate of 5.4% mentioned in the latest Development Plan 
(KG5) (GR152). Continued economic problems mean limited expansion of 
employment opportunties and thus, prolonged unemployment for the school 
1eavers. 
For a proper understanding of the performance of the economy, two 
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when the economy grew steadily at an annual rate of 6.6%; and the s~cond 
phase is 1973-80, when, as a result of the impact of a series of inter-
national crises, widespread drought which affected agriculture, and the 
balance-of-payment difficulties, growth slowed down substantially. A 
boost came in 1976 and 1977 from an unprecedented boom in the world 
price for coffee and tea. The boom was followed by another severe 
balance-of-payments problem. 
The impetus for growth in 1964-73 came mainly from the monetary 
economy comprising modern sector activities--manufacturing, agricul-
ture, and services--which grew at an annual average rate of 7.5% as 
compared with about 3.7% for the semimonetary economy, made up mostly 
of traditional subsistence and small-holder cash crop agriculture 
(KG6, 1971, 1974). Agricultural growth was stimulated by redistribu-
tion of large estates to small-holder, rapid diffusion of hybrid 
maize, and small-holder output growth. Manufacturing was stimulated 
by the expansion of domestic demand due to rising agricultural in-
comes. Investment for domestic production was encouraged by a high 
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level of protection, a liberal attitude towards foreign investment, 
and active government promotion of and some participation in manu-
facturing (KG18). Despite a rapid growth of population between 
1964 and 1973 averaging 3.6% annually, real income per head increased 
an average of nearly 3% per annum over this period (KG6 & KG7, 1964-73). 
In monetary terms, GDP per head at current prices increased progres-
sively from about Kt35 in 1964 to Kt58 in 1973 (KG6, 1965, 1974). 
One item which is of particular interest to this study is the fast 
growth of general government services. Its contribution to total GDP 
increased from 12.8% to nearly 17% between 1964 and 1973 (see Table 
XIV), due'mainly to the rapid expansion of education in the 
decades after independence. At present, an average of approximately 
30% of the total government expenditure is spent on education. 
Kenya's growth performance since 1974 has been especially vul-
nerable to swings in its international terms of trade. Whereas an 
average annual growth rate of approximately 7% was achieved between 
1970-73, it fell sharply to 3.5% in real terms in 1974, and still fur-
ther to about 1% in 1975 (KG6, 1977). This was attributed to the 
disappointing growth of agriculture (see Table XIV), traditionally 
Kenya's most important sector. The dramatic increase in petroleum 
and other import prices raised input costs (i.e., fertilizers and 
imported equipment) in monetary agriculture, and the widespread 
drought throughout Kenya in 1973 and 1974 adversely affected output 
in both traditional and modern sector agriculture, but particularly 
the former. The economy rebounded in 1976-77 due to the "coffee boom II 
following frost damage in Brazil, and decelerated after 1978 when 
95 
coffee prices began to approach a more normal level. 
Manufacturing growth, on the other hand, was less affected than 
growth in the other sectors of the monetary economy by the events 
of 1973 and 1974. The average growth rate of the manufacturing 
sector was 16.9% between 1970-79, as opposed to 11.3% in 1964-70 
(KG6, 1980: 29). Manufacturing share in the GDP rose from 12.5% in 
1964 to 15.6% in 1977. In 1979, the manufacturing share of GDP 
was 13.2%, while the share of agriculture in GDP was 36%. This 
indicates the continuing preponderance of agriculture as the major 
productive sector of the economy, despite the effort that was made 
to develop the manufacturing industry at a rapid rate. 
The dramatic growth of industry in Kenya has been largely 
based on simple import-substitution industries developed by multi-
national companies (GR76; GR102). Manufacturing production also 
catered to the export markets in neighboring countries, particularly 
in the protected East African Community (EAC). The scope of further 
industrialization along these lines is limited; the easy import 
substitution possibilities have been exhausted, and the EAC prefer-
ence for Kenyan goods ended with the collapse of the community in 
1977. The past pattern of industrialization has left Kenya's 
manufacturing sector increasingly dependent on imported raw materials 
and component and spare parts, and thus vulnerable in case of a 
shortage of foreign exchange. 
According to the Development Plan, 1979-83 (KG5: 327), about 
50% of Kenya's import bill is accounted for by capital and imported 
intermediate goods. Machinery and capital equipment account for 
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approximately 20% of all imports, and intermediate industrial 
supplies account for 30%. As the manufacturing sector grows rapidly, 
its demand for imported inputs is.·.bound to intrease at an equally 
fast rate. The result has been a foreign exchange bottleneck. It 
has become necessary to reorient industry toward increased use of 
domestic inputs and increased production. However, export perform-
ance has not been satisfactory in that it has grown consistentl~'at 
a slower pace than GOP and has not shown sufficient diversification. 
The most disturbing aspect of recent performance, from the point 
of view of future growth prospects, has been the chronic underlying 
tendency toward a trade and balance-of-payment deficit, which reflects 
the capital-intensiveness of the import-reproduction process (with 
huge increases in the import bill) and the fact that the end of the 
easy stage of that process was virtually exhausted by 1972. The 
1975-77 coffee boom disguised this tendency for a time. But during 
1978-80, Kenya again experienced strong external shocks as a result of 
the latest round of petroleum price increases and declining coffee 
prices. The balance-of-payments and income effects of these increases 
were compounded by poor weather affecting coffee and maize production. 
Once a self-sufficient nation, Kenya can no more feed its own peo-
ple adequately. As a result, GOP growth slowed to 4.2% in 1979 and 
to an estimated 2.4% in 1980 (GR152, GR153). The trade deficit rose 
very sharply in 1978, and foreign exchange reserves rapidly diminished. 
The increase in petroleum prices, combined with additional food im-
ports, resulted in a 25% rise in the value of imports in 1980 (KG6, 
1981). While exports rose by 16%, this was not sufficient to prevent 
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an increase in the current account deficit to almost US$900 million, 
and, despite increased external borrowing, a decline of US$195 million 
in foreign exchange reserves (GR169, PI16,17). 
Despite an impressive rate of growth in GNP. unemployment and 
gross inequalities in Kenya continue. In many cases, these inequali-
ties may have been accentuated by the policies of the government 
and the country·s position as a periphery of Western capitalism. A 
World Bank staff member estimated that for 1969, the poorest 40% of 
Kenya·s population received only 10% of the total income, while the 
richest 10% received 56%; the top 5% obtained 44% of the income, and 
the top 1% received 8% (GRlll). When compared with other countries, 
the interpersonal distribution of income in Kenya is among the most 
unequal in the world. A cross-national study conducted by Chenery 
et al (GR33) ranks Kenya as the seventh most unequal of twenty-six 
countries, with only Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) under European racist 
rule being more unequal in Africa. And there is not any 
significant evidence of an improvement in this situation during 
the 1970·s and 1980·s. These sharp inequalities inevitably create 
strong ambitions among the populace to migrate to the cities, to 
strive for higher education, to search for jobs. As long as extreme 
imbalances persist, so will unemployment and poverty. 
Foreign Investment and Governmental Policy 
The Kenyan government has taken a positive stance toward foreign 
investment in the country, particularly when there is Kenyan equity 
participation. And there are, at present, no legal limitations on the 
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percentage of foreign ownership. This policy is part of an overall 
effort to industrialize Kenya and to reduce its reliance on agriculture 
to provide employment for its nationals. In the pages that follow, 
by evaluating past and present performance of foreign investors and 
the overall impact they have had on Kenya, one is led to question 
the extent and type of employment efforts undertaken to date in the 
country. 
Since independence, emphasis has repeatedly been placed in 
the Development Plans upon achieving an ambitiously rapid rate of 
growth of industrial output, while at the same time, a domestic 
resource gap has been identified as a major constraint to the achieve-
ment of the target growth rate. And there has been an explicit 
decision by the government to rely heavily upon foreign sources of 
finance (both investment and aid) as an integral feature of its 
development strategy. The Sessional Paper on African Socialism 
stated that 
the real solution to the problem (shortage of capital) 
is to raise per capita income, that is to grow. The 
dilemma we face is easy to state but much more diffi-
cult to solve. To grow faster we must save more, but 
to save more we must grow faster. In order to compen-
sate for our shortage of domestic capital, in order to 
grow rapidly so that our aspirations can be realized, 
we must borrow from foreign governments and inter-
national institutions and stimulate the inflow of 
private capital from abroad. 
(KG1: 19) 
One important aspect of the industrialization policy has been 
the open door policy towards foreign investment. The Foreign Invest-
ment Protection Act of 1964 signifies the importance the government 
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attaches to foreign investment in national development. The Act 
provided for the issuing of a guarantee certificate to existing and 
new foreign investors, provided the Minister of Finance considered 
the object of their investment (or reinvestment projects) to be 
in the best interests of Kenya (KG18: 3-4). The Act further 
stipulated that the holder of a Certificate of Approved Enterprise 
could transfer out of Kenya, in the approved foreign currency and 
at the prevailing rage of exchange: 
• the profits, after taxation, of his investment of foreign 
assets; 
• the approved portion of the net proceeds of sales of all 
or any part of the approved enterprise, either in liquida-
tion or as a going concern; 
• the principal and interest of any loan specified in the 
certificate (p 26). 
The Act further reaffirmed that no approved enterprise or any 
property should be compulsory in the taking of possession and acqui-
sition and in the payment of full and prompt compensation contained in 
Article 73 of the Constitution of Kenya. 
Foreign companies benefit from a number of incentives accorded 
them by the government. The most important of these are the freedom 
of repatriation of profits, liberal depreciation allowances on their 
investments, and product market protection from other competitors. 
Generally, after tax profits, excluding profits of a capital nature, 
may be remitted only on equity capital brought into Kenya. After 
tax, there is a withholding tax on dividends remittances. Interest 
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on approved loans, which can be acknowledged in foreign currency, 
may be repatriated subject to a deduction of withholding tax. 
Repatriation of royalties and service fees is subject to the approval 
of an agreement by the Central Bank, and withholding tax is deductible. 
Corporate Taxes. The corporate tax rate for industrial enter-
prise is 45% of the net profits, excluding dividends received from 
resident companies. The tax on the income of branches of foreign 
firms is 52.5% (GR152: 20). Profits from life insurance business 
and the mining of certain specified minerals are taxed at a lower 
rate. New mining companies are afforded partial tax relief by paying 
only 28% for five years after the company initially makes a profit 
(GR152: 20). 
Companies that deliberately accumulate profits so that share-
holders can avoid taxation or distribute them in a nontaxable form 
are subject to further tax under the anti-avoidance provisions of 
the Income Tax Act. The withholding tax rates from January 1, 1982 
are as follows: a 20% tax on dividends and a 20% tax on interest have 
been introduced to be paid by residents and nonresidents. A with-
holding tax of 30% has been imposed on all payments of management 
fees and royalties to nonresidents (GR154: 415, Section 152). Where 
double taxation agreements exist between Kenya and the recipient 
country of residence, these rates are reduced. 
The various taxes imposed on foreign investors, however are 
never fully realized. According to the ILO Report (GR69: 437), for-
eign companies remit their net profits to their parent companies 
without paying tax. and in various cases, they have been shown to 
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underdeclare their true profitability. By remitting accrued profits 
through other channels (such as royalties, transfer pricing on inter-
mediates, interest payments on interaffiliate debts, overinvoicing, 
etc), they are achieving considerable tax avoidance in Kenya (GR69: 
453-456; GR102). For example, Exchange Control authorities in Kenya 
estimated that overpricing of intermediate goods is 20 to 30% more 
than they would fetch on the open market (GR69: 454). The combined 
effect of this is to reduce the potential inflow of foreign exchange 
and revenues required for economic development. As indicated in Table 
XVI below, the dividend outflow for 1970 was almost equivalent to 
TABLE XVI 
INFLOW AND OUTFLOW OF CAPITAL (Kt 1000) 
Profits (After Tax Retention Dividend* Inflow of New 
Year & Deereciation) Ratio Outflow Caeital 
1963 9,843 36 6,329 6,286 
1964 8,665 41 5,119 7,254 
1965 8,731 35 5,713 5,782 
1966 8,750 32 5,950 700 
1967 9,079 53 4,267 5,934 
1968 11 ,791 65 4,127 4,428 
1969 12,515 54 5,757 6,147 
1970 17,428 54 8,017 9,447 
* These are declared outflows. Real outflow can be very different 
owing to the use of transfer pricing. 
Source: (GR1l6, GR69: 136, 
Table 37) 
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the inflow of new capital into the country. In order to finance the 
outflow of dividends, government policies have to be continually 
shaped so as to attract a high rate of foreign investment. Such 
policies are manifestations of the dependence and underdevelopment 
of Kenya and emphasize its powerlessness to shape the course of 
national development independently. Under such conditions, the 
ability of the Kenyan government to formulate and implement policies 
directed toward the problem of graduate unemployment is severely 
circumscribed. 
Subsidies and Other Incentives. In addition to the repatriation 
of profits. Kenyan tax law specifies various other permissible invest-
ment deductions to attract foreign investors. The government advertises 
that "an industrialist can write off l20~~ of his investment against 
taxable income over a period of a few years" (KGll: 3). Since 1975, 
however. the initial investment allowance has been restricted to 20% 
of investments in the rural areas or small towns (GR69: 438; KG19). 
This allowance. which at current company tax rates represents a 
subsidy of 9% of new investments in fixed assets. was designed to 
encourage a wider geographical distribution of investments. 
Annual deductions for certain classes of capital expenditures 
incurred for business purposes are allowed as follows: 
• Industrial buildings, such as factories~ 4%, and "approved" 
hotels: 6% annually on the expenditure incurred . 
• Plant and machinery: heavy self-propelling vehicles such 
as tractors: 38% on the declared value; other self-propelling 
vehicles such as cars: 25%; all other machinery, including 
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ships: 12.5%. 
• Mining: 40% of expenditure in the first year and 10% 
in each of the following years. 
• Farm works: 20% of expenditure in the first and each of 
the four following years. 
An investment deduction is also given on the capital cost of con-
struction: 40% on ships, 20% on new factory buildings and new 
machinery installed in them, and a 20% deduction on new hotels (GR152: 
17). 
Even so, recent studies by Norcliff (GRl19) and Richardson (GR133) 
indicate that investment deductions do little to stimulate investment 
and industrial dispersion. Norcliff argues that since most industries 
believe that the greatest efficiency is to be achieved in Nairobi 
and Mombasa, there is very little pressure for localization outside 
the two big cities. According to estimates made by the ILO (GR69: 
438), investment deductions had a revenue cost of about L330,000 
a year in 1966 and 1967. This is equivalent to more than 1% of govern-
ment revenue from direct taxation in those years.* 
The availability of loans and equity participation by the 
government in manufacturing investments is another form of financial 
incentive. The extent of access to local capital for foreign enter-
prise has varied from time to time, and bank borrowing had been 
restricted to an amount equal to between 20 and 60% of the foreign 
* The consequent unavailability of such revenues directly impacts the 
performa~c~ of the economy and hence the expansion of employment 
opportunltles to Kenyans. 
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equity (GR69: 452). However, local funds are available from other 
banks, including statutory bodies. The Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation (ICDC), the Development Finance Company of 
Kenya (DFCK), and the Industrial Development Bank (lOB) lend money 
to foreign multinationals who participate in joint venture activities 
with the government. Using data collected by Herman (GR69: 45~) and con,-
bininq it with the UNCTAD (GRi16) data, the ILO Mission estimated that 
about 30% of all local private and public capital invested in manu-
facturing during 1964-70 went into foreign-owned companies. Furthermore, 
joint venture activities provide foreign corporations new avenues of 
access to the national policymaking process. This point is supported 
by the findings generated from the case study of the Industrial and 
Commercial Development Corporation presented at the end of this chap-
ter. The findings of the case study suggest that Kenya's attempt to 
maintain national control of the economy through public investment has 
been unsuccessful. 
Probably the most important incentive to foreign investment is, 
in fact, the protection which is accorded to many activities; and it 
has been suggested that "foreign firms are lodged securely where pro-
tection is highest" (GR68). Protection is given by import duties, by 
licensing and quantitative restrictions, and by remissions and draw-
backs of duty paid by manufacturers on imports used in production. 
Duties on most imported items range from 13 to 75% (GR152:6). 
In 1981, the Kenyan government unveiled a new import policy 
linked to a revised tariff schedule in an effort to shift emphasis from 
import substitution to promotion of industrial exports and the 
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elimination of quantitative restrictions and import licensing. 
Henceforth, all imported goods will be categorized into three import 
schedules on the basis of their importance to the Kenyan economy. The 
three schedules are as follows: Schedule I (most essential, i.e., raw 
materials, capital goods, spare parts, etc), Schedule IIA (priority 
goods used in industry or agriculture and petroleum products), and 
Schedule lIB (nonessential goods, for which domestic equivalents or 
substitutes exist). Schedule lIB items will receive the foreign ex-
change remaining after the demand for the importation of more essential 
goods is satisfied. 
Like the tax laws, the new import policy is not strictly en-
forced. Individual investors are able to negotiate special protection 
for their investments. As the manager of one American subsidiary 
put it: 
We used to put 100% deposit before importing capital 
goods into the country. Not anymore, thanks to the 
Kenyan representative on our Board of Directors. 
When our partners cannot make a breakthrough, our 
Managing Director goes directly to the President of 
the Republic. 
(PI: 18) 
In addition, the level of restrictions vary with the country's balance-
of-payments situation. At present, due to a deficit position and 
because of increasing fuel costs, controls are rigidly applied. 
A survey of 50 foreign subsidiaries that have significant domes-
tic-oriented manufacturing investments indicate that 48% of them have 
sought protection and another 38% were seeking protection in 1973 
(GR99). Out of the 19 subsidiaries involved in entry negotiations 
106 
in 1973, 53% were seeking import protection, while another 32% were 
seeking the right to import machinery and/or inputs duty free. Most 
of these subsidiaries achieved their objectives successfully. The 
profits obtained through protection from sales on the domestic market, 
together with the provision for the expatriation of funds, make it 
possib1e--indeed provide an incentive for foreign firms lito expatriate 
foreign exchange they have neither earned nor saved" (GR169: 310). 
TABLE XVII 
SUBSIDIARY REQUEST FOR IMPORT PROTECTION 
ill {2) {3) (4) {5) {6) 
% of N ~~ of N 
reporting seeking % of N (3) (4) 
sought protection with as % + 
N Erotection successfu11i erotection of {2) {3) 
50 48% 38% 38% 79% 76% 
r~ajor Issues Raised in Entry Negotiations by Subsidiaries (N=19): 
% of 19 subs. % of achievement 
involved of objectives 
• Seek import protection 
via tariff 53% 90% 
• Seek right to import machin-ery/inputs duty free 32% 100% 
• Seek government finance in project 16% 67~& 
• Seek guarantee against domestic competition 11% 100% 
• Seek long-term status quo 
clause 11% 100% 
• Seek guarantee or work permits 11% 100% 
• Seek approval for generous free agreements 11% 100% 
Source: compiled from (GR99, Tables B-12 & B-17) 
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A study conducted by M Phelps and B Wasow (GR128) concluded that 
consumer goods industries generally received a significantly higher 
level of effective protection (69%) than those producing intermediate 
goods (20%). Comparing the ranking of industries by the level of 
effective protection they were receiving and by their profitability 
at world prices, Phelps concludes that there is a significant negative 
correlation between the two. In other words, industries receiving 
the highest levels of protection tended also to be the least profitable 
at world market prices (GR128: 25). A high degree of effective pro-
tection may either enhance the profitability of the protected activity 
at the expense of local consumers, or, alternatively, may either allow 
a high degree of inefficiency to exist or may make nonviable industries 
artificially profitable. The primary cost of resource misallocation 
suggested here must relate to the increased cost of living and the 
loss of consumer surplus which result from the ability of producers 
in Kenya to charge high prices behind the tariff barriers. The 
protected industries are not infant industries; rather, they are 
subsidiaries of large multinationals whose employment contribution 
is very limited. The result is a structure of effective protection 
with a wide dispersion of rates and little connection between the 
protection rate and the need for protection. This situation does not 
best serve Kenya1s developmental objectives: rapid economic growth, 
social equality, and expanded employment opportunities. 
The protective system also allows free entry of intermediate 
products. This free entry provides a specific encouragement for manu-
facturers to use imported inputs and directly discourages the domestic 
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production of intermediate goods, which reinforces the tendency of manu-
facturing investment to concentrate on final-stage processing (GR99). 
It also encourages the use of productive methods which use imported 
capital rather than local labor. According to ILO estimates, duty 
drawbacks on imported intermediate goods and capital equipment in 
1969 were equivalent to a revenue loss of Ktl.3 million (GR69: 438). On the 
whole, protection and permission to export profits together confer great 
benefit on the foreign investor, while depriving Kenya of the needed 
foreign exchange inflow required for expanding the economy and employ-
ment opportunities. 
Scale of Foreign Enterprise in Kenya. Only limited evidence 
exists on the financial structure of foreign enterprise in Kenya. Many 
private companies in the estate sector are owned by foreigners, and a 
number of subsidiaries of major enterprises are also set up as private 
companies. The larger subsidiaries, particularly those that seek govern-
ment equity participation, are public companies. 
In agriculture, most of the large settler estates have now been 
taken over by indigenous Kenyans, and much of the prime land has been 
subdivided into small holdings. Foreign investment remains high in 
tea and coffee estates. According to ILO estimates, about 40% of the 
coffee and 70% of the tea produced in Kenya come from estates (GR69: 
431). Only pineapple growing and processing is still dominated by Del 
Monte, registered under its subsidiary, Kenya Canners Ltd. 
In the private service sector, foreign investment has lost its 
dominance, with the possible exception of tourism--the second largest 
foreign exchange earner. Similarly, foreign trading companies which 
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failed to move into manufacturing have also been taken over by local 
c~~ital, although takeover here does not imply independence by indig-
enous firms. On the contrary, indigenous firms are dependent on 
foreign investment for both technology and financial capital (GR69; 
GR77; GR102). 
The greatest part of foreign direct investment in Kenya has been 
in import-substituting industries, particularly textiles, footwear, 
assembly industries, paper and paper products. Studies undertaken by 
Kaplinsky (GR77) on the ownership of all large scale manufacturing and 
all tourist firms in 1966 (GRl14) and 1976, summarized in Table XVIII. 
show the share of this foreign investment and how it changed in the 
period between 1966 and 1976. The 285 firms operating in 1966 and 
421 firms operating in 1976 are subdivided into two different categories 
for analytical purposes: by sector and by size of issued capital. 
As indicated in the table, foreign subsidiaries are predominant in 
footware, leather, rubber, industrial chemicals, paint, soap, cement, and 
metal products. Despite a decline in recent years, food and beverages 
still remain preeminent. 
While the share of foreign investment in total equity varies over 
time and by sector and size of the group, the most striking observa-
tion is that the share of total equity owned by foreign capital declined 
from 59.3% in 1966 to 42% in 1976. However, this cannot be taken as 
evidence that foreign enterprise is losing its dominance in the Kenyan 
economy. The decline reflects the tendency of large foreign firms to 
sell off a minority of their share holdings to individual Kenyans or 
to state corporations. While the proportion of foreign equity in the 
TABLE XVII I 
SUMMARY OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN LARGE SCALE MANUFACTURING AND TOURIST FIRMS. 1966-76 
1966 1976 1966-1976 
Total .~ of Total ~ of 
foreign issued foreign i~sued Growth of Growth of 
Type Total owned capital Total owned capital total foreign 
of issued issued foreign issued issued foreign issued issued 
Firm capital capital owned capi tal capita 1 owned capita 1 capita 1 
KL KL KL KL KL 'j, 'j, 
----
(a) b,)' industr,)' 
Food. beverages 14.876.072 7.250.526 48.7 45.863.454 13.253.442 28.9 308 183 
Textiles, leather 2,150.727 1.223.597 59.6 14.849.560 8.393.968 56.5 690 686 
Wood. furniture 435.660 5.000 1.2 1.264.697 189.546 15 290 3.791 
Paper. printing 528.486 5.291 1 8.104.734 3.279.144 40.5 1.534 61.976 
Chemicals. rubber 8.628.955 7.698.132 89.2 19.121.916 13.607.520 71.2 222 177 
Pottery. glass 2.241.450 1.126.352 50.3 2.337,000 1.036.980 44.4 104 92 
Basic metals 300.004 100.003 33.3 2.100.000 571.725 27.2 700 572 
Fabricated metal 
products 1.814.776 1.154.340 63.6 8.713,301 4,438,560 50.9 480 385 
Other manufacturing 103.770 73.614 70.9 443.008 143.459 32.4 427 195 
Total manufacturing 31.079.540 18.636,831 60 44.914,116 19.627.468 43.7 331 241 
Large touri st 785.190 13.181 1.7 7.709.327 2.017.287 26.2 982 1~,205 
Small tourist 51.015 NA NA 1.366.281 2 0 2.678 NA 
(b) b,)' size of 
issued caDi tal 
TIIT 
1- 99 66 6 9.1 115 6 5.2 174 100 
100- 999 3.762 987 26.2 4.760 539 11.3 127 55 
1.000- 9.999 240.460 30.325 12.6 307,650 27.980 9.1 128 92 
10,000- 49,999 1.690,013 481,869 28.5 2,258.508 3137,032 17.1 134 80 
30.000-199.999 5,000,120 2.629.740 52.6 12.331.231 4.246.753 34.4 247 162 
200.000-999.999 10.330.875 5.574,177 5.4 33.407.599 15.409.875 46.1 323 277 
Over 1.000.000 14.173.740 9.932.896 70.1 63,562.890 26.859.127 42.3 449 270 
....... 
Totals 31,439.046 18,650.000 59.3 III .872.750 46.931.312 42 355.8 251.6 
0 
Source: (GR77: 9) compiled from Kenya Central 
Bureau of Statistics 
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wholly owned category (95%-100%) fell from 76.3% to 45.4% between 
1966 and 1976, the proportion in the majority-owned category (50-95%) 
rose correspondingly from 16.2% to 48% (GR77: 15). Despite the growth 
of small, indigenously owned firms, there is little evidence to sug-
gest that the dominant position Qf foreign investment eroded in the 
first 13 years after independence. Furthermore, the increased involve-
ment by parastata1s in joint venture has not been accompanied by an 
impressive rate of return. While the rate of return for other companies 
averaged between 12% and 25% in the mid-1970's, the corresponding figure 
for state investments was only 5% (GR77: 11; GR102: 25). In short, the 
influence of foreign capital has increased over the years (see Table 
XIX), and there is no suggestion that such influence will decline in 
the future. What the evidence suggests is that as long as the economy 
is controlled from the outside, the capacity of the government to design 
and implement policies directed toward the problem of urban unemployment 
is severely limited. 
Choice of Technology. Concern with the "emp1oyment prob1em" 
inevitably raises the question of the nature of technology employed in 
the Kenyan manufacturing sector. Foreign-owned subsidiaries typically 
produce inappropriate products (those demanded by a small, rich minority 
of the local population), stimulate inappropriate consumption patterns 
through advertising and monopolistic market power, and operate with 
inappropriate (capital-intensive) technologies of production. This is 
perhaps the major area of criticism of multinational corporations 
(GR14; GR76; GR99). 
Results from available studies on the capital-intensity of Kenyan 
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TABLE XIX 
DISTRIBUTION OF PARASTATAL INVOLVEMENT BY OWNERSHIP 
1966 1976 
(~OOO) % (~OOO} % 
Total parastata1 involvement 3,688 100 83,722 100 
Parastata1 involvement in 
companies with: 
a) majority shareho1ding 
by foreign company 1,797 48.7 9,006 10.6 
b) minority shareho1ding 
by foreign company 1,163 31.5 50,105 59.8 
c) majority shareho1ding 
by locally resident 
Europeans 516 14.0 2,176 2.6 
d) minority shareho1ding 
by locally resident 
Europeans 173 4.7 3,651 4.4 
e) majority shareho1ding 
by locally resident 
Asians 143 3.9 6,331 7.6 
f) minority shareho1ding 
locally resident 
Asians 2,290 2.7 
g) majority shareho1ding 
by Kenyan Africans 5 0.1 2.168 2.6 
h) minority shareho1ding 
by Kenyan Africans 4 0.1 15,263 18.2 
Source: (77: 12) 
manufacturing are mixed. Certain analysts have concluded that foreign-
owned subsidiaries tend generally to be more capital-intensive than 
their locally-owned counterparts (GR69; GR125). Others challenge this 
view and conclude that foreign-owned subsidiaries make stronger use 
of labor-intensive techniques. The suggested explanation for this latter 
view is that the subsidiaries employ more skilled supervisory staff and, 
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because of better management, use staff members more effectively than 
local firms do. Better supervision permits the use of productive 
techniques which employ unskilled labor relatively efficiently (GR69; 
GR125; GR126). Simply put, this means that firms deficient in tech-
nical supervision must rely heavily upon machines, so that their 
technology is more capital-intensive. 
Langdon, making a particularly pointed observation on the shoe 
and soap industries, concludes that foreign-owned subsidiaries are 
more capital intensive than their locally-owned counterparts, largely 
because of the sector of their operation (GR99: 66-96). Drawing on 
Stewart (GR145) and Lancaster's (GR97) work, he distinguishes between 
high income and low income products and notes that high income products 
frequently necessitate the use of a capital-intensive technique. A 
head office monopoly of policies regarding machinery purchase and pro-
duct quality control forces local managers of subsidiaries to adopt 
inappropriate capital-intensive techniques. Thus, to the extent that 
foreign-owned subsidiaries rely on their parents' portfolio of high 
income goods (which Langdon shows to be overwhelmingly the case), they 
are forced to utilize capital-intensive techniques which minimize the 
expansion of employment in Kenya." 
A highly significant part of this tendency to produce high income 
products with capital-intensive techniques is the systematic attempt 
which foreign-owned subsidiaries make to influence consumer taste 
preference towards the choice of such products. Langdon (GR102: 60) 
offers some limited evidence to support this argument. More recently, 
a comprehensive listing of all advertising expenditures in various 
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media has become avai1able.* Analysis of this data shows that of the 
100 most advertised products in 1976, only 14 were produced by major-
ity locally-owned firms, some of which were manufactured under license 
from foreign firms. Moreover, of the top 10 most advertised products, 
all were produced by foreign-own subsidiaries; and six were produced 
by the Uni1ever subsidiary. Of these six, three were differentiated 
forms of the same product (i.e., cooking fat). Of the total of 27 
subsidiaries interviewed by Langdon, 11.1% allocated over 10% of sales 
to advertising; 22% allocated 5-10% of sales; and 18% allocated 2.5% 
of sales to advertising ;n 1973 (GR103:6). Details on advertising 
confirm the degree of high income product promotion in the country. 
The tendency of foreign-owned subsidiaries to produce high 
income products using labor saving devices is having an important 
impact on locally-owned firms. From his study of the soap industry, 
Langdon concludes that the locally-owned firms were being forced into 
replicating the products and production techniques of the foreign-
owned subsidiaries. In another sector, breakfast foods, the emerging 
market for high-income products (actively reinforced by advertising) 
has led two local firms to produce under license products which en-
tail the choice of imported capital-intensive techniques. Thus, 
while an equivalent expenditure on machinery to manufacture traditional 
breakfast foods would provide 600 jobs producing a domestic value added 
of $3.6 million, a production of high income breakfast cereals created 
only 15 jobs with a domestic value added of only $325,000 (GR78). It 
is reasonable to conclude that the employment and sectoral linkage of 
multinational investment is limited because of the capital intensity 
* Kenya Media Advertising Review, 1976 (Nairobi, Corcoran & Tyrell, 1978). 
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of the industry. 
Manufacturing Output and Import Dependence. The rapid growth 
of industry based on multinational corporations has imposed many 
demands on Kenya's economy which it is incapable of meeting. The 
continued reliance on foreign technology and inputs has contributed 
to chronic trade and balance-of-payments deficits. Eight out of ten 
firms interviewed for this study admitted that they import 100% of 
their capital goods (machinery) and approximately 75% of their raw 
materials or imported inputs (PI18-25). In the case of the rubber 
and automobile industries, 100% of the raw materials and other inputs 
were imported (PI18,19). These findings are consistent with the findings 
of other studies. 
In his comprehensive study of multinationals in Kenya, Langdon 
(GR10l: 108) found that 98% of Kenyan firms imported more than 70% 
of their machinery. Of those subsidiaries, 79% imported more than 95% 
of their machinery. Another 69% imported more than 70% of their raw 
materials. In the case of soap manufacturing, the subsidiaries imported 
75-90% of their material inputs, while the less mechanized local Asian 
firms imported 40-50% of their inputs (GR10l: 69). In shoes, the sub-
sidiary imported 50-60% of its inputs, while the local small-scale shoe 
manufacturers purchased virtually all their inputs locally (GR10l: 80). 
Moreover, for subsidiaries as a whole, there was very little evidence 
of potential improvements in local linkage effects in the future. The 
vast majority of subsidiaries interviewed (all but 6 out of 48 in 
domestic market manufacturing) saw no prospects for future subcontracting 
to local manufacturers. Lack of linkage means limited expansion 
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of the Kenyan economy and hence limited employment opportunities for 
the school leavers. Table XX demonstrates the import dependence 














SUMMARY OF IMPORT DEPENDENCE OF KENYAN MANUFACTURING 
1966-74 (Kt'OOO) 
Current value Intermed Import consump Share 
of consump for of (b) 
mfg out~ut im~orts cap formation in (a) 
136,899 50,422 17,721 36.8 
154,936 53,896 23,600 34.8 
163,851 57,982 20,009 35.4 
186,892 60,839 20,932 32.6 
200,681 72,822 28,712 36.3 
251,145 95,021 36,203 37.8 
301,862 85,097 42,481 28.2 
368,340 112,086 46,145 30.4 
550,591 209,106 46,585 38.0 
455,686 162,302 61,421 35.6 
1,220,794 406,290 135,211 33.3 















A marked decrease in the import share of goods used by Kenyan 
industry would ordinarily suggest growing linkage effects to the rest 
of the economy and an increased impact on social and economic trans-
formation throughout the country. However, the evidence presented 
above does not indicate that such is the case. In the 1966-68 period, 
the share of imports for capital formation accounted for only 13.5% 
117 
of the manufacturing output, while the corresponding figure for 
intermediate consumption was. well (lV~Y' 35%. In the 1972-74 period, 
the share of intermediate consumption and capital formation were 
33.3% and 11.1%, respectively. The continued growth in the import 
bills deprives Kenya of badly needed forei~n exchange earnings re-
quired for economic growth and the expansion of employment opportunities 
in the country. 
Overall, the character of transnational subsidiary manufacturing 
can be seen to have restricted significantly the transformative impact 
on social relations from expanded industrialization in Kenya. The 
retarded employment growth that marked rapid industrial expansion in 
1976-78 and the continued import dependence noted above for all Ken-
yan manufacturing must both be traced to the central role of 
transnationa1s in the country, given the pressure seen to be working on 
subsidiaries to limit their employment and linkage effects. 
Economic Impact of the Employment Problem 
There are many dimensions to the employment problem in Kenya. 
Broadly, they may be summed up as general dissatisfaction with the 
employment opportunities available (GR69). For those who can afford to 
be unemployed, this takes the form of open unemployment; for others who 
must work to live, low-productivity employment outside the modern 
sector provides temporary (and sometimes permanent) refuge for the frus-
trated job-seeker. This approach to the problem makes it difficult to 
define precisely who and how many constitute the employment problem. 
Despite the problem of measurement, there are some indicators of 
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the magnitude of the employment problem. In Kenya, three Tripartite 
Agreements have provided an opportunity for those who wanted jobs in 
the modern sector to register. In 1964, 205,000 people registered 
within two weeks (35% of modern sector employment). In 1970, over 
290,000 registered within four days (46% of total modern sector and 6% 
of the population of working age) (GR146: 155-181). In 1979, a 
total of 260,000 people registered (28% of the formal wage employment 
in 1973 (GR107). On each occasion, the books had to be closed because 
the authorities were overwhelmed with applications. Many of those 
registering for jobs already had jobs and were trying to improve their 
positions. Therefore, it is important to note that these figures do 
not indicate numbers unemployed in the economy. However, it is reason-
able to argue that the very large numbers desiring modern sector jobs 
is an indication of how favorably these jobs are regarded. The employ-
ment problem is thus partly a reflection of the inequalities in 
income-earning opportunities throughout the economy. The ILO Mission 
to Kenya summarized the problem in this way: 
Unemployment has now become chronic and intractable in 
nearly all developing countries. . . • Part of the dif-
ficulty is structural, in the sense that many of these 
employment problems will not be cured simply by accel-
erating the rate of growth. It is increasingly clear 
that these employment problems are closely related to 
inequalities in incomes and opportunities which are 
not merely among their consequences but among their 
causes as well. 
(GR69: xi) 
Another indicator of the magnitude of the employment problem in 
Kenya is the official estimate given in the latest Development Plan (KG5) 
(which is, to be sure, imprecise and open to a considerable margin of 
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error). The figures nonetheless bring out several points. Although 
wage employment is relatively more important in Kenya than in many 
other subsaharan African countries at a comparable stage of develop-
ment, it nevertheless accounted for a mere 18% of the labor force in 
1978. The vast majority of Kenyans (51%) are employed in small-scale 
agriculture. The rest are distributed in urban "informal" and rural 
nonfarming activities, as shown in Table XXI. 
TABLE XXI 
DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION 
Selected Years (in thousands) 
Labor Force: 
Population (15-59) 







(2) Total employment 
Residual (1 less 2) 
















































Source: (KG5: 34, Table 2.1) 
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According to the figures, open unemployment is estimated for 
1978 at 9% of the total labor force, declining since 1976 and pro-
jected to fall further during the plan period. Given the present 
economic crisis and chronic ba1ance-of-payments difficulties, it is 
unreasonable to expect that such a target will be achieved. 
The estimated 9% open unemployment (540,000 people) no doubt 
represents a major blemish on the economy. Nevertheless, from the 
perspective of the overall development problem with which Kenya is 
confronted, the problem of open unemployment, visible as it is in the 
urban areas and among school 1eavers, is of smaller magnitude than the 
problem of the working poor (GR69: 35). The plan draws a poverty line 
at a household income of less than K.shs. 3,000/- per annum and identi-
fies five distinct poverty groups, shown below in Table XXII, 






Small farmers who de-
rive income from land 
TABLE XXII 
POVERTY GROUPS 
# of families 
618,500 
Landless, squatters, rural 
labor, with no land 410,000 
Pastoralists in a no-
madic setting (live-
stock income) 195,000 
Handicapped adults 140,000 
Urban poor in self 











(GR69, 22, 35) 
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The Plan estimates that these families have a total population 
of 6,073,000, which is 49% of the nation's total population. This. 
information hides the sizeable differences in income among households. 
If a line is drawn at an annual income per adult of below K.shs. 500/-, 
approximately 45% of the total small-holder population can be classified 
as living in poverty. Given the problem of measurement and a lack of 
reliable data, it is difficult to determine the total volume and pattern 
of employment in Kenya. 
In the same fashion, estimating the exact volume of urban unemploy-
ment has not been an easy task. The ILO Mission to Kenya (GR69: 10) 
estimated an urban unemployment of 8-15% (or a weighted average of 
11.5%). To this must be added the urban working poor (estimated at 
50,000) and school leavers totaling over 300,000 (KG5: 48). The problem 
is thus much more serious than it superficially appears to be. As long 
as there are imbalances in the economy, there will also be high unemploy-
ment. 
Trends in Wage Employment. The only component of employment for 
which a reasonably accurate statistical series exists is the wage 
employment in the modern sector. Table XXIII on the following page 
shows the numbers employed in the modern sector growing from 826,000 
in 1974 to 1,005,000 in 1980. During this period, employment in the 
public sector grew at an annual rate of 6.1% This is indicative of 
the fact that the public sector is the largest employer in the modern 
sector. The growth in agriculture and forestry stagnated, which ex-
plains why the private sector had a nominal growth rate due to linkages 
the sector has with the rest of the economy. Overall, the annual growth 
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rate for both the private and public sectors amounted to an average 
of 3.1% over this period, barely matching the annual population growth 
rate of 3.5% per year. The most successful period, in terms of 
modern sector job creation, was 1968-74, with an annual rate of increase 
of 5.3%. This is attributed to the rapid Africanization program dur-
ing that period and the First Tripartite Agreement which contributed 
30,000 new jobs. 
TABLE XXIII 






Sector 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 rate 
Public 330.1 342.4 356.4 376.4 390.0 424.7 471.5 6.1 
Pri vate 1.1 
Commerce/ 
Industry 282.5 280.9 303.4 320.1 332.6 353.7 N/A 
Agri/ 
Forestery 213.7 195.8 197.7 206.4 189.0 193.9 N/A 
Totals 826.3 819.1 857.5 902.9 911.6 972.3 1005.8 3.1 
* Provisional 
Source: (KG7, 1980, Table 237) 
It should be noted at the outset that the published data on 
employment (which, of course, refers to wage employment in the modern 
sector alone) may give a seriously misleading picture of the true posi-
tion of modern sector employment. This is particularly true since wage 
employment in agriculture and forestry apparently expanded at a relatively 
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higher rate. at least until 1975, than employment in the manufactur-
ing sector. On the whole, however, the public sector is the major 
industry in Kenya and has grown at a much faster rate than has emp1oy-
ment in the private sector. 
Table XXIV provides a much more accurate picture of the contribu-
tion of the modern sector. particularly the manufacturinq industry to 
emp10vrnent opportunities in Kenva. 
TABLE XXIV 
SUMMARY OF MANUFACTURING OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH, 1971-79 
% change 
in total 












% change % change % change 
in real in mfg in real 
GOP em~l.l:mt mfg out~ut 
7.0 12.8 10.5 
6.8 2.7 5.0 
4.3 11.4 9.7 
1.1 7.2 9.7 
4.1 - 0.6 0.0 
2.4 8.0 18.2 
8.8 8.4 15.9 
6.6 10.3 12.6 
3.3 6.3 7.1 
4.9 7.5 9.8 
Sources: (KG6, 1974, 1978. 1980; 
KG7, 1973, 1977, 1979) 
First, there has been a distinct slowdown in wage employment growth 
since 1974; the average annual increase in the 1975-79 period has 
been 4.2%, compared with 6.4% in the 1971-74 period. The spectacular 
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increase in 1979 was due to the Third Tripartite Agreement, which 
attempted to increase wage employment by 10%. If the pattern of the 
earlier government intervention of this sort (in 1970-71) is repro-
duced, then the 1979 increase simply represents an acceleration of 
hiring intentions, followed by a significantly lower-than-average 
increase in the 1980 data (as was also the case for 1972). Secondly, 
it is significant that although there has not been a great divergence 
among rates of change in overall wage employment and in GOP in the 
country, there has in recent years been much more divergence in the 
direction of lower rates of employment growth in the manufacturing 
sector itself. For example, in the period 1971-79, the average an-
nual growth in total wage employment was 5.2% and in GOP 4.9%, while 
in manufacturing employment growth averaged 7.5% compared with 9.8% for 
manufacturing output. That is, the expansion of production has not 
been matched by a proportional expansion of employment opportunities 
in manufacturing. Thirdly, it should be stressed that manufacturing 
employment growth has proven to be relatively limited in recent years, 
despite very dramatic increases in output in the manufacturing sector: 
18%, 16%, and 13% in 1976, 1977, and 1978, respectively. 
Employment Effects of Foreign Investment. Fairly comprehensive 
data exist on total employment and wage bills in industry, particularly 
in large-scale enterprises. However, published data draws no distinction 
between the nationality of the investor, and it is therefore impossible 
to estimate the employment generated by foreign investment, on the basis 
of this data. However, using existing data on ownership patterns in 
large scale industry and in all tourism, Kaplinsky (GR77) estimated the 
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numbers employed in different types of firms, incorporating data from 
the Central Bureau of Statistics concerning the broad size groups 
each firm (see Table XXV). In combining this data, he estimated 
the total employment in foreign manufacturing firms to be 
90,386 for 1976. This figure represents only 11% of the total wage 
employment in the modern sector for 1976. Considering the fact that 
foreign ownership is concentrated in the 25-50, 50-95, and 95-100 
percentiles of ownership groupings, the actual contribution of for-
eign investment to employment becomes even less significant. On the 
basis of minimum and maximum assumptions, Kaplinsky estimated that the 
share of multinational enterprises in total manufacturing employment 
was 30-35%, or close to 30,000 jobs for 1976. In short, foreign 
investment contributed to less than 3% of the total wage employment 
in the country in 1976. Considering all the incentives accorded to 
foreign investment, its contribution to the development of Kenya has 
been negligible. 
Regional Distribution of Wage Employment. The distribution of 
formal sector employment in Kenya is uneven, as shown in Table XXVI. 
The dominance of Nairobi has just been maintained, at 27% of total 
modern sector employment, and additional employment in Nairobi accounted 
for 26% of the national increase in 1967-78. The same is true for 
Mombasa, incorporated in the Coast Province figure. Formal sector 
employment opportunities in Nyanza and l~estern Province, where the 
need is greatest, have expanded partly due to the growth of sugar 
production. 
However, the share of employment in Nyanza and Western Province 
TABLE XXV 
ESTIMATE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN LARGE SCALE MANUFACTURING BY SECTOR 
AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GROUPINGS, (1976) 
Foreign Ownership Grouping (%) 
Sector 0 1-10 10-25 25-50* 50-90* 95-100* Total 
ISIC 
Food, beverages 31 10,501 1,391 3,213 288 4,795 4,747 24,934 
Textiles, leather 32 7,049 815 1,534 1,822 7,384 3,213 21,817 
Wood, furniture 33 6,713 0 0 0 0 719 7,432 
Paper, printing 34 3,932 0 0 0 1,534 432 5,898 
Chemicals, rubber 35 1,439 671 288 1,103 1,247 5,610 10,357 
Pottery, glass 36 2,014 144 288 1,534 2,206 0 6,186 
Basic metals 37 575 0 0 0 0 575 1 ,151 
Fabricated metal 
products 38 4,747 0 350 3,836 288 2,350 11,892 
Other manufacturing 39 575 0 0 144 0 0 719 
Totals 37,545 3,021 5,994 8,727 17,454 17,646 90,386 ..... 
N 
0'1 
(*) signifies areas of foreign concentration. 












CHANGE IN FORMAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, ALL SECTORS 
(1967-78) 
Numbers Em~lo~ed Increase in Share of increase #IS employed in #IS employed 1967 1968 1967-78 1967-78 
# % # % # % % 
163,692 27.4 244,431 26.8 80,739 49.2 25.7 
87,834 14.7 137,612 15.1 49,778 56.7 15.8 
77,763 13.0 122,678 13.5 44,915 57.8 14.3 
36,572 6.1 71 ,009 7.8 34,437 94.2 11.0 
2,232 0.4 4,941 0.5 2,709 121.4 0.9 
167,926 28.1 221,133 24.3 53,207 31. 7 16.9 
43,458 7.3 67,301 7.4 23,843 54.9 7.6 ) 
) 15.4 
17 ,892 3.0 42,456 4.7 24,564 137.3 7.8 ) 
597,369 100.0 911,561 100.0 314,192 52.6 100.0 




combined still compares unfavorably with, for example, Central 
Province: 10.3% compared with 14.7% in 1967 and 12.1% compared with 
15.1% in 1978, considering also the additional opportunity created 
for the latter by the proximity of Nairobi. Similarly, the 15.4% share 
of the two provinces in the 1967-78 increase, less than that of Central 
Province, is not sufficient to have led to any significant change in 
balance. As in the case of Central Province, increases in employment 
in Eastern Province will be supplemented by additional opportunities 
in Nairobi and the adjacent Coast Province, embracing Mombasa. 
Table XXVII shows clearly the domination of Nairobi and 
Mombasa. Together they account for 73% of wage employment in main 
towns in 1978. Outisde these two cities, there are no other important 
centers--the largest, Nakuru, still accounted for only 3.7% of the em-
ployment in 1978. Despite the urgency of expanding urban employment 
opportunities in the overpopulated regions of Western Kenya, the Kis-
umu share was only 3.5%. 
Looking specifically at manufacturing, the position is much the 
same. The two major cities, Nairobi and Mombasa, accounted for 69% 
of the total manufacturing employment in the main towns during 1978. 
The Thika municipality emerged as another potentially important center, 
with 10% manufacturing employment in 1978. This is due to the proximity 
Thika to the major city of Nairobi. On the whole, the manufac-
turing employment distribution data reflects the industrial location 
policy of the government, which tends to favor Nairobi and Mombasa. 
It is reasonable to conclude that a significant impact on the distribu-
tion of employment opportunities in manufacturing can only be made by 
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attempting to influence the location of plants. In the absence of 
such a policy, rural to urban migration, particularly among the edu-
cated, will continue, further exacerbating the problem of urban 
unemployment in Nairobi and Mombasa. 
TABLE XXVII 
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE AND MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT, 
BY MAIN TOWNS, 1978 
Wage Manufacturing 
Em~lo~ment Emelo~ment 
Main Towns # % # % 
Nairobi 244,431 53.8 48,707 50.2 
Mombasa 86,276 19.0 17,947 18.5 
Nairobi/Mombasa 330,707 72.8 66,654 68.8 
Nakuru 16,710 3.7 5,374 5.5 
Ki sumu 15,980 3.5 3,374 3.5 
Eldoret 11 ,125 2.4 4,803 5.0 
Thika 12,373 2.7 9,440 9.7 
Other towns 67,253 14.9 7,309 7.5 
Totals 454,148 100.0 96,949 100.0 
Source: (KG7, 1978) 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Kenya, like most other developing nations, relies on nonmineral 
primary product exports for a large percentage of its foreign exchange 
earnings. In 1979, coffee and tea combined made up 45% of the total 
exports. In addition to its export dependence, Kenya relies even more 
on the importation of raw materials, machinery, capital goods, inter-
mediate producer goods, and consumer products to fuel its industrial 
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expansion and to satisfy the rising consumption aspirations of its 
people. In recent years, import demands have exceeded the capaicty 
to generate sufficient revenues from the sale of exports. This has 
led to chronic trade deficits which affect Kenya's ba1ance-of-payments 
position. 
Table XXVIII indicates that between 1970 and 1979, imoorts hove 
risen at a faster rate than exports during the same period; and this 
trend has resulted in a widening trade deficit. In 1979, earnings from 
TABLE XXV I I I 
SUMMARY OF KENYA'S EXTERNAL TRADE, 
1970 and 1975-79 (Kt million) 
Type of Growth Ra tes 
Trade 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1970-79, PA 
Exports 108.8 238.0 345.1 501.8 395.7 412.8 15.9 
Imports 158.0 362.6 406.9 531.4 661.2 619.7 16.4 
Trade 
Balance - 49.2 -124.6 - 61.8 - 29.6 -265.5 -206.9 17.3 
Source: (KG7, 1980: 54, Table 51(c)) 
exports covered only 67% of the cost of imports, and the trade deficit 
was at a high level of Kt 206.9 million. The trade deficit was signifi-
cantly less in 1976 and 1977 than in previous years due to a high 
foreign exchange earning from coffee and tea. But during 1978 and 
1979, the deficit again rose due to strong external shocks as a result 
of the latest round of petroleum price increases and declining coffee 
prices in the international market. The ba1ance-of-payments and in-
come effects of these declines were compounded by poor weather 
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affecting coffee and maize production. As a result, GOP growth slowed 
to 4.2% in 1979 and to an estimated 2.4% in 1980 (GR152). The increase 
in petroleum prices combined with additional food imports resulted in 
a 25% rise in the value of imports in 1980. While exports rose by 
16%, this was not sufficient to prevent a rise in the current account 
deficit to almost $900 million and, despite increased external borrow-
ing, a decline of $198 million in foreign exchange reserves (GR169). 
In short, the economy does not have the export capacity to sustain the 
high level of imports which accelerated growth and investment set-
offs, and this regularly chokes off the accumulation process and 
hence, the expansion of employment opportunities. 
Exports 
Kenya's exports are highly concentrated by commodity, which is 
easily proven by the statistics which show that three commodities pro-
vide more than half of all exports (see Table XXIX below). 
TABLE XXIX 
SUMMARY OF TOTAL EXPORTS*, 1975-79 
(PERCENTAGE SHARES) 
Categort 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Food & beverages 35.8 47.6 65.6 58.8 56.2 
Coffee (16.4) (29.3) (42.5) (33.7) (28.7) 
Tea (10.7) (10. 0) (14.9) (17.1) (16.3) 
Industrial Supplies 28.3 23.4 13.5 17 .8 19.1 
Fuel & Lubricants 25.6 20.8 17.3 18.6 20.0 
Petroleum Products (22.6) (17.9) (15.1) (16.3) (17.7) 
Machinery/cap equip 2.3 2.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Transport Equipment 1.8 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Consumer Goods 6.1 5.0 3.0 4.0 3.9 
Others 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* excluding re-exports Source: ( KG6, 1980: 89) 
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Before 1964, sisal was the third largest export product. In 1979, 
coffee and tea combined made up 45% of total exports. These two pro-
ducts are dependent on world market forces entirely outside Kenya's 
control. 
It has already been remarked that price increases have been the 
major reason for the increase in the value of most exports, partic-
ularly coffee and tea. However, there have also been some large in-
creases in the quantity exported. A good example are the coffee and 
tea industries. The volume of tea exported rose from 16,500 tons 
in 1964 to over 70,000 in 1977 and fell to 64,000 in 1979 due to a 
decline in the price of tea. The predominance of coffee export in 
1977 was much more the result of the sharp increase in price; never-
theless, 204,336 tons of coffee were exported in 1977 compared with 
42,000 tons in 1974. In 1979, the volume declined to 110,673, due 
to a decline in the world price for coffee. Here the dependence on 
agriculture merged with the dependence on foreign trade. 
It is important to observe certain trends in the industrialized 
capitalist countries of the West who are Kenya's major trading part-
ners. For example, among these trading partner countries, the demand 
for most primary products does not increase in per capita income. 
Production of artificial substitutes--the result of technological 
changes--also partly accounts for a slackening in the demand for 
primary products. In addition, certain policy measures in the 
industrialized countries hinder increased exports from primary produc-
ing countries. Among such measures are subsidization of domestic 
raw materials and heavy import duties and tariffs against raw materials 
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in developing countries. 
A certain limitation of Africa's export orientation has to do 
with the lack of flexibility and economic diversity in an economy 
dependent on raw materials. For example, when the price of coffee 
falls on the world market, it is not possible, in the short term, to 
move resources out of coffee into other lines of production. Another 
limitation has to do with the concept of 1inkages--both forward and 
backward--i.e., the export industry does not generate enough domestic 
demand for investment. 
An examination of the direction of Kenya's exports provides 
yet another weakness. The main buyers of Kenya's exports are advanced 
capitalist countries in Europe, North American, and Japan. The insta-
bility and the unplanned nature of the capitalist markets, coupled with 
the competitive efforts of other primary producers, renders the 
dependence on such products extremely dangerous. 
Table XXX shows that between 1970-79, nearly 50% of Kenya's 
exports were destined to Western Europe and North America. In 1979, 
the United Kingdom and West Germany combined accounted for 30% of 
Kenya's exports (KG7, 1980). Although trade with Africa accounted for 
24% of exports in 1979, the trend has been declining since 1977, 
particularly after the breakup of the East African Common Market. As 
the main agricultural exports do not go to the East African countries, 
manufacturing accounted for 90% of Kenya's export to Tanzania and 
84% of its exports to Uganda (KG7, 1978). It is clear that continued 
dependence of African economies on the production of raw materials for 
export is detrimental to their long-term development. Thus, any 
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developmental policy that promotes only the exploitation of primary 
products to increase exports and obtain tax revenue for developmental 














DESTINATIONS OF KENYAN EXPORTS 
1970-1979 













North and South Far East & 
America Afri ca Australasia 
8.4% 39.4% 6.9% 
5.8 42.6 7.6 
6.0 36.3 7.6 
7.5 34.5 10.2 
5.5 34.8 10.3 
7.7 34.4 9.1 
8.8 26.3 8.2 
7. 1 19.8 5.4 
6.0 21.0 6.8 
N/A 24.0 7.6 
Source: calculated from (KG7, 1979: 64; and 
(for 1979) KG6, 1980: 93) 
Whereas in general the relative share of the various categories 
of imports remained unchanged in 1979, there was a notable increase 
in the share of the value of fuels and lubricants and nonfood indus-
trial supplies, while the shares of the values of certain other 
categories declined. Since the sharp rise in the price of oil in 
late 1973, a substantial share of Kenya's imports is now tied to the 
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importation of petroleum. Kenya, with its auto-owning bourgeoisie 
and expatriate population, is particularly vulnerable in this regard, 
as oil imports account for one-fifth of the country's imports (see 
Tabl e XXXI). 
TABLE XXXI 
SUMMARY OF TOTAL IMPORTS, 1975-79 
(PERCENTAGE SHARES) 
Categor~ 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Food & Beverages 5.9 6.5 5.2 5.8 5.3 
Industrial Supplies 29.0 30.6 30.3 27.2 29.0 
(nonfood) 
Fuels & Lubricants 26.4 25.5 22.0 17.8 23.7 
Machinery/cap equip 17.0 17 .8 19.4 21.3 20.2 
Transport Equipment 12.9 10.8 14.3 19.2 15.4 
Consumer Goods 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.4 6.3 
Others 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: ( KG6, 1980; KG7, 1980) 
Imports of nonfood industrial supplies remained almost unchanged 
in 1979, though there was more emphasis on imports of processed supplies 
than on primary goods. The most noticeable change was the heavy de-
cline in the value of imported transport equipment, particularly 
imported passenger vehicles due to government restrictions to save 
foreign exchange. Imports of nonfood consumer goods also fell sharply 
as the government banned a number of consumer goods from Nairobi 
shops. The restrictions imposed since 1978 clearly show the vulnerabil-
ity of the Kenyan economy and the worsening foreign exchange situation. 
136 
Balance of Pa~ments 
The table below summarizes Kenya's ba1ance-of-payment position 
regarding Current Accounts, Capital Accounts, and Cash Accounts. 
TABLE XXXI I 
SUMMARY OF KENYA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(MILLIONS OF KENYAN POUNDS) 
1971 1973 1975 1977 1978 1979 
A. Current Accounts 
Imports 196.2 219.0 342.7 535.1 723.3 665.0 
Exports 104.9 164.5 212.1 470.9 366.5 380.3 
Trade balance - 91.3 - 54.5 -130.6 - 64.2 -356.8 -284.7 




8.8 - 35.7 - 36.5 - 59.5 - 55.0 - 49.2 
Govt transfer 20.9 7.5 7.5 3.5 32.3 28.3 
Invisible ba1 51. 5 7.7 57.5 88.3 104.3 106.4 
Current balance - 39.9 - 46.8 - 76.7 24.1 -252.5 -178.3 
B. CaEita1 Account 
Long term inflow 15.2 53.1 62.9 90.4 171.0 250.9 
Current and cap - 24.7 6.3 - 13.8 114.5 - 81.5 72.6 
balance 
C. Cash Account 
External reserves 51.8 76.3 70.6 208.6 133.3 176.8 
Sources: (KG6, KG7, various years) 
This table indicates that, with the temporary exception of 1977, Kenya 
runs a deficit on Current Accounts, i.e., on transactions involving goods 
and services. Despite this fact, the country has consistently been able 
to secure net inflows of long-term capital from the rest of the world, 
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inflows that have become sUbstantial since 1974. The net total of the 
Current and Long Term Capital Accounts is then combined into the Basic 
Balance, which is the best single indicator of the health of Kenya's 
payment position. In three of the six sample years recorded, there was 
a surplus in the Basic Balance, reflecting a generally satisfactory situ-
ation. The years 1971, 1975, and 1978 were the main exceptions. A 
generally satisfactory situation is also revealed in the figures on the 
country's foreign exchange reserve. 
Kenya's growth performance since 1974 has been vulnerable to swings 
in its international terms of trade. The escalation of oil prices and 
the associated world inflation imposed a serious deficit on Kenya with 
little warning. The economy accelerated once again in 1976-77 due to 
the "coffee boom" following frost damage in Brazil and decelerated after 
1978 when coffee prices declined to more normal levels. At the same time, 
the import bill rose (it increased by 80% between 1975 and 1978). 
This combination resulted in a huge current deficit of K~ 252 million 
in 1978, and the foreign exhcange reserve dwindled rapidly to about half 
of the peak of 1977. During 1978-80, Kenya again experienced strong 
external shocks as a result of the latest round of petroleum price 
increases and declining coffee prices. As a result, GDP growth 
slowed to 4.2% in 1979 and to an estimated 2.4% in 1980. Kenya's 
balance of payment constraints will continue in the short run. Factors 
outside Kenya's control, such as oil price increases, reduced demand for 
Kenya's export commodities, and slow economic recovery in the indus-
trialized countries are having a significant adverse impact on the 
Kenyan economy. The ba1ance-of-payment problem is indicative of the 
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rough times ahead for the Kenyan economy and the gloomy employment 
prospect for thousands of school leavers each year. 
FOREIGN AID 
In the face of this combination of volatile export earnings and 
recurrent foreign exchange problems, Kenya has had to rely on external 
government borrowing. The deficits on external trade have been covered 
partly by earnings from tourism and to an increasing extent by grants-
in-aid from multilateral and bilateral agencies. As can be seen from 
Table XXXIII, in the early years of independence (1963-1969), the 
United Kingdom was overwhelmingly the most important source of financial 
aid. Between 1963-69, over 80% of all aid was from Britain; by 1975, 
the United Kingdom accounted for less than 30% of all disbursements. 
Since the mid-1970's, the World Bank and the Scandinavian countries 
have taken on the role of large donors. For example, in 1980, 63% 
of all loans came from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. The Scandinavian countries accounted for 30% of all grants 
in 1980. 
So far, Kenya has received 36 World Bank loans and 33 credits from 
the International Development Agency (IDA) amounting to US$1,29l.l 
million. Loans given to Kenya carry a high interest rate. IDA credits 
have only a ~% service share, while IBRD loans to Kenya have an inter-
est rate ranging from 7 to 8~%. In fact, the World Bank loans, though 
increasingly taking a big proportion of Kenya's total foreign aid, have 
been the most expensive elements of aid to the country. World Bank 
(IBRD) loans to Kenya range from 10 to 30 years for repayment, including 
Source 
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TABLE XXX III 
ECONOMIC AID TO KENYA, 1963-1980 
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a seven years grace period, while those of its affiliates (IDA) 
require 50 years repayment and 10 years grace. Other donors vary 
from 5 years to 50 years of repayment plus some grace period (PI 17). 
The obvious implication of heavy borrowing is a proportionately 
heavy debt burden. 
Table XXXIV indicates that, as of June 1979, the main countries 
to which Kenya owed a debt included West Germany, the USA, and Japan. 
The United Kingdom had abolished debts owed by Kenya and now provides 
aid on a grant basis only. Among international organizations, the 
largest debt was owed to the World Bank and its subsidiary, the 
International Development Agency. 
In general, debt servicing charges rise as the total debt rises. 
External net servicing charges jumped to Kt 25.5 million in 1979 
(from Kt 8.6 million in 1974). There was a decline in the debt 
service charges on external debts in 1979 because of the abolition by 
the United Kingdom of outstanding Kenyan debts. As a result, the debt 
service ratio as a proportion of earnings from exports of goods and 
services fell from a high of 5.5% in 1978 to 4.4% in 1979. In real 
monetary terms, interest payments siphoned off $18 of every $100 
Kenya earned on exports (Wall Street Journal, April 11,1983: 18). 
The summary of external debt charges related to exports is capsulized 
in Table XXXV. 
The influence of aid on national policymaking structures is 
very strong and has been the subject of various studies (GR63; GR159). 
Technical assistance personnel occupy crucial decisionmaking positions 
in all Kenyan governmental ministries. The expatriates are not only 
TABLE XXXIV 
SUMMARY OF KENYA'S OUTSTANDING DEBTS 
1974-79 (MILLIONS OF KL) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Bilateral Debts: 
United Kingdom 47.0 43.0 41.0 37.0 37.0 
United States 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 15.0 16.0 
West Germany 6.0 14.0 16.0 21.0 30.0 33.0 
Japan 1.0 3.0 7.0 11.0 14.0 14.0 
Sweden 7.0 10.0 12.0 12.0 
The Netherlands 2.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 9.0 7.0 
Denmark 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 7.0 7.0 
Other 4.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 22.0 36.0 
Totals 82.0 98.0 109.0 121.0 134.0 113.0 
Multilateral Debts: 
IBRD 11.0 16.0 39.0 42.0 46.0 55.0 
IDA 21.0 28.0 38.0 41.0 47.0 56.0 
African Devt Bank 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Other 1.0 2.0 2.0 9.0 30.0 
Totals 34.0 47.0 81.0 88.0 105.0 144.0 
Total External Debt 116.0 145.0 190.0 209.0 239.0 257.0 
Annual External Debt Charge * 8.0 10.0 12.0 15.0 31.0 31.0 
oj::> 
* (KG6, 1980: 77) 
Source: (KG7, 1980, Table 228 (5)) 
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TABLE XXXV 
SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL DEBT CHARGE RELATED TO EXPORT 
1974-1979 
Debt Service Charge 
on External Debt 
(Ki million) 
Exports of Goods & 
Services 
External Debt Service 
Charge as % of Exports 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
8.6 10.1 12.0 14.8 31.2 25.5 
357.2 356.9 471.7 650.2 566.8 580.4 
2.4 2.8 2.5 2.3 5.5 4.4 
Source: (KG6, 1980, Table 6.12) 
involved in devising poliCies and development plans, but also in 
identifying potential sources of aid and negotiating with relevant 
donors. Once foreign aid is negotiated and agreed upon between donor 
and Kenyan government representatives (often the technical assistance 
personnel), its conditions, objectives, and implications are never 
discussed by relevant political institutions such as the Parliament. 
Because funds must be spent as quickly as possible before the expira-
tion of the negotiated period, there is seldom time for discussions 
and debates about the real aims and implications of aid for national 
development. Unspent aid funds are regarded as a reflection of inef-
ficiency or bad management on the part of the recipient country, so 
virtually all aid is handled by technical assistance personnel whose 
chief function is to ensure that all disbursed aid is spent. 
Multilateral aid agencies such as the World Bank probably have 
more influence on policy matters than bilateral donors inasmuch as 
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they presently contribute the largest proportion of aid. The World 
Bank, for instance, claims that its aid and aid projects are based on 
purely economic nonpolitical considerations and thus tries to keep 
them out of political discussions in Kenya's Parliament. Over the years, 
the practice in Kenya has been to prevent political debate about develop-
ment projects, particularly those benefitting from aid, under the pretext 
of keeping politics out of development. In the absence of such debate, 
however, the development projects of post-independent Kenya have been 
a continuation of colonial or foreign activities, with support from 
foreign technical assistance surveyors, and in many cases, implemented 
and evaluated by the same foreign personnel. Under these circumstances, 
Kenya has lost its freedom to determine the course of national develop-
ment independently. 
The implications of external dependence are thus clear. To the 
extent that a nation is dependent upon foreign aid, foreign investment, 
and foreign trade for the creation of wealth and provision of goods 
and services, demands and decisions adopted in the developed economies 
become permanent inputs into the national policymaking process. Under 
such conditions, dependent nations such as Kenya have little prospect 
for self-sustained economic growth and expanded employment opportunities. 
The problems and demand of the national community must compete with and 
may be secondary to the requirements of external decisionmakers, which 
means that the Kenyan economy is becoming increasingly dependent on 
external factors (price increases for its two major exports of coffee 
and tea, and sources of international finance such as the IMF) to 
determine its capacity to accumulate surplus in the face of foreign 
exchange pressures. 
STATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS AN APPROACH TO 
NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY 
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The government of Kenya has tried to expand its control of the 
national economy by increasing the level of state ownership of the 
means of production. The evidence presented below, however, leads to 
the conclusion that state participation in joint venture activities 
with foreign capital is primarily geared toward bringing about a broader 
base of local private control and ownership rather than toward public 
control of the means of production. 
At independence, Kenya inherited an economy that was dominated 
in every respect by the expatriates and foreign concerns. Major finan-
cial institutions such as commercial banks and insurance companies were 
foreign owned and controlled. Agriculture, the backbone of the national 
economy, was also dominated by the settler farmers. Industrial enter-
prises were also controlled by the multinationals and expatriate 
concerns. Import-export trade as well as retail and distributive 
trade were also controlled in the same manner. It was obvious that 
something had to be done in the immediate post-independence period. 
Africanization of the economy was the political answer to the problem. 
The Africanization policy called upon the state to play an entre-
preneurial role by taking equity participation with foreign capital 
(KG1). The principal agencies employed to promote industrial develop-
ment are: the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), 
the Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK), and the Industrial 
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Development Bank (lOB). It is these three agencies that act as 
government instru~ents for engaging in joint ventures or partial 
nationalization. There are now some 115 public enterprises of various 
types in the country (GR95: 3) contributing more than 10% of the 
Gross Domestic Product in 1976 and employing about the same number 
of employees as the public sector (KG7, 1979). 
At first these actions appeared to have been motivated by the 
desire to introduce public investment into strategic industries as 
a means of taking control of the economy. In reality, however, the 
state ownership (particularly the partnership solution) appears to 
have been more politically than economically motivated for two specific 
reasons. First, public participation is seen as necessary to ensure 
a rapid Africanization of equity ownership and managerial positions 
in an essentially foreign-dominated economic sector. In addition, 
Africanization was necessary to ensure the political stability 
necessary to attract more foreign investment and also to preserve the 
impression of expanding opportunities for all Kenyans. Viewed in this 
way, the policy is not one of Africanization, but one of Kenyanization. 
The means by which prominent Africans have access to multination-
ally-generated economic rewards cover a wide spectrum, from high salaries 
to joint venture partnerhsip. MNC executives believe Africanization 
is at the heart of this process (GR99: 163). Directorships are a 
second means by which prominent Africans share MNC sector rewards. 
In fact, most governmental ministers have ownership in MNC operations. 
The ICDC, itself the largest governmental investor in the MNC sector, 
is seen as the temporary custodian of its investment pending eventual 
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transfer to direct or indirect African ownership. 
Secondly, foreign equity participation in joint ventures is 
considered critical, particularly if the foreign investor brings in 
skills, know-how, patent rights, and other benefits required by Kenya. 
This latter view is emphasized in the Third Development Plan: 
The inflow of capital is not generally the most 
important benefit to be achieved from such 
ventures. More valuable are technology, skills 
and techniques, which will enable Kenyans to 
staff and manage complex production processes, 
as well as experience and knowledge in the 
design and marketing of exports. 
(KG4: 284) 
These two points are consistent with the government's develop-
mental goal of maximizing economic growth and Africanizing the economy. 
Nevertheless, the partnership solution seems to have reduced the 
capacity of the government to fulfill these developmental objectives. 
In practice, the policy seems to effer relatively little significant 
constraint on the activities of foreign economic actors. From the for-
eign investors' point of view, such participation institutionalizes 
special access to the policymaking body of the government, subject 
only to the increasingly important proviso that IIthese privileges be 
shared with African 'insiders'" (GR99:162). As a result, a signifi-
cant symbiotic relationship has developed in Kenya between foreign 
capital and the state, focused around the structuring of II shared 
privileges," to the mutual advantage of the MNC sector and of the 
lIinsider ll African bourgeoisie which dominates the Kenyan state 
(GR99: 162). In short, state entrepreneurship in Kenya has become an 
important mechanism to reinforce the private enterprise system rather 
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than diminish its presence. A close examination of the activities 
of the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) 
will illustrate this pOint clearly. 
THE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (ICDC) 
AND THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
The ICDC was established in 1954 under the name of Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) to facilitate the industrial and economic 
development of the colony by the initiation, assistance, or expansion of 
industrial and commercial undertakings. At its initiation, the IDC took 
over the assets and liabilities of its predecessor, the East African 
Industrial Management Board (EAIMB), which had been established in 
1944 to supply certain essential products during the war period (GR74: 
3). 
In order to define more accurately the corporation's present pur-
pose and functions, the name was changed by the Industrial Development 
Amendment Act of 1967 to Industrial and Commercial Development Corpora-
tion (ICDC). Its purpose has been to promote and integrate Africans into 
the industrial and commercial structure of the country's economy. This 
trend is in total conformity with the policies laid down by the Kenyan 
government in Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and 
Its Application to Planning in Kenya. The paper specified that the 
"ICDC will help African traders and industrialists to expand their 
operations in order to participate more fully in the development of 
the country" (KG1: 41). Clearly, the government intends to use ICDC 
as the official channel of industrial and commercial development of 
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Kenya. 
ICDC has invested in a wide range of industrial and commercial 
activities including the hotel, transport, assembly, bottling, cater-
ing, mining, processing, manufacturing, and engineering activities 
and such service industries as insurance, clearing, and forwarding. 
It is also an investor in other developmental finance institutions, 
notably the Industrial Development Bank and the Development Finance 
Company of Kenya (GR65). 
ICDC Activities 
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Figure 4. Structure of ICDC Organization. 
Since the mid-1960's, the ICDC has been involved in new joint 
ventures with foreign capital, taking shares in the equity with a view 
to transferring the shares to Africans "whenever they have the necessary 
capital to acquire them" (GR74: 4). As of 1979, the ICDC has 12 sub-
sidiary companies and has minority ownership in 47 other companies, most 
of them foreign multinationals (see Appendix B). Through its subsidiary 
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companies, such as the Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK) 
and the Industrial Development Bank (IDB), the ICDC extends credit and 
provides monopoly advantages of African traders. In short, the ICDC, 
using the support of the state, has become an instrument for accelerat-
ing African private accumulation. 
The government of Kenya has reaffirmed its commitment to a mixed 
economy in which private and public enterprises would exist side by 
side (KG4). This policy requires that public enterprises conform to 
standard capitalist performance criteria. Accordingly, the ICDC is 
intended to function as a profitmaking organization. Given the influence 
of foreign capital in the Kenyan economy, the po1icymaking functions of 
the ICDC are shared with many other interested parties, both govern-
mental and nongovernmental. 
A diagrammatic representation of the policy process is presented 
in Figure 5. The principal actors are the r~inistry of Commerce and 
Industry (henceforth referred to as the Parent Ministry), the ICDC 
Board, the Legislature, the Office of the President (Inspectorate of 
Statutory Boards), and nongovernmental actors such as foreign banks, 
donor agencies, and joint venture partners (or multinational corporations). 
As a statutory body, the ICDC is responsible to the Minister 
of Commerce and Industry, which is represented on the Board of the 
ICDC through its Permanent Secretary (GR65). In theory, the Industrial 
Development Act of 1967 gives further powers and control over the 
activities of the ICDC to the Parent Ministry. In reality, however, the 
relationship of the two is formalistic. Although the Parent Ministry 
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Figure 5. ICDC and the Policy Environment. 
is never done. According to Oyugi, lithe Parent Ministries tend to 
leave these organizations pretty much on their own ll (GR124: 10). 
First, government bureaucracies in Kenya (as is often the case in 
other developing countries as well) are weak, inefficient, and lack 
the expertise to implement and evaluate policies. Secondly, the 
functions and responsibilities of the parent ministry and the Inspec-
torate of Statutory Boards are never clearly specified. In the 
absence of strong governmental institutions, public enterprises are 
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left to operate on their own. This situation leaves the policymaking 
process open to external economic actors. 
The separation of economic decisionmaking from the political 
arena is one factor which allows external economic actors to dominate 
economic policy. The representative institutions, namely, the Parliament 
and the Kenya Africa National Union Party (KANU), are not strong enough 
to monitor the activities of public enterprises. Insofar as a national 
party system has existed in Kenyan politics, it is one of patron-client 
ties built around individuals who cross into each other's district or 
organizations. As long as the privileges are shared, the question of 
transformation is answered by never being fonnally posed. It is reason-
able to conclude that some of the extra legal autonomy of Kenyan public 
corporations results from the fragmented nature of the government. 
A major characteristic of the ICDC is its heavy dependence on 
foreign finances and management advice. As shown in Table XXXVI, 
the main source of finance for the ICDC was from the Kenyan government 
(47%) in 1975 (GR65). External finance, which included a consortium 
of foreign commercial banks, accounted for 41% of the funds in 1975. 
Loans from commerical banks and elsewhere have to be repaid later with 
interest and thus contribute significantly to the balance-of-payments 
difficulties. According to the Review of Statutory Boards (KG17: 22), 
public enterprises handle about half of the country's exports and 
require large amounts of foreign exchange for the importation of equip-
ment and machinery. 
The ICDC is directed by a board of ten directors, each of whom is 
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for all policy decisions within the framework of overall governmental 
policy and planning (GR65). In reality, however, the Board cannot be 
expected to playa leading role in policy matters, for several reasons. 
Given Kenya's patron-client political structure, patronage is deeply 
institutionalized in the recruitment system of public and private insti-
tutions (GR16). Board members are appointed for political reasons rather 
than for their professional and managerial qualifications. The result 
has been that board members serve at the pleasure of the Minister and, 
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therefore, cannot take independent positions on policy matters. 
In addition, there is a conflict of interest between public respon-
sibilities and private profit. There exists a widespread practice of 
"straddling," whereby board members use their positions to secure 
business with the corporation on behalf of their own companies 
(GR32; GR41). This practice seems to have official sanction judging 
from a statement contained in the Ndegwa Commission Report which 
offered 
no objection to the ownership of property or involvement 
in business by members of the public service to a point 
where their wealth is augmented perhaps substantially 
by such activities. 
(KG14: 14) 
There are also other nongovernmental entities that influence the 
operations of public enterprises. The Federation of Kenyan Employers, 
which represents the bureaucracy of the large foreign companies; the 
Association of Kenya Manufacturers, which acts as a pressure group on 
behalf of manufacturing firms; and the Chamber of Commerce have easy 
access to the government on behalf of the multinational sector (GR99: 
139).* The result is that policies governing the operations of the 
ICDC are usually compromises between the government and the private 
interests. What one often finds, therefore, is significant private 
influence in the running of public enterprises in Kenya. 
* 
At least 72 of the 81 subsidiaries interviewed by Langdon were 
members of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, and at least 
50 were members of the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce (GR99: 
186) . 
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In light of the foregoing analyses, what role has the ICDC played 
in promoting national development? An answer to this question re-
quires an evaluation of the ICDC's performance against its objective. 
Its objective is the creation of an African entropreneurial class 
allied to international capital. The question, is, then one of 
whether the ICDC is carrying out that calling to the fullest. According 
to Mwaniki, the "ICDC is more active as an agent of integrating state 
capital with foreign capital than of accumulating capital on behalf 
of nationals (GRl13: 35). In two separate studies of the ICDC's 
small industrial loan commitments, Mwaniki and Kaplinsky (GR79) con-
cluded that the corporation's loan policy favors large industrialists, 
mostly foreign businessmen. The corporation frequently discontinues 
credit to African entrepreneurs so as to direct funds to the joint 
ventures with international big business. Thus, local savings are 
integrated with foreign capital, but as shown in the percentage of 
share holdings (Appendix B), control remains in the hands of foreign 
firms. 
As the largest government investor in the manufacturing sector, 
the ICDC serves as a mechanism through which MNC-generated privileges 
are shared with affluent Africans. Government participation in 
economic activities through the ICDC is focused around the interests 
of the political class in control of the state. The issue of equitable 
and broadly beneficial development 1s not given the attention it 
deserves. But from the foreign investor's point of view, such partici-
pation lessens the capital commitment the investor must make. It 
institutionalizes special access for an enterprise to ease problems 
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such as obtaining work permits, exemption from local borrowing 
restrictions, etc, because the government has a financial interest 
in the success of the firm. 
Many foreign firms insist that the government participate as 
a regular business partner. Because they rely on such symbiosis, 
they generally have easy, informal access to decisionmaking. Of the 
81 subsidiaries interviewed by Langdon (GR99), 55 firms, or 68%, 
reported that they had informal contacts they could use to approach 
the government. As such, the ICDC facilitates the interaction between 
foreign capital and the Kenyan state. The overall impact of the ICDC 
in the Kenyan economy has, therefore, been to reinforce the growing 
inequalities of income among different social groups. From the per-
spective of national development, the state-centered, Western-oriented 
structure of the Kenyan economy inhibits severely the full productive 
use of much of the country's resources and thereby negates long-term, 
broadly based growth possibilities in the economy. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that external economic actors 
playa crucial role in Kenya, act in a symbiotic relationship with 
the dominant African class, and are relatively unchecked by govern-
mental regulations. Government investment through the ICDC does not 
exercise national control; conversely, it gives foreign companies 
greater access to economic privileges. 
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SUMMARY 
This chapter has tried to show that several domestic and exter-
nal factors have inhibited the expansion of the Kenyan economy and 
that they have persisted, sometimes with growing intensity, since 
independence in 1963. The removal of these constraints would require 
not just marginal changes in policy and trade relations, but also 
profound structural adjustments, both internally and externally. 
First, Kenya's growth performance since 1974 has been vulnerable 
to swings in its international terms of trade. The escalation of 
oil prices, the decline in the price of coffee and tea, and the 
increase in import bills imposed a serious deficit on current accounts 
and foreign exchange reserve. The continued outflow of resources 
deprives Kenya of the needed foreign exchange inflow required for 
economic growth and expansion of productive employment to its popula-
tion, particularly school leavers. 
Secondly, public equity participation in different projects has 
also not been utilized as an instrument for the development of the pub-
lic sector. Such participation is geared toward bringing about a 
broader base of local private control and ownership rather than toward 
public control of the means of production. This particular policy 
choice institutionalizes special access for an enterprise (foreign 
or domestic) into the national policymaking process to ease prob-
lems such as obtaining special import licenses, exemption from local 
borrowing restrictions, and the repatriation of profits. The combined 
effect of these economic problems is to reduce the ability of the 
157 
Kenyan government to develop and implement policies directed toward 
the problem of urban unemployment. 
CHAPTER IV 
GRADUATE UNEMPLOYMENT: A KENYAN DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM 
Kenya has been identified in recent analyses as an example of 
a country with relatively successful economic growth and capital 
accumulation based on the dominance of foreign and domestic private 
capital (GR106; GR149). The Kenyan economy has experienced a fairly 
rapid rate of growth of real monetary GOP (well over 6% per annum 
for 1964-70). Growth in manufacturing and commercial agriculture 
were more noticeable than growth in other sectors of the economy 
(see Table XIV}. However, the detailed evidence of the national eco-
nomic indicators from the 1970's reviewed in the previous chapter 
questions the potential of the Kenyan economy to sustain capital 
accumulation. A built-in structural constraint appears to choke off 
growth through the mechanism of large'foreign exchange outflows. 
The rapid growth of industry in Kenya based on multinational 
corporations has imposed many demands on the economy which it is 
incapable of meeting. An import-substitution policy has retarded 
the rapid growth of employment because of the capital-intensiveness 
of Kenyan industries. Since 1974, there has been a distinct slowdown 
in the growth of wage employment, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector where expanding production has not been matched significantly 
by expanding employment. Furthermore, Kenya's continued reliance on 
foreign technology and inputs has contributed to chronic trade and 
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balance-of-payment deficits. To make up for these deficits, the 
government has borrowed large sums of money from the West. Unfor-
tunately, debt servicing charges for these loans has added to the 
foreign exchange problem. In the present context, all these forces 
have exerted an extremely powerful and complex influence and have 
set limits on the ability of Kenya to formulate and implement poli-
cies directed toward the problem of urban unemployment. 
THE SCHOOL LEAVER PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 
A major resultant problem facing Kenya is that for a great 
majority of those who finish school, no further educational or employ-
ment opportunities exist. In 1964, one year after Kenya attained 
political independence, it was found that of 103,000 Kenya Primary 
Education (KPE) examination candidates, approximately 67,000 (65%) 
would not have access to secondary school or vocational training (GR8; 
GR23). The situation has worsened with each passing year. In 1980, 
about 350,000 pupils took the Certificates of Primary Education examina-
tions (CPEls) throughout the country. Of these, 40.000 will fill Form I 
vacancies in 2,000 government-maintained or aided schools. Fewer than 
100,000 will receive similar placement in Harambee and private schools, 
leaving more than 200,000 pupils without any hope of further education 
(Nation, Dec 29, 1981: 6). A more potentially damaging situation has 
been the trend toward unemployment among academic and technical second-
ary school graduates (GR57; GR83). At the postsecondary level, it has 
also been observed that increasing numbers of university graduates in 
arts, law, and some areas of commerce are experiencing difficulties 
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in obtaininq emplo~ent (PI 5, 7, 10). 
Unemployment among school leavers at various levels of the edu-
cational system stems not so much from inappropriate education, as 
is often argued, as from the expansion of educational opportunities 
which are not accompanied by a corresponding expansion in the number 
of positions in employment (GR60, GR86). The particular reasons why 
school leavers are a problem, why they are frustrated, and why an 
increasing proportion of them are seeking work, is not so much that 
the opportunities do not exist, but that the opportunities open are 
not attractive in relation to those obtained by persons with compar-
able qualifications only a few years ago. In this sense, the school 
leavers seeking work are evidence, not of a shortage of jobs, but of 
a growing imbalance of opportunities in the modern sector (KG69: 67; 
KG5: 2.71). 
The increasing imbalance between job seekers on the one hand 
and well paying jobs in the modern sector on the other has merely 
intensified the demand for education. This is understandable because 
education was the primary qualification for access to wage-earning 
jobs in the first few years after independence. This led to a tremen-
dous quantitative expansion of enrollments in the face of an ultimate 
scramble for attractive jobs. 
It was indicated in Chapter II that a balanced approach to 
secondary school expansion was subverted by the uncontrolled expansion 
of Harambee schools built by communities throughout the country. 
Inevitably, the richer communities were able to do more, and thus the 
availability of secondary school education became even more unequal 
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than before independence. As a result, most of the pupils who attended 
rural and Harambee schools found themselves unable to compete on 
an equal basis with those pupils who attended government and urban 
high-cost schools. Since the type of jobs obtainable in the modern 
sector is related not only to the standard completed at school, but 
also how well the individual performed on examinations, we would 
expect rural pupils and those in Harambee schools, with low quality 
education, to be discriminated against the most. Figure 6 shows the 
relationship between the rate of expansion of positions in the public 
sector and private sectors and the rate of growth of educational 
enrollment for the period 1960-1979. An important point revealed in 
the figure is that annual growth of employment in both the private 
and public sectors was far lower than the annual growth rate of pri-
mary and secondary school enrollment. Considering that it is the 
students of these two levels of the educational system who have been 
competing for the positions which are available in the modern sector, 
then it is obvious that there will necessarily be a surplus of school 
leavers in comparison with the number of available jobs. Since the 
long range trend has been one of modern sector jobs increasing at a 
slower annual rate than the output of the educational system, then 
educated unemployment becomes a serious potentially long term problem 
in Kenya (PI 10,11,14). 
The magnitude of the school leaver problem is better understood 
after an examination of the number of job openings each year in the 
modern sector. It is estimated that Kenya's labor force as of 1980 is 
slightly greater than 7 million, of which about 1.2 million are engaged 
j'OOOI 
..... : ................................. .. ···· .. ········ .. · .. ·;·· .. ··· .. ··· .. ················· .. i~ 
, " 
: __ - - - • enrolba1t 
PI" • 
, 
) .. , . 
, 
, 





" , ; r"-·' : 
.kIOII • I, t 
I ' I 
, .............. --. . --. -... , _ .. -- ~ . -. to -. -... -. ----: 























.6' .,. .. - .. - .......... ..,," 
." , , 
,..' 
" I I 





_. ___ , I 
',11 • , ' 
• I • • • •• • ••••.••••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••• _.. • _ •••••• 0 ••••••• _ ••••• __ 1_ •• _ •• __ •• __ • _0 ......... _f. _0' • 
1%0 61 61 1,1 W .... .." hI ~ f,q 10 71 71 II 7. 7~ ." 77 JM 1'jl 
Figure 6. Expansion of Employment and Enrollments. 
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in the MES or wage employment (KG6, 1980). And accordinq to the 
fourth Development Plan (KG5: 481), it is expected that the population 0; 
working age will increase over the plan period by 266,000 per annum. 
Of this number, approximately 50,000 can expect to find work in the 
recorded modern sector (KG5: 48). Competing for those few jobs are 
100,000+ primary school leavers, 50,000 junior secondary school leavers, 
and at least 2,000 graduates from universities, poly technical schools 
and institutes of technology (GR70: 9). Tables XXXVII and XXXVIII 
should facilitate an understanding of the problem generated by illu-
sionary aspirations of school leavers. 
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TABLE XXXVII 
ENROllMENT STATISTICS BY EDUCATIONAL 
lEVEL AND YEAR 
Year 
Educational 
level 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980*** 
Standard 7 243,214 235,925 258,610 281,689 351,860 
Form I 94,834 106,496 104,733 104,733 112,185 
Form IV 48,045 53,800 61,680 74,788 87,513 
Form V 5,208 5,240 7,039 8,568 10,317 
Form VI 4,610 5,251 5,581 7,632 9,316 




* Indicated educational level is deemed to be terminal as charac-
terized by a centralized selective examination at the end of the 
year. 
** Intake figure estimate 
*** Provisional 
**** Nairobi Univ and Kenyatta Univ College. Excludes foreign students. 
Sources: (KG6, 1981: 201; KG12 ) 
TABLE XXXVI II 
SCHOOL lEAVER RESIDUALS BY EDUCATIONAL lEVEL, 1977-80 
Average Annual Growth 
Rate, 1977-80 
Educa tiona 1 
Level 1977 1978 1979 1980 # % 
Standard 7 136,718 132,192 153,877 169,504 10,929 7.4 
Form IV 42,805 46,761 53,112 64,441 7,212 13.9 
Form VI 3,133 3,567 3,272 5,221 696 18.3 
Total 188,656 182,520 210,261 239,166 18,837 8.2 
Source: see table above 
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Tables XXXVII and XXXVIII reveal that a larqe proportion of residuals 
from one educational level to the next have to compete for wage 
employment because the educational system cannot absorb them for fur-
ther advancement. Obviously, this is indicative of the intensification 
of the paper qualification syndrome (PQS) because of the widely held 
belief that a high educational attainment automatically leads to high 
wage employment in the modern sector (GR157). In the 1960's, prac-
tically every student who received an ordinary level school certificate 
was easily absorbed into the modern sector, notwithstanding examination 
performance, because of the changing political and economic circum-
stances following independence. Educational attainment was then 
directly related to high economic returns from formal wage employment, 
a factor that necessitated acceleration of the paper qualification 
syndrome. Continuation of this trend has increased school output, 
causing the labor market to become glutted. 
For Kenya, a relatively poor country, to spend 30% of its 
national budget on education and then be faced with a high rate of 
unemployment among the educated can be seen as a tremendous drain of 
national resources. This is a point of major concern among academic 
and official circles and has been referred to time and again in 
previous research and official reports (GR39; GR68: 171; GR70; G871; 
GR 83; GR129). 
In the context of national planning, three significant problems 
emerge. First, unemployment of school leavers is perpetuating the 
shortages of skills in a wide range of occupations (see Table XXXIX). 
This first problem might be called the manpower problem. 
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TABLE XXXIX 
PUBLIC SECTOR MANPOWER PROJECTIONS. 1979-83 
Surplus (+) 
Currently Additional Additional or 
Employment Employed Requirements Supply Deficit (-) 
Field 1978-79 1979-83 1979-83 1979-83 
Medical doctors 542 724 428 296 
Dentists 22 138 110 28 
Pharmacists 30 148 92 56 
Clinical Officers 1,002 835 552 283 
Registered Nurses 1,223 1,037 690 347 
Enroll ed Nurses 4,009 3,891 2,236 - 1,655 
Public Health Offcrs 250 140 107 33 
Public Health Techs 642 2,099 497 - 1,602 
Pharmaceutical Techs 221 669 138 531 
Lab Technologists 180 540 77 463 
Lab Techs 284 1,400 264 - 1 ,136 
Radiographers 217 933 122 811 
Physiotherapists 116 544 101 443 
Occupational Thrpsts 45 555 68 487 
Dental Technologists 15 115 13 102 
Orthopedic Technolgsts 12 138 35 103 
Family Health Field Eds 430 930 1 ,012 + 82 
Nutrition Field Wrkrs 210 280 248 32 
Jurists 217 527 250 277 
Engineers 421 999 325 674 
Agronomists/Vets (grads) 841 1 ,478 900 578 
Physical Scientists 107 297 300 + 3 
Grad Level Teachers 2,864 3,829 3,700 129 
Agronmsts/Vets (semi- 1,399 1,684 1,500 184 
prof) 
Other qualified A~ron- 4,399 8,404 2,250 - 6,154 
omists/Vets 
Engineering Techs 1,760 3,365 3,600 + 235 
Printing Techs 183 325 200 125 
Scientific Techs 429 677 540 137 
Other techs/artisians 523 1,225 900 325 
Source: (KG5) 
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The structure of the educational system, with its colonial mold, is 
considered the main source of the problem. Secondly, when education 
ceases completely after only seven years, what was painfully learned 
will shortly be forgotten. Furthermore, this short time in school 
often raises false expectations of future employability. Thirdly, 
the educated unemployed represent an articulate and politically 
conscious group (relative to the general population of the country), 
with the ability to mobilize public opinion and governmental opposi-
tion. Recent political events in Kenya tend to confirm this view. 
Since the attempted coup of August 1, 1982 (which was largely supported 
by students), the government of Kenya closed the University and other 
colleges. This and other studies (GR59) suggest that the prospects 
of unemployment among the educated could become a major impetus for 
student unrest. Therefore, the deep rooted, socioeconomic causes of 
these educational problems should be understood in their proper societal 
context if realistic and viable solutions are to be suggested. 
THE STRUCTURE OF KENYAN EDUCATION 
At independence, Kenya inherited an educational system carefully 
designed for the exclusive benefit of European settlers in the country. 
The examination and selection process, the content of educational cur-
ricula, the structuring of educational administration and finance 
still reflect the pattern of social relations which existed during the 
colonial period. Such continuity in educational policy contributes 
immensely to the perpetuation of neocolonialism and tends to discrim-
inate against the vast majority of Kenyans who, by virtue of their 
low social status, cannot afford to receive the type of quality 
education required to gain access to modern sector employment. 
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The Republic of Kenya is divided into seven provinces plus the 
Nairobi extraprovincia1 district. The seven provinces are subdivided 
into a total of 38 districts. There is no provincial government as 
such. Rather, the provinces serve as administrative boundaries for 
various central governmental activities (GR123). For example, the 
system of primary education is overseen by the seven Provincial Edu-
cation Officers, who in turn de1gate responsibility to the District 
Education Officers. Superimposed upon the system of provinces and 
districts is a network of local governmental bodies whose jurisdictions 
often, but not always, coincide with district boundaries. The local 
governmental bodies in several designated urban areas are called 
municipal councils, and the rest of the country is subdivided into 
county councils. 
Primary Education 
Soon after Kenya achieved independence in 1963, the administra-
tion and operation of primary schools became the responsibility of the 
municipal and county councils. The central government, through the 
Ministry of Education, became responsible for curriculum, examinations, 
and the setting of standards. The eight year primary cycle established 
by the Beecher Commission of 1949 was later shortened to seven years. 
Secondary education extended for six years and was divided into a 
lower course of four years duration (called Forms) and an upper course 
of two years duration. This structure is shown graphically in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Structure of Education. 
Source: (GR62) 
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Prior to 1970, rural primary schools were funded partly by 
school fees, partly by local government revenues, and partly by 
central government revenues. The most important sources of funds 
were grants from the c~ntral government, which provided roughly 35%, 
followed by graduated personal tax funds (23%), and school fees (24%) 
in 1969 (GR48). However, in 1971, because of the financial diffi-
cu1ties of the districts, the central government took over from the 
councils the responsibility for financing education and other services. 
The central government now collects school fees and graduated personal 
taxes, and no longer extends grants to the councils. This decision did 
not, however, affect primary schools within the jurisdiction of the 
municipal councils, of which there are seven in the country. 
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Primary schools in the rural areas are run by District Education 
Boards, which are composed of governmental officials, educators, and 
private citizens. The DEB's employ teachers directly through the 
Teachers' Service Commission (an ad hoc subsidiary of the Ministry 
of Education) and collect school fees in addition to performing their 
administrative and curricular functions. For budgetary purposes, the 
Ministry of Education grants funds to the DEB's, which pay the salaries 
of the teachers. 
Secondary Education 
The secondary schools are classified as either "aided" or "unaided." 
The aided (or government maintained) schools are completely under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Education, and all budgetary and educa-
tional responsibilities belong to the government. There are also some 
assisted schools within the aided school system, where the central gov-
ernment pays 80% of the salaries of both the teaching and nonteaching 
staffs. 
The unaided schools, on the other hand, operate outside the 
established jurisdictions of the government. The Ministry of Education 
has little to do with the unaided school system other than to certify 
its existence. These schools include private schools which are owned 
and operated by enterprising individuals and the Harambee or self-help 
schools built with community contributions. In 1969, the central 
government initiated a small scale program to assist selected Haram-
bee schools in securing teachers. The government also takes over a 
number of Harambee schools each year, thus relieving the local 
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communities from financial responsibility. 
Examination and Selection Process 
Accompanying the ferocious competition for access to educational 
opportunity in Kenya is an emphasis on academic criteria for advance-
ment within the system. There has been little attempt to break away 
from the inherited colonial pattern of academic credentials. In 
fact, a tightening of these requirements has occurred as employment 
opportunities have become scarce; the minimum educational require-
ments have been raised, and research and reform efforts have been 
directed toward improving the efficiency of the examinations, thus 
perpetuating the neocolonial situation (GR38; GR143). 
At the end of the primary cycle, nearly all students sit for 
the Certificate of Primary Education Examination (CPE). Those who 
pass the examination go on to secondary schools. Those who do poorly 
frequently repeat Standard VII in order to improve their performance 
the following year. Passing the EACE qualifies students for 
admission to senior secondary or technical schools. Passing the EAACE 
qualifies students for admission to the university. The pyramidical 
structure of the Kenyan educational system is perhaps best exemplified 
by Figure 8 , which diagrams school enrollment for the period 1973-
1974. 
As Figure 8 shows, the critical problem in Kenyan education 
is the scarcity of secondary schools. Of the 227,000 students who sat 
for the CPE examination in 1974, only 58,638 (25%) were admitted to 
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unaided secondary school system. The remaining 168,362 (75%) left 
school without any prospect for further schooling or employment. On 
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the basis of previous research by Fordham and Sheffield (GR51), 
approximately 33% of the 1974 primary school leavers were expected to 
find work in the formal or informal sectors of the economy. Dore 
et al (GR44) gave a much higher estimate of unemployment. Of 
the estimated 347,000 children entering the labor market in 1980, 
57% had completed primary school and 21% had completed at least four 
years of secondary school. Making the very optimistic assumption 
that there was a 5% growth in modern sector jobs and that 2% of the 
existing modern sector job holders died or retired, the net increase 
in modern sector jobs could be enough to accomodate only 13% of the 
primary school age students and 6% of the secondary school age stu-
dents. Primary school leavers unable to find modern sector jobs 
would comprise 44% of the total. The corresponding figure for unem-
ployed secondary school leavers would be 15%. The unemployment 
figure for females was much higher than for males at both the primary 
and the secondary level. Thus, a major bottleneck occurs every year 
at both the primary and the secondary level, and this bottleneck has 
intensified the competition for nonexistant jobs. 
The Primary School Leavers. Because of the relatively limited 
number of places in secondary schools, the chief problem with Kenya's 
educational system starts at the primary level. As Table XXXX indi-
cates, on the average, about 30% of the primary school candidates pass 
the Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) examination and continue 
their education in government and private secondary schools. The aver-
age opportunity index for admission to the government aided secondary 
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TABLE XXXX 
SUMMARY OF PRIMARY SCHOOL CANDIDATES AND RESIDUALS 
1964-81 
Form I O~~ortunities 
KPE/CPE Aided Unaided Total 
Year Candidates Schools Schools Secondari: Residuals 
1964 103,400 11 ,500 24,900 36,400 67,000 
1965 148,900 12,800 11 ,300 24,100 124,800 
1966 146,900 14,500 17,700 32,200 114,700 
1967 149,700 15,700 20,500 36,200 113,500 
1968 159,700 18,900 21,900 40,800 118,900 
1969 159,900 21,200 20,800 42,000 117,900 
1970 166,900 22,500 24,900 47,400 119,500 
1971 176,100 24,300 30,000 54,300 121,800 
1972 187,600 26,700 32,800 59,500 128,100 
1973 200,300 27,300 37,400 64,700 135,600 
1974 216,200 27,600 46,100 73,700 142,500 
1975 226,700 27,800 42,200 70,000 156,700 
1976 243,214 27,715 78,781 106,496 136,718 
1977 236,925 30,587 74,146 104,733 132,192 
1978 258,610 29,180 75,553 104,733 153,877 
1979 281,689 37,272 74,913 112,185 169,504 
1980 351,860 40,000 111,860 151 ,860 200,000 
Total 3,414,598 415,554 745,753 1,161,307 2,253,291 
Opportunity Index for Form I Admission 
12;~ 22~; 34% 
Residuals as % of Candidates 66~~ 
Sources: ( KG6, 1964-81 ; KG7, 1964-81; 
KG8, 1964-78) 
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school system was only 12%, while the overall opportunity index for 
both government and Harambee schools was 34%. On the whole, the aided 
school system accounted for 39% of secondary school candidates~ while the 
Harambee schools accounted for over 60% of all secondary enrnllment~. Harl 
it not been for the Harambee schools. the educational system of Kenya 
would have collapsed. The Harambee schools thus serve as cushions. 
Despite the limited number of students who are admitted to 
secondary schools every year, the available Form I places are not 












OPPORTUNITIES FOR CPE CANDIDATES, 1975 
BY TYPE OF SCHOOL AND PROVINCE 
1975 Proportion Gaining Form 1 Places 
Candidates Aided Unaided 
50,361 6,550 (13%) 11 ,072 (22%) 
12,479 2,084 (16~n 2,533 (20%) 
42,059 4,379 (10%) 9,153 (22%) 
547 151 (28%) 
43,412 4,109 ( 9%) 6,660 (15~n 
31,782 4,162 (13%) 5,623 (18%) 
30,422 3,835 (13%) 7,274 (24%) 
8,488 3,392 (40%) 2,722 (32%) 
219,550 28,663 (13%) 45,037 (21%) 
Source: (KG8,1975) 
of 220,000 candidates, about 28,663 (12%) were admitted into govern-
ment-aided secondary schools, while another 45,000 (21%) were 
admitted to Harambee secondary schools. The corresponding figures for 
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Nairobi show that 40% of the candidates were admitted to government 
schools and another 35% to Harambee schools. Thus, the probability 
of gaining Form I places from a Nairobi primary school is significantly 
greater than from a rural primary school. In the case of Harambee 
schools in Nairobi, access is determined almost entirely by the 
student's ability to meet the fees which are charged. 
The pyramidical structure of the Kenyan educational system may 
be better understood from the following diagram which illustrates pro-


















Data were taken from a recent government report on university edu-
cation in Kenya (March, 1981). The report stated that in 1980, some 
900,000 children enrolled in Standard 1; about 860,000 of them will be 
expected to sit for CPE in 1986. If the present trend continues, about 
220,000 of them will be able to proceed to Form I in 1987 (double the 
present intake), with about 215,000 being allowed to sit for EACE in 
1990. Thereafter, about 43,000 will likely aspire to proceed to senior 
secondary (A level) and the university, although only about 17,000 of 
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them are apt to meet the minimum entrance requirements for university 
admission (KG16: 71). Even if the government opens up a second uni-
versity (as projected), it is unlikely that the projected 17,000 
candidates will be absorbed into the university system. 
Given the statistical realities of secondary school opportuni-
ties, primary school for the majority of pupils is terminal formal 
education. Unfortunately, the primary school content and teaching 
methods, dominated by the CPE examination--a computerized multiple 
choice test made up of three papers (English, mathematics, and general 
knowledge)--are almost inseparably tied to the task of preparation 
for secondary education rather than a test of skill acquisition 
(GR143). Furthermore, the performance of repeaters and older 
children is categorically better than that of first sitters and 
younger students. It has been convincingly argued that to a large 
extent, the CPE tests the teachers rather than the pupils. Because 
of the orientation of the primary school curriculum towards the 
CPE, other important issue~ such as the quality of education, have 
been neglected. 
The validity of the CPE examination as an instrument for select-
ing children for secondary school must be viewed within the context 
of the regional distribution of educational resources (i.e., the 
number of qualified teachers, etc) and opportunities discussed in the 
previous chapter. Results of student performance in national examin-
ations tend to ignore historical and other economic and political 
factors which influence the nature and structure of the school sys-
tem (GR85; GR1l8; GR143). Those students who come from the relatively 
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rich areas, such as Central Province or the urban centers of Nai-
robi, perform better than those students from the relatively deprived 
areas of the Northern, Eastern, or Coast Provinces. The unequal dis-
tribution of qualified teachers and other school inputs tend to 
intensify regional inequalities among the fortunate and the less 
fortunate provinces. 
A number of questions have been raised regarding the validity 
of the CPE as an objective criteria for selection of secondary school 
bound students. The Report of the National Committee on Educational 
Objectives (KG15: 131) highlights the major problems with the ePE: 
• The examination has been dominated by items which test 
abilities related only to the cognitive aspects of learning. As 
a result, it has encouraged memorization of facts rather than 
acquisition of career oriented skills. 
• The examination has not fulfilled the function of a 
terminal examination for the majority of primary school 1eavers 
who have no chance of going further with education. In particular, 
it has given only limited attention to agriculture and practical sub-
jects and has therefore not prepared children for life in the rural 
environment where the majority of them will live. 
• The examination favors children from urban schools because 
there settings provide an improved socio-economic background and 
surroundings, more qualified teachers, and excellent school facilities. 
The reasons for this situation are understandable. Since inde-
pendence, competition for secondary school entry has steadily 
intensified. The simplest way of making the examination more difficult 
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(thereby keeping the numbers of graduates low) is to increase the 
proportion of items requiring specialized knowledge. Moreover, 
most of the people responsible for the certificate have been recruited 
from secondary teaching and are naturally concerned about ensuring 
a continued supply of high-caliber recruits to the secondary schools. 
They have been supported by the manpower planners, who until quite 
recently, were preoccupied with the need to provide for Kenya's high-
level manpower needs, particularly in the occupations still dominated 
by expatriates (GR69: 236). The result has been that the syllabus 
of upper primary schools, and particularly the Certificate of Primary 
Education (CPE), has become overloaded with topics that are the more 
proper concern of the secondary schools. The CPE does not make a 
more accurate prediction of which pupils would make the best use of 
secondary-level education. 
Some attempts have been made to reform the primary school cur-
riculum by adopting a freer approach to teaching in which children 
are encouraged to be more spontaneous and to draw on their environment 
and by adding a rural aspect to the science courses. But these ef-
forts to change the curriculum are largely nullified by the examination 
system. The questions related to agriculture in the examination for 
the CPE in 1971 accounted for 17 marks out of a possible 250 (50 for 
mathematics, 100 for English, 100 for history, geography, science, 
and nature study) (GR69: 237; GR70: 65). Clearly, the \'/eight given 
to a subject in the examination and the form the questions take define 
the method and content of teaching. This;s known as the "backwash 
effect" of the examination structure. 
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The Secondary School Leavers. Although initial expansion of 
the secondary school system was justified by the manpower needs of 
the country, it was the problem of primary school leavers which later 
became the driving force for such expansion. International aid and 
community self-help encouraged the expansion of secondary schools; 
the Harambee schools now outnumber the government schools. 8y the 
time these Harambee schools had been funded, built, and the first 
batch of students graduated in 1968, the halcyon era of the secondary 
school was over. Only those with some sort of distinction in the 
EACE examination could any longer secure the sort of jobs that had 
spurred the vast building programs (GR83; GR88). 
If school certificate results may be taken as a measure of the 
quality of education in aided and unaided schools, then it may be 
said that the quality of the unaided schools is extremely poor. 
According to the examination results presented in Table XXXXII, on 
the next oage, the Harambee schools are producing failures. The 
table shows that 48% of the pupils in government schools obtained 
Division I-III certificates between 1972 and 1979. During the same 
period, the proportion of Harambee school students who merited 
Division I-III passes was only 16%. The combined percentage of 
those who received EACE certificates (Division IV) and those who failed 
was 91% in the Harambee schools and 53% in government schools. Fewer 
than 6,000 students were admitted annually into senior secondary or A 
level schools and the Mombasa and Kenya Polytechnics. In 1979, 
approximately 53,000 secondary school graduates were out looking for 
work. This figure is well in excess of the 50,000 jobs the economy 
TABLE XXXXII 
EACE EXAtUNATION, PERFORMANCE OF CANDIDATES 
Average 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1972-79 
Aided Schools 
Candidates 26,217 28,385 32,311 38,228 47,239 55,878 60,707 70,000 
Div 1-3 12,494 14,199 15,847 18,821 22,410 28,250 29,889 27,302 
% (48%) (50%) (49%) (49%) (47%) (51%) (49%) (39%) 48% 
Div 4 8,138 8,598 8,866 10,532 7,660 15,410 16,648 23,712 
% (31%) (30%) (27%) (28%) (16%) (27%) (27%) (34%) 28% 
Fail 5,585 5,588 7,598 8,875 17,169 12,488 14,170 1~,9a6 
01 (21%) (20%) (24%) (23%) (36%) (22%) (23%) (27%) 25% 10 
Unaided Schools 
Candidates 5,109 6,044 5,773 9,698 5,004 5,330 4,214 4,158 
Div 1-3 1,235 846 944 786 436 
% (13%) (17%) (18~~ ) ( 19%) (11 %) 16% 
Div 4 (EACE) 3,832 4,545 3,522 4,960 1,553 2,492 2,067 1,988 
% (75%) (75%) (61%) (51%) (31 %) (47%) (49%) (4856 ) 55% 
Fail 1,277 1,499 2,251 3,503 2,605 1,894 1,361 1,734 ..... 
% (25%) (25%) (39%) (36%) (52%) (35%) (32%) (41%) 36% co 0 
Source: (KG7, 1980: 200) 
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generates annually. 
The next examination hurdle for those admitted to A level schools 
(approximately 6,000) comes at the end of Form VI. The EAACE examination 
is strictly used to select candidates to the university. Even at this 
level, the ability of the university to absorb qualified students is 














TABLE XXXXI II 
FORM VI LEAVERS AND CANDIDATES ADMITTED INTO THE 
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI AND KENYATTA UNIVER-
SITY COLLEGE, 1970-1980 
Form VI # Adm to the U of Nairobi # 
Leavers* & Ken~atta Univ College Left Over 
2,672 1,279 1,393 
3,448 1 ,215 2,233 
3,953 1,641 2,312 
5,602 1,735 3,867 
6,459 1,469 4,990 
7,998 1,519 6,479 
7,493 1,804 5,689 
8,655 2,461 6,194 
8,429 2,592 5,837 
11 ,032 2,611 8,421 
12,306 2,600** 11,706** 
private candidates 
** University admission for the 1981/82 academic year was given from 
the Nation Newspaper, February 14, 1982, p 3. 
Source: (KG8) 
For example, the total number of applications received for the 1981/82 
academic year was 9,298. Of these, a total of 4,500 met the minimum 
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requirements to enter the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta Univer-
sity College. The University, however, only admitted a total of 2,412 
students (Daily Nation, Feb 14, 1982, P 3). 
The importance of examination results in terms of opportunities 
for further education, training, and employment has been well docu-
mented by Kinyanjui (GR88). For example, in 1968, of a total sample 
of 1,186 secondary school 1eavers, 394 (33%) were engaged in employment 
and 531 (41%) were in school. Of those who were employed, 24% were 
from national schools, 38% from provincial schools, and 37% from Haram-
bee schools. The remaining leavers were distributed accordingly: 531 
(45%) received further training, 175 (14%) were unemployed, and 86 (7%) 
were untraced. The overall unemployment rate for the group with 
Division I to III certificates was 6.9%, but the unemployment rate among 
1eavers from national schools with these certificates was 4.5%, 6.7% 
for 1eavers from provincial schools, and 28.2% for 1eavers from Haram-
bee schools (GR85: 37). On the whole, the Harambee schools had the 
highest numbers of leavers remaining unemployed: 37% in the sample were 
unemployed in their first year after school, while smaller proportions 
from national and provincial aided schools fell into this category. as 
demonstrated in Table XXXXIV. 
Unemployment in the second year after school was as follows: 86% 
for Harambee school 1eavers, 59% for provincial school leavers, and 15% 
for national school 1eavers. 
EACE performance for the three types of schools was as follows: 
the mean grade aggregate was 31.0 for national schools, 3S.7 for pro-
vincial schools, and 43.1 for Harambee schools (GR8S: 38). On the basis 
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of performance criteria, one might expect the distribution of oppor-
tunities for leavers from these three types of schools to be different, 
but the Harambee leavers experienced discrimination beyond that indi-
cated by their lower performance on EACE. This discrimination also 
affected leavers from the less well-established government aided 
schools. While more than 60% of the leavers from aided national schools 
and about 42 % from provincial schools went on to higher education or 
some form of formal training, only 18% of the leavers from Harambee 
schools continued their education or training. The implicatior. is 
that more than 60% of Kenya's secondary school students are in the 
Harambee schools and are receiving an inferior education. Consequently, 
they cannot compete on an equal basis with students who attend 
government aided and urban high-cost schools. In short, the different 
school systems in Kenya have differential effects on social mobility. 
TABLE XXXXIV 
FIRST YEAR AFTER SCHOOL OPPORTUNITIES BY TYPE OF 
SECONDARY SCHOOL ATTENDED, 1968 SCHOOL LEAVERS 
Type of After National Provincial Harambee 
School School School School 
OQQortunit.l % 0/ % Total /0 
Higher Ed 37.8 17.4 4.1 266 
Training 21.3 24.2 14.2 265 
Employment 24.1 37.8 32.7 394 
Other Activities 1.1 0.8 6.1 16 
Unemployment 9.2 14.5 36.7 175 
Unknown 6.4 5.3 8.2 70 
Totals 99.9 (357) 100.0 (731) 100.0 (98) 1,186 
Source: (GR85) 
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POPULATION GROWTH, EDUCATION, AND MIGRATION 
Population in Kenya over the past decade has grown at one of 
the highest rates in the world, 3.5% per annum. In real terms, Kenya's 
population grew from 11 million in 1969 to 16 million in 1979. At the 
present rate, it is expected to swell to 28 million by the year 2000. 
The projections shown below in Table XXXXV are based on a declining 
birth rate. Should this not occur, total population in the year 2000 





















POPULATION IN KENYA (%) 
Estima ted 
1962 1969 1978 
Projected 
1983 2000 
17 19 19 18 14 
29 29 29 30 27 
49 46 48 48 55 
5 6 4 4 4 
8,636 10,943 14,732 17,470 28,182 
1 04 11 7 1 08 1 08 82 
Sources: (GR132: 208. Data for 1948, 1962, and 1969 are taken from 
the Population Census for these years. The estimate for 
1978 and projections for 1983 and 2000 were obtained from 
KG5, Table 2.6, Declining Birth Rate Columns. 
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The present population structure is indicated in Table XXXXV 
above. In 1978, 48% of the population was under the age of fifteen, 
and only 3.7% was over the age of sixty. Hence, the population of 
productive age (15-59) was, in fact, smaller than the dependent popu-
lation, comprising only 48% of the total. As a result, the dependency 
ratio (the number of people dependent on each one hundred persons of 
working age) increased steadily from 92 in 1948 to 117 in 1969, and 
then began to drop. The projected dependency ratio for the year 2000 
is 82. The school age population was 29% in 1978, which, combined with 
the other developments, suggests that there will be an increased demand 
on the government to provide sufficient quality education and productive 
employment. The impact of this demand is expected to place tremendous 
strain on both governmental and family budgets. 
It is estimated that 90% of Kenya's 16 million people live in 
rural areas and earn their 1ivelhood from peasant agriculture. Because 
of demographic and land tenure patterns, access to land has become 
limited in recent years. According to the latest Development Plan 
(KG5), less than 17% of Kenya's land area is considered arable (i.e., 
high and medium potential land). The average overall population density 
was 26 per sq kilometer in 1978, while the density on arable land was 
135 per sq km. By the year 2000, these densities are anticipated to be 
50 and 250 per sq km, respectively (KG5: 65). Already, approximately 
30% of Kenya's households do not have access to land. Land is concen-
trated in a very few hands. Njonjo (GRl17) reports in his 1974 survey 
of 230 large farms occupying 222,000 acres, representing about 67% of 
the total African-owned mixed farmland, that the smallest 91% of the 
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farmers owned only 21% of the land and the largest 5% owned 69%. 
Most of the landless in Kenya are too poor to be able to set up a 
business. Even those with access to some land have a hard time 
generating subsistence-level income. 
The increased drain on the land and the relatively low income 
of rural peasants create a situation in which the vast majority of 
rural peasants are forced to migrate to other, more prosperous rural 
areas or urban centers. The significance of such migration is 
shown in Table XXXXVI, which indicates the proportion of casual labor 
in the formal sector. The table shows that 50% of the casual labor 
is employed in agriculture and forestry; about 15% is employed in 
manufacturing. The high percentage of casual labor in the sugar and 
coffee plantations reflects seasonal peaks as in coffee picking. On 
the whole, the data indicate that casual labor is a major source of 
supplementing low incomes in rural Kenya. Given the implied expansion 
in the adult workforce and the comparatively small proportion of 
medium and high potential land, this raises major questions of future 
employment and labor migration. 
Livingstone (GR107) has identified three kinds of population 
movements in Kenya: rural-urban migration; rural-rural migration; and 
reverse urban-rural migration of returning migrants. Rural-urban migra-
tion has been the main focus of attention because of its association 
with the problem of urban unemployment (GR132; GR150). 
In the 1960's and the early 1970's, rural-urban migration to 
Nairobi was nearly 11% per annum. The 1972 ILO Mission to Kenya was 
particularly concerned with this problem because of its possible impact 
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TABLE XXXXVI 




Mi xed Fa rmi ng 
Coffee Plantations 
Sisal Plantations 
r·1ining & Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Food Products, mec 
Soap, etc 
Plastic Products 
Electricity & Water 








































Sources: (GR69: 5-16; GR107. Compiled from Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Employment and Earnings, 1977, p 11). 
on urban unemployment. The Mission projected that a major urban avalanche 
would take place in Kenya during the 1980's; however, the anticipated 
explosion in the number of urban unemployed in Nairobi has not material-
ized. One reason has been a considerable growth in large numbers of 
other towns in Kenya which have absorbed the anticipated migration to 
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Nairobi. As indicated in Table XXXXVII, 12 towns grew faster than 
Nairobi, and 14 grew faster than Mombasa. Kakamega and Kisii grew 
at nearly 18% per annum--phenomena1 growth rates. Reflecting this 
general dispersal of urban growth, the proportion of the population 
in towns of 10,000 or more accounted for by Nairobi and Mombasa 
appears to have fallen from 81.6% in 1969 to 60.7% in 1979, a dra-
matic change. This change in urban population, however, has not 
been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the distribution of 
manufacturing establishments and wage employment. In 1978, Nairobi 
and Mombasa together accounted for 73% of wage employment and 69% 
of manufacturing employment in main towns (KG7, 1978). Given the 
historical concentration of manufacturing and commercial activity 
in Nairobi and Mombasa, these two urban centers are expected to at-
tract the majority of migrants, particularly those with several years 
of formal education. One feature of rural-urban migration is that it 
tends to be selective, with a bias towards the younger age groups 
and toward those who have had some education. This may be due either 
to raised expectations among the educated or to the greater probability 
of securing a job in the case of migrants with some years of education. 
A corollary of the latter is that as more of the populace acquire edu-
cation, the degree of education required for a given probability of 
employment will increase. Thus, following the dramatic expansion of 
education after independence and the gradual slowing down of the rate 
of growth of industrial employment in the late 1960's and 1970's, unem-
ployment among school graduates has reached epidemic proportions. 
In an extensive study of labor migration by male students and 
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TABLE XXXXVII 




~la in Towns 1969 1979 1969-1979 
Kakamega 6,244 32,000 17.8 
Ki si i 6,083 31,000 17.7 
Kisumu 32,431 150,000 16.6 
Nyeri 10,004 36,000 13.7 
Keri cho 10,144 30,000 11. 5 
Eldoret 18,196 50,000 10.6 
Kitale 11 ,573 28,000 9.2 
Thika 18,387 41,000 8.4 
Malindi 10,757 23,000 7.9 
Nakuru 47,151 93,000 7.0 
Athi River 5,343 10,000 6.5 
Nanyuki 11 ,624 19,000 5.0 
Nai robi 509,286 828,000 5.0 
Naivasha 6;920 11,000 4.7 
Nyahururu 7,602 11,000 3.8 
Mombasa 247,073 342,000 3.3 
Isio10 8,201 11,000 3.0 
Sources: (KG7, 1969 and Central Bureau of Statistics Provisional 
Estimate, 1979) 
urban unemployment in Kenya, Rempel (GR132) found a relationship 
between a migrant's education and his propensity to migrate to an 
urban center. * The data presented in Table XXXXVIII, next page, 
indicate that 25% of the migrants have some secondary education, 
while an additional 47% have 5 to 8 years of formal schooling. 
Of those with 5 to 8 years of education, 75% appear to have completed 
primary education. For i~airobi, 34% of the migrants have some 
* The sample excluded female students because of their low rate of 
migration, resulting from a number of cultural sanctions which 
act as prohibiters. The fear of being stigmatized as a "prostitute" 
is one such example. 
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secondary education, while an additional 42% have 5 to 8 years of 
formal schooling. 
TABL E XXXXV I II 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LEVELS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 




Urban Centers Education 1 - 4 5 - 8 1 - 6 
Nairobi 10.8 13.5 41.7 34.0 
Mombasa 15.8 18.4 50.1 16.1 
Kisumu 11.6 21. 7 45.8 20.9 
Nakuru 17.5 12.7 55.5 14.3 
E1 doret 30.8 9.6 38.5 21.1 
Thika 5.0 7.5 52.4 35.0 
Nanyuki 10.0 12.0 68.0 10.0 
Nyeri 7.6 12.7 45.5 34.2 
Totals 12'.7 14.8 47.1 25.4 
Source: (GR132: 31, Table 3.6) 
The age characteristic of migrants is given by Whitelaw (GR167). 
According to the data presented in Table XXXXIX, the typical 
migrant tends to be very young, with several years of education. 
Rempel also noted a significant variation in the distribution 
of the levels of educational attainment among provinces of migrant 
births. For example, the Central and Nyanza Provinces contain a 
proportionally higher population concentration in the secondary educa-
tion group, while Coast and Eastern Provinces contain a low concentration. 
On the other hand, Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces contain a 
191 
proportionally greater population concentration with no formal 
schooling, while Coast and Nyanza Provinces contain the proportionally 
greater concentration of people with some primary education. This 
variation could be the result of differences among provinces in the 
availability of employment opportunities in rural areas or in the 
quality of primary education, which determines a student's ability to 








A 11 ages 
* 
TABLE XXXXIX 
PROPORTION OF AFRICANS SEEKING WORK IN NAIROBI, 
BY AGE AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION 
1970 (PERCENTAGES) 
Length of Education (In Years) 
All 
0 1 - 6 7 - 8 9+ Lengths 
(43)* (38) (44) (11 ) 32 
(15 ) 52 33 19 31 
43 28 10 7 17 
36 14 7 0 13 
15 12 6 4 12 
21 19 17 12 18 
Parenthesized figures indicate less than 25 observations 
in cell. Persons not specifying age or education were 
excluded. 
Source: (GR167) 
The most important population activity in the quarter prior to 
migration was determined to be the obtaining of an education (47.4%). 
Only a small proportion of the population (16.6%) was engaged in 
farming. An additional 19.6% were employed for wages, which mayor 
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may not have been on a farm. This suggests that those with some years 
of formal education may choose to take a risk and decide to migrate; 
those with no formal education are much less likely to do so. The 
following, Table L, shows 'the percentage distribution of the 
various employment categories prior to migration. 
TMLE L 
THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT 
OF MEN PRIOR TO THEIR RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION 
Nature of Employment 
Province of In Empl for Self- Empl 
Birth School Wages Empl Farming PIT Unemel 
Urban Center 41.4 20.7 3.5 13.8 10.3 10.3 
Nyanza 48.9 15.1 4.8 16.5 3.5 11.2 
Western 41.8 18.6 2.3 20.9 2.8 13.6 
R Valley 53.8 15.4 7.7 2.6 5.1 15.4 
Central 54.4 14.5 3.5 9.6 3.2 14.8 
Eastern 39.9 14.6 4.4 27.8 4.4 8.9 
Coast 50.0 14.5 3.9 22.4 2.6 6.6 
Uganda and 21.9 31.2 12.5 18.8 3.1 12.5 
Tanzania 













On the basis of this study, a typical migrant is determined 
to be relatively young, will likely have completed more formal educa-
tion than the average Kenyan of the same age, and will have less 
actual or potential claim to land ownership than the average Kenyan. 
Conclusive evidence is presented to support the claim that the pro-
pensity to migrate increases with the level of educational attainment. 
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Thus, Kenya1s continued efforts to expand educational opportunities 
will likely increase the internal migration flows. 
EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING URBAN EMPLOYMENT: 
THE KENYAN EXPERIENCE 
That Kenya has achieved a high rate of expansion in primary 
and secondary education has been well documented in Chapter II. The 
unprecedented growth in primary and secondary school enrollment 
achieved so far has led to the emergence or accentuation of unemploy-
ment problems among school graduates. Measures to deal with the 
unemployment of school leavers have been taken at two levels: from 
within the formal educational system and from outside it. Reforms 
within the educational system have concentrated on curriculum changes 
and the expansion of institutions to provide technical and agricultural 
education (GR37; GR92; GR93). Outside the formal educational system, 
measures intended to alleviate the unemployment problem have ranged 
from land settlement schemes to direct intervention in the labor 
market through tripartite agreements, and more recently, from wage 
guidelines set by the Industrial Court, and through the taking of jobs 
held by nonresidents (GR14E). 
The central component of the school leaver problem, as per-
ceived by planners and politicians, is the so-called IIwhite-collar 
mentalityll fostered by the educational establishment which makes 
youngsters set their sights on the limited number of civil service 
and management jobs available and causes them to reject agricultural 
or manual work (PI3-5, 12, 15). This attitude is cited as a major cause of 
unemployment. According to an editorial which appeared in the 
Daily Nation: 
The trouble with our educational system is that it just 
isn't suited to our development programme. In its orig-
inal form, the system was designed to produce a small 
group of clerical Iyes men l who would help perpetrate 
colonialism in Kenya. And the disheartening thing is 
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that this sorry state of affairs has been allowed to con-
tinue up till now--18 years after Kenya became an 
independent nation . . • . What this means is that the 
educational system cannot play its role as the nerve 
centre of our development process. It achieves a 
spectatory role rooted in its colonial mess. It cannot 
take an innovative role. . •. So, yearly we are pro-
ducing school 1eavers whose most important qualification 
is the ability to speak English with an anachronistic 
Oxford accent. And the baffled kids, waiving certificates 
that don't mean much, flock into urban areas where they 
hope to get white-collar jobs and practice their Oxford 
English. And so we end up with 'educated ' but unemploy-
able kids who, because they have no skills, start loitering 
in urban areas with imponderable consequences. The solu-
tion to this roblem lies in reformin the educational 
system to give it a rura orlentation emphasis added 
(January 19, 1982: 6) 
The general theory behind this style of thinking is that unem-
ployment in this case is due to an educational system which turns 
out inappropriately trained labor, i.e., labor which is academically 
geared. The colonial legacy in the educational structure, which 
ensures that an elite is groomed for administration is often blamed 
for producing this situation. The solution, therefore, appears to 
lie in a reform of the educational system by promoting vocational and 
practically-oriented training such as the Village Polytechnic Pro-
gramme {PIl-15}. Instead of fostering aspirations for passing 
examinations and gaining white-collar jobs, this program imparts the 
skills necessary for gaining local craft employment. In other words, 
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the new orthodoxy advocated changes in the different components of 
the school system particularly curriculum reform, thus maintaining 
intact the main elements of the colonial educational and economic 
structures. 
A recurring theme all these reforms suggest is the view that 
education and production ought to be closely linked. The integration 
of education and production is expected to discourage students from 
seeking employment in the urban areas and lead them into rural areas 
where employment is considered plentiful (GR3; GR37). In Kenya, this 
thinking was originally spawned by the National Christian Council of 
Kenya (NCCK) in the mid-1960's. One of its pioneering reports, en-
titled After School What? (GRllS) focused attention on the hundreds 
of thousands of primary school leavers (67,000 in 1964) who had little 
hope of finding higher wage employment or further education, yet who 
were unprepared in terms of knowledge, skills, or expectations for 
the rural environment into which they were left. The report was sub-
sequently discussed at an international Conference on Education, 
Employment and Rural Development, held in Kericho, Kenya, in March 
1966 (GR14l). One of the solutions proposed was the establishment 
of Village Polytechnics to equip primary school leavers with simple, 
practical skills such as masonry and carpentry, which could be util-
ized locally in a self-employed capacity. The idea is that if 
polytechnic graduates establish themselves in business locally, 
possibly using skills which are new to the area, they will be creating 
new jobs (hence bringing down the unemployment rate) and retaining 
and bringing additional income into the community (hence developing 
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the rural economy); the combined effect will, in turn, lower the 
rate of rural-urban migration. 
r1any of these reforms are to be welcomed on strictly educational 
grounds. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether they will succeed in 
having any major impact on the school leaver problem, and in partic-
ular whether they will succeed in halting the pressure for expanding 
upper secondary and higher education, ignoring as they do the earnings 
that regularly accrue to persons with advanced levels of schooling in 
Africa (PI8; PIll). The appeal of standard examinations stems not 
merely from the wish of students to achieve entrance to higher edu-
cation, but also from the very high earnings and status associated with 
jobs to which higher levels of education give access. 
In Kenya, for example, educationally qualified people with 
relatively low skills can earn incomes that are large multiples of 
minimum formal sector wages (GR68: 271). According to a recent ILO 
report (GR70: 11), a high school graduate (EACE certificate), for 
instance, may take a two-year certificate or a three-year diploma in 
an agricultural field. At the end of the first training period 
that graduate would earn Kt351/- in Job Group E, with a title of 
Technical Assistant, Agriculture. At the end of the second year, he 
would earn K~ 864/- in Job Group G, with a title of Agricultural Exten-
sion Officer. An extra year of learning simply awards him two promotions 
within the same salary structure, amounting to about a 63% increase in 
salary. The difference for one year's earning, Kt 303/- (i.e., Kt 864/-
less Kt 531/-), is nearly equal to the total annual salary of a 
Kenyan with seven years of primary education. In a study of 
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entrepreneurship and development, Marris and Somerset (GRllO) 
concluded that Kenya is a society in which rewards for the educationally 
qualified in employment far exceed the returns of all but the most 
successful entrepreneurs. The roots of the unemployment problem, 
therefore, lie in the interaction of the conventional educational 
system and the wage and salary structure through the allocation of 
jobs and wages by reference primarily to educational qualifications 
(GR69: 11). This has led to a great desire for education at every 
high level, such education being associated in the minds of the public 
with income aspirations and expectations which the economy is becoming 
increasingly unable to fulfill. 
While changes in curriculum and in systems of selection may be 
expected to bring educational benefits, it is unrealistic to suppose 
that such changes will make people content to accept work at very low 
incomes in rural areas if they believe themselves to be eligible for 
highly-paid urban jobs. As Colclough and Hallack succinctly put it: 
Fundamental educational change may not be possible 
in many societies without a significant change in 
the existing structure of economic and social 
relationships--and particularly in the incentives 
structure that directly links the educational sec-
tor to the labour market. 
(GR35: 20) 
In short, as long as employers continue to use the level of 
education attained as the main criterion for hiring recruits and 
as long as the existing income differentials between the highest and 
lowest paid jobs in the occupational hierarchy remain somewhat what 
they are, the phenomenon of educated unemployment in Africa is unlikely 
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to be more than marginally affected by even major changes in the 
qualitative aspects of education. 
THE SCOPE OF INDUSTRIAL TRAINING IN KENYA 
Po1icymakers in Kenya have rationalized the unemployment situ-
ation among school 1eavers as that of graduates lacking marketable 
skills to participate effectively in modern sector employment (PI3, 4, 12). 
This has led to the establishment of various forms of industrial 
training activities, combining both public and private initiatives. 
The diversity of current involvement in policy for and provision of 
training in Kenya is presented in Figure 10 (next page). In general, 
these activities can be classified into three component parts (GR92): 
(a) Supplementary Programs are designed to supplement the formal 
educational system. Some are aimed at character building and the 
formation of appropriate attitudes; others develop particular skills 
that mayor may not be relevant to the needs of Kenyan youth. Many 
are local branches of international organizations and are aimed at 
the school-going population. The following are typical of this 
category: 




Outward Bound Trust 
World Assembly of Youth 
BOY Scouts 
Girl Guides 
St John's Ambulance 
Kenya Red Cross Society 
Kenya Voluntary Develop-
ment Association 
(b) Follow-up Programs attempt to provide primary school 1eavers 
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Secondary Technical Schools 
Jiljniet:-y of Labour 1 National Youth Service - Vocational Tra1!Ung 
Unit 
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Institute . 
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School 
~i:.try of Information _ Kenyn Institute of ~ass Communication 
fti!-..i::trv of Works - Starr Training Department 
Figure 10. Domains of Industrial Training Activity--1975. 
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skills for employment or self-employment, preferably in the rural 




National Youth Service 
Correspondence Courses 
(c) Alternatives to Formal Education are for the unschooled 
who are not covered by other educational programs. They basically 
take the form of literacy classes and are run by various organiza-
tions such as: 
Youth Clubs and Centers 
Farmer and Rural Training Centers 
Maendeleo - Progress for Women 
In this section, the focus will be on the follow-up programs 
which provide vocational training for primary and secondary school 
leavers. Specifically, the impact of the Village Polytechnics and 
Secondary Technical Training programs are examined in detail. The 
careful examination of the village polytechnics and industrial train-
ing for secondary school leavers indicates that these programs are not 
realizing their aims because of the restricted market for technical 
and vocational skills in the country. 
The Village Polytechnics 
The village polytechnic movement has thus far been the most popu-
lar program for alleviating unemployment among primary school leavers, 
attracting both state and international financial support (GR7; GR50; 
GR93). Following the Kericho conference, the NCCK set up four 
village polytechnics--at Maseno in Western Province, at Mucii-wa-Urata 
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in Central Province, Ndere in Nyanza Province, and Nambale in 
Western Province (GR93: 190). Since then, the number of projects 
has increased to 300 including, in addition to the ones receiving 
governmental funding, those projects financed entirely by the church, 
by contributions from local authorities, by foreign aid donations, and 
by Harambee collections. The number receiving government funding is 
currently 220, as shown below in Table LI, which gives some idea 
of the growth rate of the program (30 projects being added each year). 
Plans have been made to continue expansion at the same rate until 
1985 (GR24) . 
TABLE LI 
EXPANSION OF POLYTECHNIC PROGRAM* 
# of # of # of 
Year Projects Trainees Instructors 
1973/74 75** 4,000** 375** 
1975/76 130 7,000 650 
1976/77 160 9,000 800 
1977 /78 190 11 ,000 950 
1978/79 220 14,000 1,100 
1979/80 250 20,000 1,250 
1984/85 400 30,000 2,000 (Projected) 
* Table shows increases in Number of Trainees/Instructors/ 
Projects, 1973/80 
** Commonwealth Youth Development Programme, March 1975, p 115. 
Youth for Development: an African Perspective 
Source: (GR37:ll5) 
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The above table indicates that during the period 1973-30, 
the number of projects has almost quadrupled, whereas the number of 
trainees has grown five fold. It is questionable whether the number 
of graduating artisians will all be absorbed into the labor market, 
given the slow rate of economic growth in the country. The situation 
is made more acute by the existence of other institutions offering 
similar training to the polytechnics, such as the National Youth 
Service, Christian Industrial Training Centres, The Kenya Association 
of Youth Centers, centers run by the YMCA and YWCA, Approved Schools 
and Technical Secondary Schools, as well as various types of formal 
and informal apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs. 
The considerable expansion of the Village Polytechnic Program 
that has occurred over the past decade has undoubtedly been promoted 
by the adoption of a regional rural development strategy (KG3). This 
development plan referred to Village Polytechnics as part of a broad 
policy of youth training and rural development. The approach, as the 
name suggests, focuses on rural development; in order to achieve this 
development, increased output in the small holder farmer sector, the 
wide scale adoption of appropriate technology (GR147), promotion of 
informal sector activity (GR69), and decentralization of decisionmaking 
are being advocated. The emphasis on rural development is a reaction 
against the industrialization policy of the 1960's which failed to 
produce sustained economic growth and expanded employment opportunity. 
This new approach, however, should not be seen as a substitute for an 
industrialization policy; rather, it is complementary to an industriali-
zation policy, and both are essential elements in a comprehensive 
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development plan. 
The most common courses offered by the polytechnics are 
carpentry (21%) and Masonry (19%) for boys and tailoring/dressmaking 
(19%) and home economics (16%) for girls (GR158: 25). Other courses 
include: commerce (including bookkeeping, accounting, and typing), 
leatherwork (including tanning and shoe making), metal work/tinsmith-
ing, welding and fitting, motor mechanics, agriculture (including 
animal husbandry, horticulture, and beekeeping), painting and tech-
nical drawing. Courses are usually two years in length, and 
governmental trade tests may be taken at the end. Fees vary from Kshs. 
50/- to Kshs. 800/- per year (GR24: 17). 
The Village Polytechnic program got underway officially in 
1971 with financial support for 40 VP's from NCCK and other voluntary 
agencies (GR37: 115). Then, in the early 1970's, the Kenyan govern-
ment became involved in the project in both a financial and an 
administrative capacity. In 1973-74, the government spent just over 
-KL210,000 on the Youth Development Program, including Village Poly-
technics and the lower level youth centers, and approximately KL 
154,000 was provided from overseas (GR37: 117). 
Today, the government is the major source of finance and pays 
all staff salaries, though funds from other sources remain important 
for buying materials and equipment and paying for new buildings. It 
remains the case that a new project must be funded from nongovernment 
sources for a certain period as a test of local support and its via-
bility; if it is successful, generally the government will eventually 
adopt it. 
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The ultimate test of the village polytechnics has been what 
happens to the graduates after they complete their training. The 
results of previous research on the subject have been mixed. Mackie 
(GR109), for example, reported that of 24 1eavers from one pioneer 
village polytechnic, only 3 had followed the anticipated route to 
self-employment in the trade they learned, while 11 had returned to 
formal education. In a subsequent study, Anderson (GR1l) reported 
that 30% of the polytechnic leavers he traced had migrated to urban 
areas and almost 37% of those who were then employed had migrated. 
These studies suggest that the village polytechnics had failed to 
realize their aims. On the other hand, other researchers have re-
ported that graduates of polytechnics were able to find employment 
or start their own businesses. The Norad Report (GR120) uses the 
figures of 50-75%; and David Court (GR39) reported that at least 
90% of the males trained in the village polytechnics in Western 
Kenya found employment, but the percentage figures for females were 
extremely low. This raises the problem of defining realistic goals 
for the training of females since their entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties are subject to stricter cultural sanctions in rural areas than 
is the case for males. The last two studies, in particular, should be 
examined carefully since they exaggerate the percentages that were 
self-employed. The nature of rural life in Africa requires that every 
member of the family participate in the production of goods and services, 
and this pattern of lifestyle may have distorted the outcome of the 
above quoted studies. 
The most up-to-date study on the whereabouts of village polytechnic 
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graduates was conducted by Brian Cal pen and the Ministry of Labor 
(GR24), based on information derived from two tracer studies carried 
out in two communities of rural Kenya. The aim of the study was to 
test the hypothesis that a substantial number of polytechnic leavers 
would be unable to take up the type of employment envisaged because 
of the limited absorptive capacity of the informal sector in rural 
areas. It was felt that the demand for skilled artisans in rural 
areas is limited by the level of development of the area concerned 
(GR24: 1). Furthermore, it was considered that even if there were 
sufficient demand, the leavers might be unable to fully exploit their 
potential because of the lack of raw materials, tools, and credit to 
start their own businesses. The question was then asked: Is the 
provision of training by itself sufficient to engender this type of 
development, or are other kinds of assistance also necessary? 
The hypothesis was then tested by carrying out surveys of the 
polytechnic leavers in two communities. One survey was undertaken 
in an economically vibrant area (Othaya in North Central Kenya), with 
a good demand structure; the other was accomplished in Kenenya (in 
Southwest Kenya), a less prosperous district with lower demand. By 
comparing the two sets of data, it was possible to assess the impact 
of the demand level on the fortunes of the leavers. Predictions were 
that the program might be relatively successful in the high demand 
area (i.e., Othaya), but less so in Kenenya. The aggregate results of 
the leavers' surveys for both polytechnics are presented in the table 
that follows. 
One striking feature of Table LII is the small percentage (9%) 
* 
TABLE LII 
SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR VOCATIONAL SCHOOL GRADUATES 
IN KENENYA AND OTHAYA* 
Kenenta Otha,la 
Cate90ries # % # 
Self-Employed: 
Self-sufficient (80%+) 22 10 16 
Borderline (50-80%) 21 9 12 
Unclassifiable 11 5 13 
Total Self-Employed 54 24 41 
Farming 55 25 51 
Rural Wage Labor 5 2 23 
Towns 39 18 48 
Unknown 41 18 15 












Total 222 100 191 100 
Two tracer studies carried out at Kenenya and Othaya Vi 11 age 
polytechnics in August and September, 1980. 
Source: (GR24) 
of leavers from both polytechnics who belong in the self-employed, 
self-sufficient subcategory. This small pertentage represents the 
real success stories among the leavers as defined by the program's 
express goal of producing self-employed artisans. The percentage 
rises to 22.5% if leavers in the borderline subcategory (an average 
of 7.5%) and those in the unclassifiable subcategory (an average of 
6%) are considered. However, it is doubtful whether more than 9% 
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of these self-sufficient artisans would be able to survive solely 
with income earned from their craft during a slump time. The table 
also shows that 26% of the leavers were found to be deriving the 
majority of their income from farming, as they would have done had 
the polytechnic not been there. They may use their polytechnic 
skills to improve their land or to earn some extra pocket money by 
helping out with a local contract, but their chief occupation is 
farming. So what the polytechnics are doing in these cases are 
graduating, not self-employed artisans, but better-grade peasant 
farmers. This and the prevalence of agriculture as a compulsory 
subject in polytechnics is indicative of how the program is in some 
ways a training for rural life rather than providing a breeding 
ground for tomorrow's entrepreneurs. 
The significant difference between the two sets of results 
which can be noted at this stage is the much higher percentage of 
Othaya's leavers who got local salaried jobs--12% compared with 
Kenenya's 2%. Considering the difference in employment opportunities 
available in the two communities (Othaya being more heavily endowed 
with wage labor posts), this is not surprising. 
Complicating the problem still further is the lack of govern-
ment financial assistance to the graduates. The revolving loan fund 
established by NCCK from which VP graduates could purchase tools and 
equipment was too small to make a significant impact. For example, 
the maximum loan of Kshs. 2,000/- per graduate was too small to score 
large contracts estimated to be around Kshs. 50,000/- (GR24: 63). This 
point illustrates the difficulty of getting started in self-employment 
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regardless of one's technical skills. 
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis 
is that the Village Polytechnic program is not substantially real-
izing its aims. These schools provide training opportunities for 
less than 5% of the total number of school leavers not admitted into 
secondary schools, and the chances of self-employment for those 
trained in these institutions is determined by the social and economic 
development taking place in each rural community. As a result, these 
schools are unlikely to provide a solution to the serious unemployment 
problem facing the country. As the data have indicated, only a small 
proportion of leavers are becoming self-employed; and of those who do 
become self-employed, the majority are unable to expand their busi-
nesses signficantly due to a lack of government support in the areas 
of credit extension and protection from multinational competition. 
Therefore, the rural economy is not being developed as planned. This 
failure is clearly due to economic factors, e.g., limited and non-
exploitable demands which obviate an earlier key statement that 
changes in the educational structure alone are insufficient to bring 
about the program's aims. The provision of training must be accom-
panied by other forms of assistance. Rapid transformation of the rural 
economy will be critical to the functioning of the village polytechnics, 
even at the limited level at which they are now operating. 
Technical Training for Secondary School Leavers 
Secondary school is the only aspiration of many children, because 
it is from secondary school that other viable openings in life (teacher 
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training, employment in commerce, recruitment into the Armed Forces, 
and so on) become real possibilities. Since 1968, however, the problem 
of the secondary school leaver has been acute, particularly in the case 
of those from the Harambee secondary schools. Despite this, a new 
optimism emerged in the 1970's which argues that the only real se-
curity could be found in a technical qualification. Once again, 
international aid and self-help efforts were directed toward building 
new vocational schools and technical colleges (GR57). The result was 
the same tale once again: the first students emerged from the tech-
nical schools in 1970 and were absorbed into Nairobi's Industrial 
Estate--the government's technical ministries. Many of the next group 
(from the class of 1971) were still walking the streets in early 1973 
(GR84). Thc situation has worsened since the mid-seventies. 
At first, it was suggested that secondary technical school 
graduates would have a better chance of obtaining employment than 
students with academic secondary training. Because of the country's 
drive toward industrialization, it seemed certain that the expanding 
manufacturing sector would absorb the graduates of technical schools. 
But as these jobs in the MES became scarce, the government began to 
emphasize the importance of technical training for self-employment. 
A political rationale replaced the economic ones. like their counter-
parts (the graduates of village polytechnics), the secondary technical 
school graduates were asked to accept employment in rural areas. 
In the absence of an up-to-date tracer study, it is difficult to 
examine what happens to technical school leavers. In 1975 and 1976, 
the technical education section of the Ministry of Education attempted 
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to follow up secondary technical school leavers from the previous year 
to find out what had happened to them.* The surveys have certain 
weaknesses (notably the low response rates--42% and 51% respectively--
and the short time that had elapsed since the graduates had left school), 
but they represent the most complete set of information available per-
taining to outcomes. The most useful table in each of the surveys 
is that showing the status of secondary technical school leavers after 
the Directorate of Industrial Training had completed its recruitment 
of craft apprentices. Table LIII combines that information for both 
years. 
The DIT apprenticeship program, to which the technical schools 
are supposed to be geared, took only a small proportion of school 
leavers in both years, leaving the majority to find their own ways in 
the job market. It would be wrong to conclude from Table LIII alone, 
however, that a large proportion of the technical school graduates 
are destined for chronic unemployment. Both 1974 and 1975 were years 
of recession for the Kenyan economy. This does not mean that the 
economy has rebounded since then. Moreover, school leavers spend 
several months waiting for their EACE results before deciding on 
their best job market strategy. 
A question that must be considered is what the optimal alloca-
tion of public resources among the various forms of education should be. 
Which parts of the system should be marked out for emphasis in the 
* Technical Education Section, 1974 Secondary Technical School 
Graduate FOllow-ur Study, Summary of Findings, August, 1975; and 1975 Technica Secondary School Graduates Follow-up Study, 
Summary of Findings, October, 1976. 
TABLE LIII 
SECONDARY TECHNICAL SCHOOL GRADUATES' STATUS AFTER DIT INTAKE, 1974 AND 1975 
Working & Employed Looking 
and going or for 
Student to school ~1i 1 i tary self-empl work Other Total 
1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 
Mechanical 8 10 39 38 2 10 19 39 28 2 5 100 100 
Electrical 15 14 18 16 2 8 63 57 2 4 100 100 
t1otor Vehi cl e/ 5 38 31 4 9 8 48 51 2 5 100 100 
Agr Mech 
Building 4 22 43 2 8 74 41 2 2 100 100 





future: primary? secondary? university? nonformal education? 
That this is a question of great relevance to the efficient use of 
resources and public funds is illustrated by the following contrasts 
in recurrent costs per student, contained in Table LIV. 
TABLE LIV 
ESTH1ATES OF UNIT RECURRErn COSTS OF FORr1AL EDUCATION 
1975-76 (Kt) 
Educational Level Per Year Per Graduate 
Prima ry (rural) 16 130 
Secondary aided Form IV 80 450 
Secondary tech Form IV 150 750 
Secondary aided Form VI 120 700 
University (undergrad) 1,500 5,500 
NOTE: These are costs to government, i.e., excluding 
expenditures financed by fees and other parental 
contributions. 
Cost per graduate = total from time of entry into 
primary school. 
Secondary costs are an average for day and board 
pupil s. 
Source: (KG: 15) 
As can be seen, current cost per student in a technical 
school is almost double that of the first four years of secondary 
academic school; and any route to further training which involves 
four years of technical rather than of academic secondary schooling 
costs KL300 more per graduate. The government's own estimate for 
1978-79 confirms the NCEOP's previous estimation (as shown in Table 
LIV , above). Estimated recurrent cost per student in 1978-79 
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ranged from K~18 in a primary school to Ktl,700 at the University 
of Nairbbi. The cost to the government for one year of secondary 
schooling in an aided institution amounts to nearly five times the 
expense of educating a primary school pupil, while the average cost 
per student at the University of Nairobi is nearly 100 times the 
cost per student in a primary school. The estimated recurrent cost 
per student rose in all types of institutions between 1976-77 and 
1978-79, with the University of Nairobi registering the smaller pro-
portion increase per student, while Kenyatta University College 
recorded the largest increase. An examination of these figures under-
scores the problem confronting the government in financing continued 
expansion of the educational system (see, for example, Table LV). 
Even relatively modest rises in cost per student, such as the 12.5% 
increase in per pupil expenditures in primary schools, when combined 
with large-scale growth in enrollments, require considerable increases 
in the educational budget. 
TABLE LV 




Secondary Aided School 
Primary Teacher Training College 
Harambee Institute of Technology 
Kenya Science Teacher's College 
Kenyatta University College 

















Source: (KG6, 1979: 180) 
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The village polytechnics and the technical and industrial 
training schools are important initiatives, but as conceived at 
present, they clearly reflect the unfortunate dichotomy which has 
grown between formal and nonforma1 education. As long as the formal 
educational system operates as it does with its close ties to the 
examination-selection system: attempts to gain popularity for a 
separate, nonforma1 system of education without such ties will have 
little impact. As in the colonial period, Africans consider voca-
tional education as inferior education, and they regard all government 
efforts to instill vocational education as attempts to suppress 
particular ethnic groups, thus restricting their access to formal 
employment opportunities in the modern sector. The attempt to for-
malize and ritualize technical and vocational types of education and 
training attests to the failure of the government to diversify into 
other areas of the economy where most of the potential for employment 
actually lies: small scale farming and the social infrastructure at 
the local level (GR69: 239; GR107). 
While a reassessment of the value of formal education for an 
essentially agrarian society is badly needed, advocates in favor of 
nonforma1 education have missed the point (GR3; GR37). Their argu-
ment provides policymakers with little in the way of realistic policy 
options with respect to education for rural development. The reasons 
for this are as follows: 
• The topic of "education for rural development" cannot be 
addressed without linking the various alternatives for rural education 
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to the larger issue of the kind of development which will be enhanced 
by the choice of policy. There are clear linkages between the chosen 
educational strategy and its impact on the lives and options of the 
school leavers and their communities. 
• Advocating for an expansion of vocational and technical 
education without addressing the existing disparities in educational 
resources and opportunities (which created the problem in the first 
place) seems hollow. Any nonformal educational program which leads 
to an essentially dual system will ultimately work to reinforce the 
status quo and thus will neither provide mobility for the school 
leavers nor promote their interests and the interests of the society 
at iarge. The lesson from this and other similar examples is clear: 
any system which contains dual educational institutions will be seen 
as prejudicial to the groups whose access is limited to the lower 
status level. 
GOVERN~·1mT INTERVENTION IN THE LABOR f1ARKET 
In addition to vocationalizing the school curriculum, the 
government of Kenya has, from time to time, tried to alleviate the 
unemployment problem by direct intervention in the labor market. The 
policies adopted include the establishment of wage guidelines, land 
settlement projects, road building projects, and the Africanization of 
jobs and commerce formerly held by expatriates. Many of the measures 
taken were of an emergency, short term nature, induced by the pressure 
of events. Among measures of a short term nature were the three 
Tripartite Agreements (1964, 1970, and 1979) where the government and 
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the employers undertook to increase their labor force by 15% and 
10%, respectively. A review of these agreements indicate that they 
failed to achieve what they were designed to do. 
Quantitatively, by far the greatest contribution to the relief 
of unemployment was made by the settlements projects. By the middle 
of 1968, 45,000 families had been settled under various types of 
the settlement program, which collectively provided gainful employment 
to nearly 135,000 persons. Several thousands more were employed 
on individual and corporate farms seasonally as migrant workers 
(GR69: 91). 
r~easures to step up the Africanization of commerce and industry 
was justified in part on the grounds that it would provide jobs for 
the local unemployed. The Trading and Licensing Act of 19GJ (Regula-
tion 10(1) of Immigration Regulations of 1968) was one such measure 
designed to restrict Asians from certain economic activities, thus 
allowing Africans to participate in activities \'/:1icll \'/ere [)revious1y 
off-limits to them (GR69: 93). In a similar move, the government 
ordered all companies in the country to provide full employment 
returns (Daily Nation, January 17, 1982). According to the Principal 
Immigration Officer, the purpose of requiring the returns was to 
ensure that "noncitizens holding jobs which Kenyans were capable of 
doing were rep1aced" (Daily Nation). 
Most of the other measures taken to relieve unemployment have 
been directed at the problem of school 1eavers. They are largely 
of an experimental nature and have been relatively insignificant 
quantitatively. A good example ;s the Village Polytechnic movement, 
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which was fully discussed earlier in this chapter. Its quantitative 
importance to the solution of the unemployment problem has been 
relatively insignificant. 
The best known program directed at the problem of school 1eavers 
is the National Youth Service, which was established in 1964 to pro-
vide training and employment through work on development projects. 
Since its inception, a total of 20,000 young Kenyans (18,452 men 
and 1,579 women) have undergone training under this plan. Even so, 
only one of every fifty applicants is admitted into the program. 
Until 1972, the policies adopted to stimulate wage employment 
in Kenya were of an ad hoc, short term nature, often induced by the 
pressure of events. Since the visit of the ILO Mission to Kenya in 
1972 and subsequent publication of the Basic Needs Strategies in 1977, 
a more coherent strategy for employment creation has been evolved 
for the future. The three main elements of this strategy, as indicated 
in the latest development plan, are a significant acceleration in 
the rate of growth output (almost a repeat of past policies), a com-
prehesive incomes policy, and an intensified program of integrated 
rural development. Nevertheless, past Kenyan experience with regard 
to implementation suggests that what is preached is not necessarily 
what is practiced. It remains to be seen whether such strategies will 
be implemented in the future. The following, Table LVI, sUl,lTlarizes 
the employment policies and the institutional framework undertaken to 




Agri cu lture 
Pastoralists 




SUM~IARY OF EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS 
Objectives 
Alter relative cost of labor 
Produce appropriate manpower in sufficient 
numbers 
Raise income levels 
Increase labor productivity 
Raise income levels 
Increase livestock numbers & quality 
Increase productivity 
Increase labor absorption 
Produce some of the privately consun~d 
basic needs goods 
Generate more employment 
Produce goods and services for low 
income groups 
Increase productivity 
Produce skilled workers 
Policy Instruments and Institutional Framework 
I~ages Po 1 icy 
Trade Policy 
Fiscal Policy 





Agricultural Extension Services & Training 
Rural Development Policy 
Land Policy 
Pricing & Marketing Policies 
Provision of basic needs 
Pricing and Marketing Policies 
Development of arid & semi-arid areas 
Provision of basic needs 
Rural Development Policy 
Appropriate training, e.g. the Village 
Polytechnics 
Review of the existing legislation on rural 
non-farm activities and remove or an~nd those 
sections that are unnecessarily inhibitive 
Provide credit extension services & other support 
Remove restriction on informal sector activities 
Provide basic infrastructure including the 





EMPLOyr1ENT CREATION BY TRIPARTITE AGREH1ENT 
In addition to efforts to create employment in Kenya through 
expansion of the economy with the help of foreign capital, the 
Kenyan government has attempted from time to time to produce employ-
ment artificially, but directly,through agreements with the Employers 
Federation and the Trade Unions. Since 1963, there have been three 
such agreements, one in 1964, the second in 1970, and the third in 
1978. These were recognized to be short term measures to allow time 
for long term measures to take effect. These efforts are worthy of 
specific mention, particularly the 1970 and 1979 agreements. 
The 1964 Tripartite Agreement 
The aim of the 1964 Agreement was 
to alleviate the hardships being experienced by 
the unemployed and to provide the new government 
with a breathing space in which to get its plans 
for economic development under way. 
The government undertook to expand employment by 15%, and the employ-
ers· goal was 10%. In a conciliatory move, the trade unions agreed 
to a policy of wage standstills for one year. Stewart (GR146) ex-
plains that the conjunction of events in which the 1964 Agreement 
took place was significantly different from the 1970 and 1979 Agree-
ments. In the first place, the 1964 Agreement occurred at a time 
when employment had been falling steadily and substantially: by 
83,000 or 13% between 1960 and 1963. Secondly, it occurred just a 
year after independence when it was particularly important for the 
government to reassure its own people and the capitalist world that 
it was in command of events. Stewart explained the situation 
this way: 
One of the key elements behind the 1964 Agreement was 
the determination to show people overseas, particu-
larly foreign investors, the spirit of cooperation 
that united employers, workers, and Government, and 
that was symbolized in the Tripartite Agreement. 
(GR146: 177) 
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Indeed, some of the loss in employment was due to a lack of confi-
dence by the resident foreign community and foreign private capital 
abroad, so that, insofar as the Agreement generated confidence, it 
contributed both to its own and other more significant objectives. 
The 1964 Agreement was greeted with enormous and immediate 
response; within two weeks, 205,000 workers had registered, of whom 
106,000 were classified as top priority (i.e., locally domiciled 
unemployed--ex-wage earners and the landless). Despite the claims 
that over 38,000 extra workers were absorbed under the plan, total 
employment increased by only about 18,000. Some of the extra jobs 
came from the transforming of casual into regular employment. Among 
men, the proportion of casual employment fell from 7.5% to 6% 
between 1963 and 1964 (GR146: 178). There was also a substitution 
of adult for child labor, with an absolute drop in child labor of 
3,000 for the same period. It is, therefore, difficult to tell 
whether the Agreement had any long-lasting effect on employment. 
Employment in private industry and commerce was the same in 1965 and 
1964. Vacancies registered in 1965 were more than 20% lower than in 
1963, while applications for employment were 12% higher and placements 
about 10% lower. These figures suggest that the Agreement had only a 
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temporary effect. In addition, the Agreement did not bring the indus-
trial peace that was originally envisioned. In 1964 and 1965, there 
were a total of 494 strikes involving 172,757 employees (KG8). 
The 1970 Tripartite Agreement 
The aim of the 1970 Agreement was similar to that of the 1964 
Agreement: to alleviate unemployment. The agreement contained three 
main elements: 
• the government and employers agreed to expand their employ-
ment by 10% of their regular establishment; 
• employees agreed to a twelve-month wage standstill; 
• there were to be no strikes or lockouts during the Agreement. 
Interestingly, employers were given the option, in special cases, of 
making a financial contribution to national projects instead of expand-
ing employment. 
Altogether, 290,111 people registered (46.4% of total modern 
sector employment in 1969 (see Table LVII ), this figure cannot be 
taken as a true measure of unemployment because people with jobs of 
one kind or another also registered. However, the massive response 
does give a clear indication of the enormous potential demand for 
modern sector employment. 
Table LVIII shows the ratio of registrations to employment. 
There were considerable variations. Nairobi had the lowest ratio 
where registrations formed slightly less than one third of existing 
employment. Registrations were greatest in relation to existing employ-
ment wherever employment formed a relatively small proportion of the 
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TABLE LVII 
REGISTRATION UNDER TRIPARTITE AGREE~ENT 
(DECEMBER 1970) 
Tota 1 Modern Pop of Working Age 
Registra- Sector Empl (15-60) 
Province tion * 1969 ** 1969 *** 
Nairobi 52,000 163,615 299,674 
Central 40,442 93,800 702,198 
Nyanza 39,516 45,722 962,480 
Hestern 26,775 18,761 561,647 
Coast 40,504 84,526 508,131 
R Valley 59,641 178,949 1,048,941 
Eastern 27,914 39,219 855,198 
N Eastern 4,119 2,622 123,498 
Totals 290,911 627,214 5,061,767 
* Ministry of Labor 
** Annual Enumeration of Employees, 1968-70 
*** Population Census, 1969 
Source: (GR146: 157) 
total population of working age. In both the Western and North Eastern 
Provinces, modern sector employment covers a very small proportion of 
the population of working age (3.3% and 2.1%, respectively); and these 
were the only provinces in which registrations exceeded the total 
number employed. Nyanza and Eastern Provinces, which have the next 
smallest proportion of modern sector employment in relation to popu-
lation, also showed substantially above-average ratios of registration. 
The Nairobi figure indicates a positive correlation between regis-
tration in relation to working age population and the proportion of 
the working age population employed in the modern sector. It appears 
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that the urban areas attracted a disproportionate share of registra-
tion, reflecting the belief that good jobs \'/ere more likely to be 
found in the larger cities. 
TABLE LVIII 
REGISTRATIONS AS INDICATORS OF DEMAND FOR EMPLOn~ENT 
Regis as % of Regis as % of Empl as % of 
1969 Empl Working Age Working Age 
Province (modern sector)* POE ** Poe *** 
Nai robi 31.8 17.4 54.6 
Central 43.1 5.8 13.4 
Nyanza 86.4 4.1 4.8 
Western 142.7 4.8 3.3 
Coast 47.9 8.0 16.6 
R Valley 33.3 4.9 17.1 
Eastern 71. 2 3.8 4.6 
N Eastern 137. 1 3.3 2.1 
Total s 46.4 5.8 12.4 
* r~inistry of Labor 
** Annual Enumeration of Employees, 1968-70 
*** Population Census, 1969 
Source: (GR146: 159) 
Altogether, 45,680 jobs were provided under the plan, 30,203 
by the private sector and 15,477 by the public sector. The public 
sector thus provided jobs for an additional 6.5% of its 1969 employees, 
and the private sector provided jobs for 7.8%. The percentage for 
public and private combined was 7.3%, which falls short of the tar-
geted 10%. Overall, 16% (45,600) of those registered (290,911) got 
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jobs. This low ratio is significant from the point of view of 
assessing the effect of the Agreement on aspirations: clearly, it 
raised more hopes than it satisfied. As shown in Table LIX below, 
placement was in general only a fraction of registration--less than a 
fifth in all cases except Nairobi and Eastern Province. 
Province 
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Fiyures exclude government employment in Kiambu. 
Source: (Tables LVII and 
LVIII) 
The 1979 Tripartite Agreement 
On December 12, 1978, the fifteenth anniversary of Independence, 
the President announced that a third Tripartite Agreement had been 
concluded whereby wage employment in both private and public sectors 
should be increased by 10%, effective January 1,1979. By June 30, 
1979, a total of 260,089 people had registered as unemployed (64,000, 
TABLE LX 
REGISTERED JOB SEEKERS AGAINST DECLARED VACANCIES 
(6/30/79) 
# of Declared Vacancies Excess of 
registered Public Seekers job Central Local Over 
Category Seekers Private Gov1t Gov1t Total Vacancies 
Technical 3,572 1,072 8,309 802 10,183 ( 6,611) 
Managerial 749 438 89 527 222 
Clerical 14,264 2,301 5,004 712 8,017 6,247 
Sales 3,170 462 38 500 2,670 
Services 14,046 1,254 2,727 310 4,291 9,755 
Skilled 17,981 3,409 747 1,651 5,807 12,174 
Semi ski 11 ed 16,607 3,295 3,789 644 7,748 8,859 
Genr1 Labor 108,614 15,658 5,174 2,023 22,855 85,759 
School Leaver 81,086 81,086 
Totals 260,089 27,889 27,750 6,289 59,928 200,161 
N 
Sources: (GR70: 9.2 (Table 9.1); N 01 
GR107) 
226 
or 24.6% of whom were female) which is equivalent to 28.5% of 
the formal sector of wage employment in 1978. The number registering 
was not far short of the 290,911 who responded to the 1970 exercise. 
One interesting revelation is that the number of declared 
vacancies in the professional and technical category is well in 
excess of the numbers of registered job seekers (see Table LX). 
In terms of numbers, unskilled general labor and agricultural workers 
(42%) and school leavers (31%) dominate; together they accounted for 
73% of job seekers in 1979. Altogether, a total of 71,515 (27.5%) 
of the registered seekser found jobs in the public sector, compared 
with only 16% in 1970. A total of 11,587 jobs were found in addi-
tion to the 59,928 declared vacancies at the time. In comparison 
with the 1970 Agreement, the 1979 Agreement demonstrated improved 
performance of the public sector, which provided jobs for an addi-
tional 3.8% of its 1978 employees. On the other hand, private sector 
employment decreased from 7.8% in 1970 to 7.1% in 1979. The per-
centage for public and private combined was 7.9%, which was short 
of the targeted 10% (see Table LXI). 
There is reason to believe that the 7.9% increase might have 
been exaggerated. In the first place, average annual rate of growth 
in the formal sector wage employment over the five year period 1973-
1978 was 3.7%; this trend might have continued independent of the 
Agreement. Secondly, past trends in local government recruitment 
suggest normal growth of 2%, leaving no more than 5% attributable 
to the Agreement. Given these circumstances, Livingstone (GR107) 
concluded that an upper limit of 18,274 jobs might be attributable 
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to obligations imposed under this agreement, which represents only 
2% of the total modern sector employment in 1978 and oniy 25% of 
th 72,000 jobs considered by ine r'linlstry of Labor to have been 






SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYMENT TREND: THE 1970 AND 
1979 TRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS 
% Increase 1978 Increase 
Placement in Empl Wage in Empl 
1970 1969 EmEl 6/30/79 
15,477 6.5 390,000 34,226 
30,203 7.8 521 ,600 37,289 








There are also other reasons which minimize the real employment 
contribution of these Agreements. First, a certain number of vacan-
cies occur naturally during the year through labor turnover. Data 
from a study of labor turnover showed a rate of turnover of 27% 
for the economy as a whole (GR71). The figures for agriculture 
were over 60%, while mining and construction together accounted for 
40%. Outside these industries, the rate varied between 10 and 12%. 
A rate of 10% means that 10% of the jobs in a typical firm become 
vacant during each year without any expansion in the number of em-
ployees. Thus, with such rates, the obligations under the Tripartite 
Agreement could be met by filling the vacancies which occurred during 
the year. There are also allegations that employers normally fire 
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newly hired workers after the agreement period is over. 
From the perspective of alleviating poverty and generating 
productive income-earning opportunties, the type of jobs created do 
not constitute employment in the true sense of the word. For example, 
in the 1979 Agreement, 80% of private sector and 22% of public sector 
jobs were general labor, and overall general labor was 55%. If 
general and semiskilled labor were taken together, these percentages 
would be 87%, 22%, and 62%, respectively. Only 8% of private sector 
employment is clerical, compared with 50% for the public sector, and 
25% overall. On the basis of the data presented above, it is obvious 
that the economic and employment effects of the Tripartite Agreements 
were extremely limited. The Agreements probably contributed more 
to raising expectations than to realizing them, as shown by the massive 
registrations. 
It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the problem of 
educated unemployment does not lie so much in the numbers of school 
graduates as it does in the whole philosophy of the educational 
system which mentally prepares the pupils for nonexistent high paying 
urban jobs in the context of a dependent economy. In the forseeable 
future, this will continue to be the case unless there are fundamental 
changes both inside the school syste~s and outside them. 
SU~1~1ARY 
The school leaver problem in Kenya is more complex than is 
often assumed. It is an oversimplification to consider it essentially 
as an excess of new school leavers over new job openings. The root 
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of the problem lies in the interaction of the conventional educational 
system and the wage and salary structure through the allocation of 
jobs and wages by reference primarily to educational qualifications. 
This has led to a great desire for higher education and for migration 
to major urban centers. 
As shown previously, many of the efforts to solve the unemploy-
ment problem have taken place within the school system, with occasional 
governmental intervention in the labor market, through tripartite 
agreements and the setting of wage guidelines by the Industrial 
Court. The evidence presented in this study indicates that many of 
these educational reforms solved an immediate political problem by 
offering a new outlet for the economic aspirations in the society. 
But their impact on employment creation has been limited by the 
restricted market for technical and vocational skills. The move to 
employ more school leavers through tripartite agreements among the 
government, employers union, and trade unions has also turned out 
to be temporary and to provide only limited solutions. 
What can be observed in Kenya (and in Africa in general) is that 
the initial concern and emphasis on manpower development through the 
expansion of the educational system was modified to deal with the unem-
ployment of graduates which the modern sector could not cope with. 
The aim of this policy was to inculcate values, attitudes, knowledge, 
and skills which would lead school graduates to be committed to oppor-
tunities in the rural areas. In fact, there are striking similarities 
between this policy and the colonial policy which emphasized vocational 
education for Africans. In essence, the educational system in 
2~O 
postindependent Kenya has become the pillar of neocolonialism. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this research project has been to examine the 
consequences of Kenya's educational and economic growth policies on 
the problem of urban unemployment. Central to the urban unemploy-
ment problem has been the dichotomy arising out of a rapidly growing 
number of school graduates on the one hand, and on the other, the 
limited growth in employment opportunities for this segment of the 
labor force. Thus, an attempt to trace the causes of this particular 
developmental dilemma must place the problem in the wider context of 
the economic, political, and social predicament with which Kenya is 
confronted. 
The approach to this study has basically been in the political 
economy tradition: seeking to explain the interactions among social, 
political, and economic organizations and processes. A dependency 
approach is used to analyze the structuring of the post-independence 
Kenyan society, focusing first on the historical pattern of Kenyan 
incorporation into the international economy, second on the shaping of 
Kenyan social relations as the country's links with the international 
economy changed in the context of decolonization, and third on the post-
independence structure of the Kenyan economy as shaped by dependence 
on external economies. As shown in the previous chapters, these pro-
cesses of change led to some structural economic change and much 
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institutional continuity in the post-independence period. The central 
focus of this study has been, therefore, to determine to what extent 
dependency conditions the relationship between the educational system 
and the economy and distorts manpower planning in Kenya. 
THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE IDEOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT 
To understand the causes of underdevelopment and growing unem-
ployment in Kenya, a historical perspective must be examined, particularly 
the periods of colonial and post-colonial development. 
Until the mid-1950's, the structure of the Kenyan economy, educa-
tional system, and social interaction reflected the dominant interest 
of the tiny European settler class which limited effectively the 
political activity and social mobility of the Africans. This European 
dominance was maintained by restrictive legislation developed in the 
periods between 1902 and 1952 and reflected the ideological climate of 
colonial rule which justified the permanent relegation of Africans to 
the status of laborers (GR22; GR105; GR168). 
The measures introduced to forestall or permanently prevent 
African participation in Kenya's political economy included: (a) evic-
tion of Africans from the White Highland and relocation in the Reserves; 
(b) the forcing of a large percentage of the African population to work 
in European farms; (c) the barring of Africans from lndividual owner-
ship of land; (d) the unequal distribution of tax burden; (e) the denial 
of Africans' right to grow cash crops; and (f) severe credit restrictions. 
By manipulating the legal frameworks of colonial rule, the European 
settlers in Kenya constructed a system of Apartheid capitalism for their 
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own exclusive benefit (GRl17). 
On the eve of independence, the Kenyan economy was already 
structured along lines which could effeciently sustain very different 
levels and styles of living for a tiny minority of Europeans on the 
top and the impoverished African population on the bottom. Large sec-
tors of the civil service as well as the private sector, including 
manufacturing and agriculture, were still controlled by expatriates. 
Access to both education and income was heavily racially biased and 
self-enforcing, as poor educational qualifications justified limited 
African access to higher paid jobs and low incomes increased the 
difficulties of acquiring an education. Some of these imbalances 
still persist and may even have been accentuated by the developmental 
policies of the post-independent government. 
IIREFORM" OR REVOLUTION?--THE INDEPENDENCE BARGAIN 
The sharp inequalities among the three racial groups, in partic-
ular the limited amount of land available for Africans residing in the 
Reserves and the large land holding of the Europeans, became a major 
catalyst for the Mau Mau uprising in the early 1950 1 s. The rise of 
African nationalism in this period succeeded in creating a new political 
context in which successive colonial Secretaries accepted the urgent 
need for political and economic reforms in the African areas. 
The most important reform was the 1954 Swynnerton Plan, which 
introduced some changes into African agriculture. The Plan included 
the development of extension service in the African areas, permission 
to grow cash crops, access to credit, and land consolidation and 
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registration. In other words, the racial division of labor which 
was strongly emphasized in the early colonial period ceased to be impor-
tant as the post-colonial economy took shape in the 1960's. But the 
declared aim of this process was to encourage the emergence of an Afri-
can capitalist class with interest in land, commerce, and political 
stability. This class assured the smooth transition of Kenya from 
colonialism to neocolonialism. The important question of structural 
transformation for the majority of Kenyans who had formed the most po-
tent Mau Mau base was largely forgotten. 
The 1950's and 1960's thus marked a period when the racial char-
acter of the society was dismantled, and the Africans increasingly 
participated in the economic and political affairs of Kenya. Impor-
tant though these changes were, the underlying philosophy concerning 
economic development since independence has remained unchanged. This 
philosophy stresses that growth, whether for Europeans or for Africans, 
can be sustained only by relying on skills, capital, and enterprises 
imported from the developed countries of the West. The new leadership, 
under the chairmanship of Jomo Kenyatta, was, from the outset, fully 
committed to the maintenance of the economic structure inherited from 
the colonial period. thereby insuring the continuity of colonial 
economic relations in Kenya. This is clearly evident from the Presi-
dent's speech to Parliament: 
My government has continually affirmed its determination 
to build a nation based on greater welfare for all its 
citizens. We believe that rapid economic growth is essen-
tial to our goal .••• Rapid growth requires the 
cooperation of other countries. We need external assis-
tance both to finance Government development projects and 
to provide technical advice on managing development. While 
we appreciate the benefits of this dependence, we 
propose to achieve greater control over our economic 
destiny by reducing the influence of external factors. 
(KG2: i) 
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The ideological and developmental philosophy which the new 
leadership emulated called for the maintenance of colonial development 
plar.ning and economic relationship. The new leadership viewed such 
institutional continuities with the West as necessary to its immediate 
goal of rapid economic growth resulting from increased access to foreign 
capital, skilled cadres, technology, and markets. Structural trans-
formation of a Socialist type as in the neighboring Tanzania was ruled 
out. Instead, Africanization of commerce, industry, schools, agricul-
ture, and the civil service became the hallmark of the Kenyan government 
developmental policy. 
Africanization was directed toward establishing broader African 
participation in the monetary sector. Some land was distributed among 
the peasants. Part of the White Highland and other areas of the country 
were converted into settlements where about three quarters of a million 
families are now settled. About 90% of the civil service was aiso 
Africanized by 1967, benefitting mostly those with some education. 
Through legislation and other administrative directives, non-Kenyans 
were gradually replaced in the army, in education, and in business. 
However, despite the increased access to opportunities, certain unantici-
pated problems emerged which have drastically influenced the nature of 
politics as well as the pattern of development in the country. 
The policy of Africanization was adopted at the time of indepen-
dence in order that Africans might take over positions of power and 
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privilege from the Europeans and the Asians. This new class of 
Africans has used its position of power to accumulate personal wealth. 
As a result, the pyramid of privileges which existed during the colonial 
period has simply shifted from the Europeans to a small elite group of 
Africans, and the inequalities may even have been accentuated. 
DEPENDENCE, TRANSFORMATION, AND STAGNATION 
At independence in 1963, Kenya inherited a disintegrated economic 
system, already organized for effective maintenance of different social 
strata. The economy, the educational system, the public service system, 
and agriculture were all organized around the interests of the Europeans. 
This legacy of colonial rule left the new leadership with limited op-
tions to chart the course of national development independently. To 
resolve this unsettling situation, Kenya sought to maintain close ties 
with the major Western industrial nations in order to build overseas 
markets for its products, to expand tourism, and to maintain the flow 
of private and public foreign investment into the country. The Foreign 
Investment Protection Act of 1964 (KG18) signifies the importance the 
government attaches to external economic assistance in its development 
drive. 
The detailed evidence of national economic indicators examined 
in this study, however, leads to the conclusion that Kenya's reliance 
on external economic assistance has reduced its ability to determine the 
course of national development independently. Some of the dependency 
is shown by the openness of the economy. Exports and imports form a 
high percentage of gross domestic product. The major domestic exports 
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of the country consist of plantation-grown crops such as coffee and 
tea. This is a major weakness from the point of view of achieving 
economic independence. Because of the dominant position of developed 
economies in the world market, Kenya is not in a position to bargain 
effectively for its products to attain comparative advantage. The 
events of 1975 and 1978, when coffee prices went down and the balance-
of payments problem worsened, are good reminders of Kenya's vulnerability 
in the world market. 
The "incentives" guaranteed under the 1964 Foreign Investment 
Protection Act enhance the process of decapita1ization in the form of 
repatriated profits, interest payments on loans, and royalty fees. 
This has drastically reduced the amount of resources available to Kenya 
and has contributed instead to the growing balance-of-payment difficulties. 
The policy of import-substitution has resulted in reduced employment 
opportunities, high import dependence, high industrial profits, and 
a high industrial wage for the labor elite, further aggravating the 
inequalities in income among both regions and social groups. 
Another measure of underdevelopment is the limited range of 
policy options available to the regime. Government participation in 
joint venture activities with foreign capital seems to offer relatively 
little significant constraint on foreign economic powers. Rather, a 
symbiotic relationship has developed between foreign capital and the 
State, focused around the structuring of "shared privileges" to the 
mutual advantage of the multinational sector and of the "insider" 
African bourgeoisie which dominates the Kenyan State (GR99). Such 
participation is geared toward bringing about a broader base of local 
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private control and ownership rather than toward public control of 
the means of production. The practice also institutionalizes special 
access for foreign enterprises to obtain such privileges as work per-
mits, exemption from local borrowing restrictions and import licenses, 
etc. The combined effect is to inhibit the full productive use of much 
of the country's resources and thereby negate long-term, broadly 
based growth in the economy. 
Kenya's continued reliance on imported technology, spare parts 
and other processed inputs, low world prices for coffee and tea, and 
rapidly increasing prices for manufactured goods has contributed to 
chronic trade and balance-of-payments deficits. The 1977 windfall 
coffee earnings helped matters for a short time, but the situation 
again worsened. Kenya's deficit for 1976-77 was just over Ki40 million 
and improved to Kt34 million in 1977-78. However, in 1978-79, the 
situation worsened by three times, and the deficit reached almost KtlOO 
million. Provisional figures for 1979-80 show the deficit at Kt88 million 
(The Standard. Oct 11, 1981: 5). The estimate for 1qRO-Rl is almost KL173.4 
million (KG6. lqRl). This is a massive increase--almost 333% in 5 vrs. To 
offset these deficits, Kenya has continued to borrow large sums of 
money from bilateral and multilateral agencies. Unfortunately, debt 
servicing charges for these loans has merely increased the deficits. 
As a result, Kenya has mortgaged itself to the West, and its ability to 
make truly independent decisions has been circumscribed. The removal 
of these constraints would require not just marginal changes in policy 
and trade relations, but also profound structural adjustments, both 
internally and externally. 
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CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
In the field of education, two achievements are noticeable in 
the post-independence period. First, the racial character of the school 
system which was strongly emphasized in the colonial period was abolished 
after independence. The integration of the different school systems, 
however, was not followed by fundamental changes in the structure of 
the educational system as a whole. The policy of Africanization simply 
transformed the racial structure of the colonial society into a class-
structured, post-indepencence society. 
The second significant development that took place was the rapid 
quantitative expansion of enrollments at all levels of the educational 
system. This uncontrolled expansion without any attempt to significantly 
alter the colonially-molded school system contains a number of inherent 
contradictions from the main thrust of development: regional educational 
disparities, rising costs, and educated unemployment. 
The Problem of Eguity 
The educational system in Kenya is characterized by an enromous 
disparity between rural and urban educational systems and among high-
cost and low-cost schools in the urban areas. The disparities documented 
in this study had their roots in the colonial past. Until independence, 
the extent of educational opportunity for Africans correlated closely 
with the intensity of mission activity. Those tribal groups, such as 
the Kikuyu and the Luo, whose geographical accessibility made them 
the first target of mission education, received greater educational 
inputs than those who were not. Proximity to European areas, and above 
240 
all, proximity to Nairobi yielded advantages for employment and for, 
exposure to new patterns in economic relations. After independence, 
these two groups, particularly the Kikuyu, were able to move most 
rapidly into open educational slots and into new economic opportunities 
availed to Africans. Unfortunately, this has not been the case for 
those Kenyans who live in the most underdeveloped regions of the 
North Eastern, Coast, and some parts of the Rift Valley Provinces. 
The effort to achieve a wider distribution of educational oppor-
tunities by accelerating the rate of expansion in the post-independence 
period has, in fact, accentuated the disparities inherited from the 
colonial period. The inequalities are further aggravated by differences 
in the quality of teachers, educational facilities, and other inputs 
among schools serving different geographical areas and income groups. 
Those provinces and districts that were closely integrated into the 
colonial economy had a head start in Western education; and because of 
their political and economic influence, they have consolidated their 
lead in the post-independence period. One such region is Central Prov-
ince, home of the Kikuyus, who are now in control of the political and 
economic apparatuses of the government. What clearly emerges from this 
study is that educational and other benefits in Kenya are being distribu-
ted in favor of the economically and politically advantaged districts 
and provinces in the country. 
The uneven development of educational opportunities among the 
various ethnic groups in Kenya poses something of a dilemma in civil 
service staffing: should criteria be employed for the sake of national 
harmony, or should universal achievement norms be adhered to for the 
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sake of professionalism and civil service efficiency? Because the 
political culture and development have not wholly embraced a smoothly 
managed merit and achievement system in the administrative process, 
a certain amount of tempered patronage is present. As a result, ethnic 
differences are well pronounced (GR122). Allegations of Kikuyu pre-
dominance in the Kenyan political economy are widespread. 
The constant expansion of formal education in Kenya is necessary 
to preserve the impression of widening opportunity under the leadership 
of Kenyatta and his Kikuyu-dominated cabinet. But clearly, there is 
a limit to the extent to which Kenya can absorb the cost of continuing 
at the present rate of expansion. The government spends approximately 
32% of the total national budget on education, and dire predictions 
have been made about other forms of productive investment likely to 
be hampered by a continuation of the present rate of growth in educational 
expenditure. It is clear that there will be a slowing down in this 
rate, but the danger is that such an action will make the government 
appear to be blocking the aspirations of those Kenyans who had seen 
education as their salvation. 
Recruitment 
Within the context of its strategy of development, Kenya's sys-
tem of education has continued to offer opportunity for advancement 
through a competitive examination system and to hold out to young 
people the prospect of reward through merit and hard work (GR38; GR144). 
Credential ism is well ingrained in the political culture, and the 
governmental manpower policy seems to perpetuate it. David Court 
challenges the basis of this policy and concludes: 
The preoccupation with educational qualification as 
the touchstone of educational merit may be attacked 
on the educational grounds that examination results 
are a relatively poor predictor of employment per-
formance--but it has a strong socio-economic 
rationale. In a pluralistic society characterized 
by inequalities, it provides visible evidence 
against the charge of official discrimination. Poor 
people can accept ultimate inequalities of wealth if 
they believe that they have a chance to enter the 
school system, will be judged by objective criteria 
within it, and will have an equal chance to enter 
employment outside it. 
(GR38:682) 
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As a result, the concept of equality of opportunity is invoked 
as a means of achieving the political stability necessary to preserve 
a selective school system geared to the high-level manpower require-
ments believed to be necessary for economic growth. In this respect, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the manpower requirements of partic-
ular industries have continued to dictate the content and structure of 
the educational system in Kenya. Given the likely continuation of 
disparities of educational provision by region, the credibility of a 
policy of equal opportunity depends upon the impartial use of examina-
tion criteria for allocating opportunities. 
For many students, secondary school is the single target of their 
aspirations. In fact, many repeat once or twice in Standard 7 in order 
to pass the entrance examination. This is understandable in view of 
the fact that it is from secondary school that other viable openings 
in life (e.g., teacher training, employment in commerce, recruitment 
to the Armed Forces, etc) become real possibilities. However, because 
of the limited capacity of the government to meet the growing demand 
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for education, competition for secondary school entrance has been 
intensified. Since very few students can be admitted to this level, 
the unrestrained expansion of Harambee secondary schools, which are 
below recognized standards, has occurred; these schools provide edu-
cation for 60% of the Kenyan secondary school students. The implication 
is that a high proportion of the nation's secondary school students 
are being trained in low quality schools, and their ability to compete 
in national examinations and employment is very limited. A tracer 
project by Kinyanjui (GR8B) found that 37% of Harambee secondary school 
graduates are unemployed, compared with 9% of the graduates of government 
secondary schools. Kinyanjui also found that while 63% of the pupils 
in government-aided schools obtained Division III certificates and above 
in 1969 and 1970, over 70% of Harambee school 1eavers either failed 
or obtained passes which merited only the East African Certificate of 
Education during that same period. This pattern has not changed since 
1970 (see Table XXXXII, Chapter IV). 
The expansion of the Harambee schools immediately after indepen-
dence served certain social, economic, and political objectives in the 
country. For the government, the Harambee schools served as a safety 
valve to accommodate the growing demand for education. The financial 
burden on the government was also removed. For the majority of Ken-
yans whose aspirations were raised, the Harambee schools provided an 
impression of expanded opportunities resulting from political indepen-
dence. But in actuality, Harambee school graduates have received very 
little notice. On the other hand, children from upper class backgrounds 
who study in high-cost schools, perform very well in examinations and 
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are allowed to occupy high power positions in the modern sector of 
the economy. In short, the different school systems in Kenya have 
different resultant social impacts. 
THE EDUCATION-EMPLOYMENT DILEMMA: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The unemployment among school leavers in Kenya has been viewed 
as entirely an educational problem, and all efforts to solve it have 
been directed toward improving the different components of the school 
system, such as examinations and curriculum. There are two reasons 
for the focusing of attention on the school system. First, the govern-
ment rationalized the problem to be a matter of graduates lacking 
marketable skills to enter the work force (PI3, 4, 5). This led to a 
concerted effort to establish village polytechnics and secondary 
technical schools. These educational reforms solved an immediate 
political problem by offering a new outlet for the economic aspirations 
in the society. But their impact on the employment prospects is 
severely limited by the restricted market for technical and vocational 
skills in Kenya. 
The second reason the government has continued to tinker with 
the educational system stems from the fact that education is the only 
area where the government has any direct control over policy matters. 
The distribution of educational resources and opportunties, the content 
of educational curricula and the examination, are determined by estab-
lished national governmental agencies, with some private participation 
(PI 4 ). The economic sphere, on the other hand, is beyond the con-
trol of the Kenyan government. The separation of economic decisionmaking 
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from the political arena allows external economic actors to dominate 
economic policy. So long as the benefits generated by the multinational 
sector are shared with a few elite Africans, national control of economic 
decisions is not vigorously sought. The result has been that the ef-
forts to reform the educational system in the absence of economic 
reform simply did not lead to a resolution of the unemployment problem. 
The move to employ more school leavers through tripartite agreements 
between the government, employers, and trade unions also turned out to 
be a temporary and limited solution. 
The challenge of education for rural development cannot be solved 
by good intentions. While a reassessment of the value of formal educa-
tion for an essentially agrarian society such as Kenya is badly needed, 
advocates in favor of vocational training have missed the point. 
Hanson explains the shortcomings of current rural educational strategies: 
No matter how imaginative a plan for rural education may 
by, it cannot by itself achieve its goals if there is no 
comprehensive strategy for rural development. Such a rural 
development strategy must be accorded more than verbal 
alleigance; it must be allocated the resources necessary to 
carry it out, be dedicated to ensuring that rural incomes 
approach those in urban areas, and be implemented not to 
realize social class interests but rather to improve the 
quality of life of the entire rural populace. Only such a 
comprehensive strategy and the policies and programs 
undertaken to implement it will provide the conditions un-
der which young people will be able to visualize and then 
achieve the good life on the land or in the village. 
(GR60: 80) 
The results of this study suggest that changes in the educational 
structure alone are insufficient to bring about employment in the labor 
market. Although education does effect major changes in society in the 
long run, schools are in the short run largely dependent variables of 
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the society that surrounds them. Any attempt to formalize and rit-
ualize vocational education without a significant change in the economic 
structure of Kenya will have little impact on employment. It would be 
foolish to expect of schools that which they cannot alone provide. 
Therefore, the unemployment problem is rooted in the structure of the 
Kenyan society. and particularly in the failure of the Kenyan economy 
to industrialize and modernize at a rate that absorbs the entire labor 
force, including the school leavers. The unemployment existing among 
school leavers in Kenya is, then, a reflection of the contradictions 
and limitations existing in the economic sector of the country. If 
this essentially economic problem is to be resolved, it appears that 
the solution must come about through structural adjustments of the 
entire political economy of Kenya, both internally and externally. 
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MAJOR TOWNS (PERCENTAGES) 
Average Number of Planned distr 
Earnings Industry of public 
of Wage Emp Plants investment 
(1975) t (1974 ) 1974-78 plan 
647/- 747 51 .15 
504/- 191 31.27 
503 43 4.52 
381 52 6.35 
379 23 1.55 
332 17 1.35 
382 8 1.09 
388 7 0.52 
344 14 0.94 
406 5 0.67 
377 3 0.59 
Source: (GR133) Compiled from Central Bureau 
of Statistics 
APPENDIX B 
ICDC SUBSIDIARIES AND ASSOCIATED COMPANIES 
June 30, 1979 
Wholly Owned ICDC share-
Subsidiaries holding 
Kenya Nat'l Trading 100% 
Corp (KNTC) 
Keyna Film Corp, Ltd 100% 
Kenya Nat'l Properties 100% 
Africa Diatomite Ltd 100% 
Kenya Fishing Indus 100% 
Uchumi House 100% 
Other Subsidiaries: 
Kentaco Transport Co, 
Ltd 




General Motors Kenya, 
Ltd 
Minet-ICDC, Ltd 









Kenyanization of Distribution of 
Trade and Export House 
Importation and distribution of 
cinema filem, owns & runs cinema 
Develop commercial properties 
Production of calcined and un-
calcined diatomite 
Inshore and deep sea fishing, 
cold storage 
Large grocery stores 
Long distance hauling and taxi svc 
Importation/distribution of wine 
Production of crockery, chemical 
resistant floor tiles 
Assembly of medium size trucks 
Insurance broking 
Manufacturing of sewing thread 
Associated Companies: 
Kenya Cashewnuts, Ltd 33% 
Associated Battery Manuf 20% 




ESA Book-shop, Ltd 
Kenya Fishnet, Ltd 
Brollo Kenya, Ltd 
NAS Airport Service, 
Ltd 
East Africa Clothing 
Factory 
Union Carbide, Ltd 








Pan Africa Paper Mills 




















Assembly of radio, tv, tape re-
corders 
Produce clocks, shovels, etc 
Distribution of books and lab 
equipment 
Manufacture of fishnets 
Steel sheet rolling and cutting; 
fabrication of pipes, angles 
Catering of airlines 
Manufacture of industrial uniforms 
Manufacture of dry cell batteries 
Manufacture of textiles and 
fabrics 
Manufacture of melamine wares, 
dinner sets, toilet seats 
Produces soap, detergent, fats 
Operates tourist hotels in Kenya 
Seychelles 
Produces over 45,000 tons of pulp 
and paper per year 
An investment company assisting 
small investors to share directly 
in the profits of well established 
companies in Kenya 
Clearing and forwarding agent 
Raymond Woolen Mills, 
Ltd 
Metal Box (K), Ltd 
Firestone (EA), Ltd 
Nakuru Chrone Tan-
ning, Ltd 
Sokoro Fiber Boards, 
Ltd 
Elson Plastics, Ltd 
Mount Kenya Bottlers, 
Ltd 













Kenya Textile Mills, 
Ltd 





















Woolen/worsted yarns, suiting 
fabrics 
Printed metal containers, plas-
tic pipes, domestic appliances 
Produce tires and tubes 
Tanning of goat skins 
Produce and export soft boards 
and wa 11 boa rds 
Produce rigid PCV pipes, plas-
tic bottles and containers 
Bottle soft drinks 
Bottle soft drinks 
Produce synthetic resin for 
paint, paper, and textile 
industries 
Adhesive and wide range PCV 
coated fabrics and unsupported 
films 
Vegetable dehydration for export 
Sawmilling and export timber 
Medical infusions 
Pharmaceuticals 
Manufacture of textiles 
High quality shirts, children's 
wear 
Polyester texturized filament 
yarns 
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Salt Manufacturers, 25% Produce common salt 
Ltd 
Tiger Shoe Company, 33% Manufacture of footwear 
Ltd 
CPC Industrial Prod 42% Ma i ze mi 11 i ng and animal 
feeds 
Milling Corp (K), 50% Produce maize starch/glucose 
Ltd syrup 
Development Finance 38% Development financing (93 
Company companies) 
Industrial Develop- 21% Development financing 
ment Bank 
New Additions: 
Kenya Peanuts Co, 75% 
Ltd 
Aero-chemical and 28% 
Food Company 
Chloride Exide (K), 18% 
Ltd 
Tanneries of Kenya, 47% 
Ltd 
Interfood Kenya, Ltd 20% 
Fluorspar Co (K), 53% 
Ltd 
APPENDIX C 
EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY INTERVIEW 
Date ________ _ 
Code Number 
------




1. In what ways is education being put to use in Kenya? In other 
words, in what ways does education contribute to the development 
of Kenya? 
2. How do you evaluate Kenya's primary and secondary educational 
system? If you believe some changes need to be made, what are 
tho:,e changes? 
3. Unemployment in Kenya is a major concern of government policy. 
Would you identify some of the underlying causes of urban 
unemployment? 
4. The growing numbers of the unemployed are school leavers. Would 
you identify some of the underlying causes of unemployment among 
the school leavers? 
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5. Are rising levels of educated unemployment a temporary or chronic 
phenomenon? Would you consider that provision of technical edu-
cation will increase employment opportunities for school leavers? 
6. What suggestions would you make for improving the links between 
education and the labor market? Are there any questions I should 
be asking you that are relevant to this issue? 
SECTION II 
7. What has been the influence of external economic assistance to 
Kenya's developmental efforts? Conversely, in what ways have 
Kenya's policies influenced the inflow of aid and investment 
into the country? 
8. What sort of working relations do you have with the government 
of Kenya? If there were a particular issue you wished to influ-
ence government policy on, what channels would you use to approach 
them? Would you have any informal contacts in government that you 
could use to make your influence felt? 
9. How much of the initial investment capital was raised by your firm 
(or parent company) and how much was raised through loan or credit 
from local Kenyan sources? 
10. What percentage of your machines and equipment is imported directly 
and from which countries? 
11. What oroducer materials/items (raw materials) do yoU import and 
which countries are the main suppliers? 
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12. What are the advantages and disadvantages of going into a joint 
venture activity with the government of Kenya. What assistance 
do you receive from such government parastatals as the DFCK and 
ICDC? 
13. If you have a parastatal partner, in what ways does the para-
statal help your business operations in Kenya? Be specific. 
